├│└Ż└ŞĚ╬ > IKIS └┌Ě߯ă > IKIS └┌Ě߯ă
╚Ş┐° Á┐┴Ą ┼Ű└¤Ă¸Ě│ ░ďŻ├Ăă ╝Ď░│ ┼Ű└¤Senior żĂ─źÁą╣╠ ┤Ű║¤ă¨╗ˇżĂ─źÁą╣╠ IKIS └┌Ě߯ă ┼Ű└¤─«Ě│Żă └╠╗š╚Ş ┐Č▒Ş┐° ╝Ď░│
└╠Şž ikis┼Ű└¤╗§-┴Ž96╚ú └╠ŞŮ└¤
└█╝║└¤ 2016-09-24 ┴Â╚Ş╝÷ 3861
Ă─└¤├Ě║╬ TFR74_North Korea.pdf
┴ŽŞ˝
A Sharper Choice on North Korea (CFR 2016 Report)

A Sharper Choice

on North Korea

Engaging China for a Stable Northeast Asia

 

Independent Task Force Report No. 74

Mike Mullen and

Sam Nunn, Chairs

Adam Mount, Project Director

 

Task Force Members

Victor D. Cha*

Georgetown University

Roberta Cohen

Committee for Human Rights

in North Korea

Joseph R. DeTrani

Daniel Morgan Academy

Nicholas Eberstadt*

American Enterprise Institute

Robert J. Einhorn

Brookings Institution

Bonnie S. Glaser*

Center for Strategic and

International Studies

Mary Beth Long*

Foundation for Defense

of Democracies

Catherine B. Lotrionte

Georgetown University

Evan S. Medeiros*

Eurasia Group

Adam Mount

Center for American Progress

 

Independent Task Force Report 1

Executive Summary 3

Findings 12

A Changing Region 12

A Deteriorating Position 18

Recommendations 27

A Sharper Choice 27

Conclusion 44

Additional and Dissenting Views 45

Endnotes 51

Task Force Members 61

Task Force Observers 71

Contents

 

 

Independent Task Force Report

 

Executive Summary

Since 1953, when an armistice put an end to the major military operations

of the Korean War, the Democratic Peopleí»s Republic of Korea (DPRK),

the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States Forces Korea have

been trapped in an increasingly dangerous cycle in which North Korea

provokes a militarized crisis until minor concessions settle the situation at

a new normal. The U.S.-ROK alliance has succeeded in preventing these

recurrent crises from igniting a war, but this cycle of provocation hides

perilous long-term trends. North Koreaí»s accelerating nuclear and missile

programs pose a grave and expanding threat to the territory of U.S.

allies, to U.S. personnel stationed in the region, and to the continental

United States. More generally, North Koreaí»s behavior has endangered

the emergence of a stable and prosperous Northeast Asia.

The United States and its allies have failed to meet their critical objectives:

to roll back North Koreaí»s expanding nuclear and ballistic missile

programs and prevent it from spreading nuclear and missile technology

to dangerous actors around the world. Chinaí»s reluctance to pressure

the DPRK has allowed the regime to further destabilize a region critical

to U.S. national interests, to systematically perpetrate crimes against

humanity, and to threaten the safety of U.S. allies. The countervailing

diplomatic, economic, and military steps required to deter and contain

the North Korean regime threaten to aggravate U.S. tensions with

China just as the United States and its regional partners are attempting

to encourage Chinaí»s rise to remain consistent with a peaceful, prosperous,

and just regional order.

Yet developments in the past year have altered the North Korea problem

in important ways. In March 2016, the United Nations (UN) Security

Council—ith Chinaí»s consent—nanimously passed Resolution

2270 to significantly strengthen the sanctions regime that restricts

arms transfers and limits trade with North Korea. Pyongyangí»s actions

and Beijingí»s reticence have also provided incentive for closer military

4 A Sharper Choice on North Korea

cooperation between the United States and its allies, including on missile

defense. Additionally, South Korean President Park Geun-hye has

made concerted efforts to improve the ROKí»s bilateral relations with

both China and Japan, and a new round of regional diplomacy has

improved coordination over the North Korean nuclear problem.1 Yet

North Korea is also accelerating the development of a capability to

strike the continental United States, as well as U.S. allies, with a nuclear

warhead delivered by an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).2

These developments present the U.S. president with an exigent threat

of a North Korea that can strike at the United States—ut also with new

opportunities to halt the cycle of provocation and prevent North Korea

from achieving this capability.

Chinaí»s policy toward the DPRK will critically affect the fate of the

region. If China, the United States, and U.S. allies can work together to

pressure North Korea to abandon its nuclear program and mitigate its

threatening military posture, a stable, prosperous Northeast Asia led

by China and U.S. allies can emerge; if they cannot, the DPRKí»s recklessness

will further strain the U.S.-China relationship and destabilize

a region vital to both countriesí» interests. For this reason, encouraging

a transformation of Chinaí»s policy toward North Korea should be

the next administrationí»s top priority in its relations with China. This

transformation should be accomplished through a sequence of steps

to gradually increase the pressure on China to support a cooperative

approach, which could result in the peaceful resolution of the armistice,

the elimination of nuclear capability, and the eventual reunification of

the Korean Peninsula.

In this context, the Council on Foreign Relations convened an Independent

Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward North Korea to assess the

efficacy of existing policy and offer recommendations to U.S. policymakers

on reducing the threat from North Korea for the remainder of

President Barack Obamaí»s presidency, as well as for the next administration.

The Task Force assesses that the current policy of strategic

patience will not halt the recurrent and dangerous cycle of provocation

or ensure a stable regional security order into the future. If allowed to

continue, current trends will predictably, progressively, and gravely

threaten U.S. national security interests and those of its allies.

Halting these alarming and negative trends requires a new strategy

toward North Korea and the region, one guided by a broader organizing

principle: to bring about a stable and prosperous Northeast Asia

Executive Summary 5

that U.S. allies have a hand in leading. In the long run, achieving this

vision requires that the Korean Peninsula be free of nuclear weapons

and respectful of human rights, whether by genuine transformation of

the North Korean regime or by unification. U.S. policy toward North

Korea will have to be integrated with broader U.S. strategy for maritime

Asia, or both are likely to fail.

The United States should present North Korea with a sharper choice:

seek a negotiated settlement to return to compliance with UN resolutions

on nuclear weapons or face severe and escalating costs. These

steps should be carefully and deliberately sequenced to calibrate pressure

on North Korea—o credibly signal to Pyongyang that the United

States and its allies will continually increase pressure until serious talks

resume, to ensure that the regime has an opportunity to respond to specific

pressure tactics at designated junctures, and to maximize opportunities

to work with China.

The United States should act immediately to secure its interests and

those of its allies against the grave and growing North Korean nuclear

and missile threats by expanding U.S.-ROK-Japan cooperation to

actively and strictly enforce sanctions on North Korea and by strengthening

its joint deterrence profile.

On a parallel course, the United States and its allies should offer

restructured negotiations that provide genuine incentives for North

Korea to participate in substantive talks while increasing pressure by

strictly enforcing the new sanctions in UN Security Council Resolution

2270, targeting North Korean illicit activity, and encouraging other

nations in the region—ncluding China—o join this effort. If Pyongyang

refuses this proposal, the United States should seek new multilateral

sanctions to restrict the regimeí»s funding sources and enact

additional military measures to strengthen allied deterrence of military

attacks. New nuclear tests or military attacks by North Korea should

accelerate this timetable. North Korea should not be allowed to use

talks as a way of detracting attention from bad behavior, as has been the

case in the past. Abrogation of the testing ban, new attacks, or stalled

talks should result in their termination.

The United States should also make a new approach to China. To

enlist China in the effort to bring about a stable and nonnuclear Korean

Peninsula, U.S. officials should propose a dialogue on the future of the

Korean Peninsula to demonstrate that it is in both countriesí» security

interests to find a comprehensive resolution to the problem. A unified

6 A Sharper Choice on North Korea

response to North Korea stands the greatest chance of finding a lasting

solution on the peninsula and of forging a stable and prosperous Northeast

Asia, and is by far the preferable course of action.

As long as North Korea retains a nuclear capability, the U.S.-China

relationship will be strained. To the extent that Beijing declines to cooperate

or this effort does not show results, the United States and its allies

will have no choice but to greatly accelerate efforts with Japan and South

Korea to bring about a Korean Peninsula without nuclear weapons.

Findings and Recommendations

The Task Force reached ten findings and six recommendations. These

support five broad principles for U.S. policy: promote a stable and prosperous

Northeast Asia, restructure negotiations, protect human rights,

enforce sanctions and escalate financial pressure, and strengthen deterrence

and defense.

Finding

1. In its assessment of the status of the North Korean regime, the Task

Force finds that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has ruthlessly

consolidated power and there is low probability of regime collapse

in the near future. Over time, however, North Korean citizensí»

increasing access to information from the outside world, as well as

growing internal markets, could form the basis for a gradual transformation

of the totalitarian system.

PROMOTE A STABLE AND PROSPEROUS NORTHEAST ASIA

Findings

2. The Task Force finds that although China remains North Koreaí»s

primary patron, it is increasingly willing to exert pressure to curb

the regimeí»s erratic behavior.

3. The Task Force finds that South Koreaí»s improving relations with

Japan and China present new opportunities for cooperation on

North Korea policy.

4. The Task Force finds that South Korea can be an effective representative

of shared U.S.-ROK interests, including deterrence signaling

to North Korea, coordination with China, and regional diplomacy

to promote sanctions enforcement.

Executive Summary 7

Recommendations

I. To ensure that U.S. policy remains consistent with the long-term

objective of a stable and prosperous Northeast Asia, the Task Force

recommends that the United States and its allies engage China as

soon as possible to plan for the future of the Korean Peninsula.

These talks, both trilateral and in a five-party format, should plan

for militarized crises, collapse scenarios, and the role of a unified

Korea in Northeast Asian security.

íßíß Five-party talks consisting of China, Japan, Russia, South Korea,

and the United States should begin as soon as possible to prepare a

common proposal for the next round of multilateral negotiations

and also to discuss other areas of regional concern. In this way, the

parties can accomplish the intended regional stability functions

of the Six Party Talks and help promote their resumption.

íßíß To convince China to participate, Washington and Seoul should

jointly reassure Beijing that Korean unification will not damage

its interests. These steps can include guarantees that Chinese

investments on the peninsula will remain intact or be compensated,

as well as a dialogue to de-conflict plans for border control,

refugees, port access, and military operations during collapse

scenarios. The United States and South Korea can also jointly

present conditions under which the alliance would consider revising

the number and disposition of U.S. forces on the peninsula.

Although the alliance should continue in any event, attenuation of

the threat may allow for a commensurate reduction of U.S. force

posture on the peninsula.

RESTRUCTURE NEGOTIATIONS

Finding

5. Although a negotiated agreement on complete and verifiable denuclearization

remains a preferable mechanism for resolving the

nuclear issue, the Task Force finds that negotiations are unlikely

to eliminate North Koreaí»s nuclear or missile capabilities in the

near future. Nonetheless, a new diplomatic approach could potentially

freeze North Koreaí»s nuclear and missile programs, establish

conditions for increasing pressure if North Korea rejects the proposal,

and lay the groundwork for eventual rollback of the regimeí»s

nuclear capabilities.

8 A Sharper Choice on North Korea

Recommendations

II. The Task Force recommends that the United States move quickly

to propose restructured negotiations to limit North Koreaí»s nuclear

and missile programs and work toward denuclearization and a comprehensive

peace agreement.

íßíß Under this model, the United States should undertake talks

subject to the following conditions: first, reaffirmation of the

principles of the 2005 Joint Statement, including a nonnuclear

peninsula, by all parties; second, progressive steps on the nuclear

issue at each stage in the negotiations; third, a moratorium on

tests of nuclear weapons and missiles with a range-payload capability

greater than existing Scud missiles. The United States and

the other members of the talks should avow that they will never

accept the DPRK as a nuclear state.

íßíß Early stages of the negotiations should focus on attaining a verified

freeze on the DPRKí»s nuclear capabilities. Additionally, the

parties may explore steps on conventional arms control (including

limits to the deployment of and exercises with conventional

forces), limitations on missile development, nonproliferation

of nuclear material or technology, or site-specific inspection of

North Korean nuclear facilities.

íßíß The eventual outcome of the talks is a comprehensive deal in which

North Korea, South Korea, and the United States, supported by

China, sign a peace agreement that will finally end the Korean

War and gradually normalize relations in exchange for complete

nuclear disarmament and progress on human rights.

PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS

Finding

6. The Task Force finds that the North Korean state continues to

commit grave crimes against humanity, but may be sensitive to

international pressure to live up to UN standards on human rights.

Recommendations

III. The Task Force recommends that the United States work with allies,

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the United Nations

system to escalate pressure on North Korea to respect the human

rights of its citizens.

9

íßíß As a first step, U.S. diplomats should work with global partners

to signal that they will move to suspend North Koreaí»s credentials

at the United Nations if it does not demonstrate real progress

on human rights. To avert this action, North Korea would have to

accept visits from UN human rights officials to demonstrate progress.

When it meets at the start of each General Assembly session,

the UN Credentials Committee can assess whether North Korea

has met the requirements.

íßíß U.S. policymakers should facilitate governmental and nongovernmental

efforts to allow information about the outside world to

reach the North Korean people.

íßíß The United States should support international efforts to seek

accountability for North Korean individuals and entities responsible

for crimes against humanity while expanding U.S. sanctions

against them.

ENFORCE SANCTIONS AND

ESCALATE FINANCIAL PRESSURE

Finding

7. The Task Force finds that the recent expansion of the sanctions

regime is a necessary step in exerting pressure on North Korea. However,

expanded and sustained efforts are required to ensure that they

are rigorously implemented and have the desired effects, including

measures to provide amenable states with material assistance and to

pressure those that illegally trade with or finance North Korea.

Recommendations

IV. The Task Force recommends that the United States invest in rigorous

enforcement of the sanctions regime and apply escalating pressure

on North Koreaí»s illicit activities.

íßíß The United States should act quickly to support East and Southeast

Asian states in creating a standing multilateral mechanism to

coordinate implementation of Resolution 2270. This group should

facilitate the sharing of intelligence, coordinate enforcement operations,

and distribute resources donated by partners from outside

the region, including the United States. Given its sophistication in

circumventing previous sanctions, regional states should prioritize

interdiction and inspection of North Korean shipping.

Executive Summary

10 A Sharper Choice on North Korea

íßíß Should North Korea fail to reenter negotiations, the United

States should work with its allies to prepare future financial sanctions

and other measures that target the full range of the regimeí»s

illicit activity, including steps to punish corruption, exporters of

slave labor, as well as foreign firms and banks that support these

activities, wherever they reside. The United States should allow

U.S. companies to bring legal action against sanctions violators

and facilitators.

STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE

Findings

8. The Task Force finds that North Koreaí»s development of the capability

to deliver a nuclear warhead on a long-range ballistic missile

would dramatically increase its ability to threaten the United States

and its allies.

9. The Task Force finds that although U.S.-ROK deterrence policy

may have succeeded in preventing major military attacks since 2010,

the frequency and severity of North Koreaí»s aggressive behavior

will likely increase as its nuclear and sub-conventional capabilities

continue to develop.

Recommendations

V. The Task Force recommends that the United States, South Korea,

and Japan move expeditiously to tighten collaboration and strengthen

their deterrence and defense posture.

íßíß To reduce North Koreaí»s incentives to divide the three partners

with selective military strikes, they should issue a collective security

commitment declaring that an attack by North Korea against

any one of them is an attack against all.

íßíß The United States, South Korea, and Japan should, through joint

exercises and coordinated deployment, expand allied capacity in

defensive and offensive cyber operations, antisubmarine capabilities,

missile defense, special forces, and air and naval forces to

enforce new UN sanctions.

VI. The Task Force recommends that the United States, South Korea,

and Japan build capacity to intercept all missile launches with

a range-payload capability greater than existing Scud missiles

Executive Summary 11

originating from North Korea, whether they are declared to be ballistic

missile tests or civil space launch vehicles. In the event that

Pyongyang fails to reenter negotiations, or the negotiations fail, the

three partners should be prepared to declare and then implement

this policy.

Finding

10. The Task Force finds that current trends, if allowed to continue, will

predictably, progressively, and gravely threaten U.S. national interests

and those of its allies.

This overall strategy seeks to prevent North Korea from attaining the

capability to carry out a nuclear strike on the continental United States,

but also hedges against the possibility that it does cross this threshold.

The proposed enhancements of allied deterrence and defense posture

will help ensure that the United States and its allies can meet their

national security needs in the years immediately following a successful

North Korean test of an ICBM capability. Although it does propose

increasing pressure on North Korea to return to the negotiating table,

this strategy does not seek to cause the North Korean regime to collapse,

an event that is most likely to occur as a result of the regimeí»s

continued gross economic mismanagement and cruel and inhumane

treatment of its citizens.

However, if North Korea continues to develop its nuclear and longrange

missile capabilities and achieves the capability to strike the United

States, Washington will have to work with allies to reassess overall strategy

toward the regime. That policy review would consider more assertive

diplomatic and military steps, including some that directly threaten

the regimeí»s nuclear and missile programs and, therefore, the regime

itself. At that juncture, these measures may be necessary to protect the

United States and its allies and to meet their immutable objective of a

stable, free, and nonnuclear Korean Peninsula.

12

A CHANGING REGION

Since the end of the Korean War, North Korea has perpetuated a brutal

and familiar pattern: the regime carries out a dangerous and often fatal

provocation and escalates tensions near to the point of war, following

which both sides deescalate the crisis and often agree to talks (figure 1).

In August 2015, for example, two South Korean soldiers were maimed

by land mines, resulting in a militarized standoff. The Park administration

succeeded in extracting a pro forma expression of regret, which

led to a brief detente and a reunion of families separated for decades

by the Korean War. In late 2015, the Obama administration reportedly

made a new attempt to restart negotiations with North Korea but was

rebuffed.3 Six days into the new year, North Korea conducted its fourth

nuclear test, which initiated a new round of international condemnation,

threats, and sanctions. Tensions remained high through the first

half of 2016 as North Korean leader Kim Jong-un threatened military

action in response to regular U.S.-ROK spring military exercises and

carried out an aggressive program of missile tests.4

This 2015 cycle of provocation is the latest iteration of a pattern that

has persisted for decades.5 During this time, the DPRKí»s diplomatic

and economic isolation from the rest of the world has deepened, and

only limited information about the outside world reaches North Korean

citizens, who continue to struggle with starvation, torture, internment,

and execution.

1. The Task Force finds that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has ruthlessly

consolidated power and there is low probability of regime collapse

in the near future. Over time, however, North Korean citizensí» increasing

access to information from the outside world, as well as growing internal

markets, could form the basis for a gradual transformation of the totalitarian

system.

Findings

Findings 13

DPRK reveals it has

weaponized plutonium

DPRK abandons

nonaggression

agreements

DPRK prepares for

missile tests

January 17

January 29

February 16

July 26

August 5

August 16

July–ugust

October 30

November 23

August 4

August 20

August 22

August 24

September 7

DPRK sinks Cheonan, a South

Korean warship

ROK cuts off trade with

DPRK

Two South Korean

soldiers maimed by DPRK

landmines in DMZ

DPRK and ROK exchange

artillery fire across border

DPRK says it is open to

nuclear talks

Former president Bill

Clinton negotiates

freedom of U.S.

journalists

DPRK reopens border

with South Korea for

family reunions and

tourism

DPRK calls for better

relations with ROK

DPRK and ROK reopen

communication lines, begin

to discuss talks

DPRK and ROK hold talks

DPRK and ROK hold

talks

DPRK expresses

í░egretí▒over landmine

incident, ROK ceases

broadcasts

DPRK and ROK agree

on family reunions

DPRK launches Taepodong-2

missile

DPRK leaves Six Party Talks and

restarts its nuclear program

UN Security Council passes new

sanctions

DPRK conducts second nuclear test

DPRK puts U.S. journalists on trial

April 5

April 13

April 14

May 14

May 24

March 26

May 23

Mid-August

August 21

January 2

January 12

February 8

United States and ROK

start major naval

exercises

DPRK and ROK

exchange artillery fire

DPRK shells ROK

territory Yeonpeong

Island, killing two South

Korean marines; ROK

returns fire

ROK begins loudspeaker

broadcasts, DPRK threatens

to attack them

DPRK orders forces to

wartime footing, redeploys

forces closer to the border

2010–011

2015

2009

Provocation

Crisis Intensifies

Crisis Abates

Figure 1: North Korea í»s Cycles of Provocation

14 A Sharper Choice on North Korea

During North Koreaí»s leadership transitions of 1997 and 2011, when

Kim Jong-il assumed power from his father and was then succeeded by

his son Kim Jong-un, some in the West predicted that the regime would

collapse, scattering refugees and fissile material across the region.6 In

both cases, the regime has endured and succeeded in maintaining centralized

authority in Pyongyang. Yet all is not business as usual in North

Korea; in 2016, the regime is still struggling to return to normalcy after

its new supreme leader initiated a series of gruesome purges that destabilized

the ruling elite.7 The young leader is attempting to revitalize the

stateí»s party apparatus as a way of reasserting his control over its leadership.

North Koreaí»s economy has largely failed to develop over the last

several decades. Pyongyangí»s centralized control has produced chronic

malnutrition, prevailed over a steady decline in imports and exports, and

prevented the emergence of a modern industrial or service economy.8

At the same time, some facets of daily life in North Korea have seen

gradual changes. Under Kim Jong-un, the regime has proved willing

to tolerate the emergence of unofficial markets, which, coupled with

a brisk cross-border trade with China, has allowed the North Korean

economy to grow at marginal rates of 1 to 2 percent, according to some

estimates (figure 2).9 Meanwhile, the regime has become permeable to

personal information technology, allowing ordinary citizens access to

outside information through foreign DVDs and radio broadcasts and

elites to also own USB drives and mobile phones. A recent survey of

defectors found that í░nearly half the studyí»s sample reported having

watched a foreign DVD while in North Korea.í▒10 Others note the

explosion of active mobile phones in the country, which have climbed

past two million in a population of twenty-five million (though many

of these phones cannot make international calls).11 Gradual marketization

presents opportunities and challenges for U.S. policy. On the one

hand, it could widen North Koreaí»s thin middle class and lead to gradual

evolution of the regime; on the other, the increasing complexity of its

economy affords North Korea greater ability to resist and circumvent

the international sanctions regime.

2. The Task Force finds that although China remains North Koreaí»s primary

patron, it is increasingly willing to exert pressure to curb the

regimeí»s erratic behavior.

Even as North Korea continues to revolve through its cycle of provocation

and conciliation, changes in the global context and in regional

Findings 15

politics present new opportunities to pressure the regime. Despite a

long and troubled history, China has continued to serve as a patron of

the North Korean regime—s a main trading partner and a defender

in the UN Security Council.12 Chinaí»s primary interest with respect to

North Korea is the maintenance of regional stability: Beijing worries

that collapse of the regime could open the door to millions of refugees

streaming over the Tumen River border into China and deprive Beijing

of a geographical buffer against U.S. forces in the region.

In the last year, however, China has shown signs that it is willing to

apply pressure to prevent North Koreaí»s most dangerous behavior.13

Chinese diplomats have repeatedly called for the resumption of Six

Party Talks, its commerce ministry has moved to enforce some of the

new sanctions, and Chinese state media have included pointed indications

of the partyí»s displeasure with the Kim regimeí»s intransigence.14

There are other signs as well: in the volatile days of August 2015, Chinese

social networking sites showed evidence that Chinaí»s Peopleí»s Liberation

Army deployed light armored formations to their border with

North Korea, and in December, a North Korean pop group abruptly

departed Beijing ahead of a prominent scheduled concert.15

0

250

500

750

1000

1250

1500

1750

2000

2250

2500

U.S. Dollars (millions)

China

Russia

South Korea

All Other

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2010

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Source: Nicholas Eberstadt, í░North Koreaí»s í«Epic Economic Failí» in International Perspective,í▒ Asan Institute

for Policy Studies, November 2015.

*Unit: 2013 producer-price-index-adjusted illustrative U.S. dollars (millions)

Figure 2: Proportion of North Korean Balance of Trade

by Countr y, 1994–013*

16 A Sharper Choice on North Korea

In this context, North Koreaí»s January 2016 nuclear test could be seen

as a public defiance of Chinese President Xi Jinping, just as China had

been extending its hand in an attempt to mend poor relations.16 North

Koreaí»s disruptive behavior over the past year underscores the threat

that North Korean policies pose to Chinaí»s national security interests

and its standing in the region. It is in this context that President Xi in

April 2016 told a group of foreign diplomats that his country í░will never

allow war or chaos on the peninsula,í▒ a warning that seemed to apply

to all parties.17 Further provocations will only strengthen the hand of

those in Beijing who support taking a firmer line with Pyongyang.

However, there have also been troubling trends in China-DPRK

relations. Beijingí»s strategy for sanctions and diplomatic contacts evidently

intends to maximize its leverage over Pyongyang. U.S. officials

should not be surprised if China selectively implements Resolution

2270, modulating the volume of cross-border trade in response to diplomatic

developments.18 Despite the new sanctions, there is little hard

evidence that China has placed serious limits on the volume of trade, in

part because a great deal of it can pass through loopholes in Resolution

2270 for freight that is í░exclusively for livelihood purposes.í▒19 There are

other indications that China continues to look for ways to improve ties.

Although North Korean politburo member Ri Su-Yong told Chinese

officials that North Koreaí»s policy of expanding its nuclear capabilities

is í░permanent,í▒ his invitation to Beijing to meet with President Xi was

probably meant to repair relations.20 China reportedly continues to

allow North Korean hackers to operate from its territory.21

Chinaí»s assessment of its interests in North Korea will critically influence

the fate of the Kim Jong-un regime and the efficacy of U.S. policy

toward it. U.S. officials cannot depend on China to fully implement

Resolution 2270 or to share their views. However, there are indications

that factions in China increasingly perceive North Korea as a threat to

stability rather than a requirement for it. If so, Beijing may gradually

become more willing to discipline Pyongyang for aggressive behavior

and its nuclear program. For this reason, encouraging this shift in Beijingí»s

calculus should be a primary objective of U.S. policy toward the

region. The United States and its allies should approach this by laying

out a sequence of steps, including diplomatic, political, economic, and

military, that gradually increase the pressure to resolve the major issues

with respect to the Korean Peninsula.

Findings 17

3. The Task Force finds that South Koreaí»s improving relations with

Japan and China present new opportunities for cooperation on North

Korea policy.

In the last year, Japan-ROK relations have made significant steps

toward recovery. A November 2015 summit between President Park

Geun-hye and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe succeeded in

breaking an almost four-year impasse between the two countries. This

brief meeting set the stage for a late December agreement in which

Prime Minister Abe apologized to South Korea for Japanese soldiersí»

forcing Korean women into sexual slavery during World War II, and

the Japanese government pledged to fund a foundation administered

by the Korean government that would pay reparations to survivors.22

The historic agreement has now paved the way for broader Japan-ROK

coordination on a range of issues, including defense.23 Although South

Korea and Japan, along with the United States, already cooperate on

some defense issues—ncluding the 2014 Trilateral Information Sharing

Arrangement on North Koreaí»s nuclear and missile threats, which

led to a plan to conduct joint missile defense exercises in June 2016—

there is ample room to deepen the relationship, which should be done

under any future circumstances.24

For their part, China and South Korea have jointly committed to

urgent steps to limit North Koreaí»s nuclear program.25 In September

2015, while Kim Jong-un remained ensconced in Pyongyang, President

Park attended a military parade in Beijing to commemorate the end of

World War II and met with President Xi. In a joint appearance, Park

thanked Xi for his countryí»s role in defusing the August crisis; looking

forward, both leaders warned the DPRK against new military aggression

and called for resumption of the Six Party Talks.26 Despite concerns

over U.S. missile defense assets in South Korea, China and the

ROK have maintained frequent and high-level coordination over the

North Korean nuclear issue in 2016.27

4. The Task Force finds that South Korea can be an effective representative

of shared U.S.-ROK interests, including deterrence signaling to North

Korea, coordination with China, and regional diplomacy to promote

sanctions enforcement.

China continues to see the United States as a geostrategic adversary

attempting to encircle and isolate it, and North Korea justifies

18 A Sharper Choice on North Korea

its own vast military as necessary to defend against a U.S. invasion.

As a result, U.S. involvement in the region can sometimes provoke

strongly negative responses from China and the DPRK. As South

Korea improves its relations with Japan and China, it can increasingly

play a leadership role in regional deliberations over the North Korean

issue. In direct discussions with its northern neighbor, South Korea

continues to possess a greater range of policy options than the United

States, including the economic, informational, and cultural levers it

has used to favorable effect in the recent past. Furthermore, because

South Korea is more vulnerable to a North Korean attack, threats that

come from Seoul may have greater credibility and be less inflammatory

than those from U.S. officials. The allianceí»s successful management

of the August 2015 crisis may prove a useful model: South Korea

took the lead on deterrent threats, and the Park administration was

able to patiently negotiate a favorable resolution. Last, some potentially

valuable forms of regional cooperation will be impossible if they

are seen to be imposed by states outside the region; South Korea is

well positioned to lead efforts of this kind. Direct U.S.-DPRK negotiations

may sometimes be necessary to serve allied interests, but U.S.

officials should not automatically assume that they are the best representatives

of allied policy.

A DETERIORATING POSITION

5. Although a negotiated agreement on complete and verifiable denuclearization

remains a preferable mechanism for resolving the nuclear issue,

the Task Force finds that negotiations are unlikely to eliminate North

Koreaí»s nuclear or missile capabilities in the near future. Nonetheless,

a new diplomatic approach could potentially freeze North Koreaí»s

nuclear and missile programs, establish conditions for increasing pressure

if North Korea rejects the proposal, and lay the groundwork for

eventual rollback of the regimeí»s nuclear capabilities.

As North Koreaí»s nuclear capabilities have grown, multilateral negotiations

aimed at securing a denuclearized peninsula have ground to a

halt. Since the collapse of the 1994 Agreed Framework, international

negotiators have focused their attention on the Six Party Talks, a group

that includes representatives from China, Japan, North Korea, Russia,

South Korea, and the United States. The groupí»s best chance at resuming

19

negotiations on a denuclearization agreement was announced on February

29, 2012, when North Korea agreed to suspend nuclear and missile

tests, halt the production of fissile material, and allow International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors back into the country.28 In

exchange, the United States offered security assurances and nutritional

assistance that would be delivered to malnourished women and children

in North Korea. Just over a month after this Leap Day Agreement,

North Korea carried out a failed attempt to launch a satellite into orbit,

an effort widely seen as a test of ballistic missile technology. As a result,

the agreement collapsed; the United States suspended its aid efforts and

wider talks did not take place.29

In the years since the failed agreement, the possibility of resuming

the Six Party Talks has receded further. North Korean diplomats

have reneged on previous willingness to negotiate a denuclearization

agreement and have instead begun to insist that the DPRK is a legitimate

nuclear power that will not consider restrictions to its nuclear

program.30 In June 2016, North Koreaí»s deputy nuclear envoy reportedly

told a forum in Beijing that the Six Party Talks are í░dead.í▒31 North

Korean diplomats insist that Washington and Pyongyang should

negotiate a peace agreement prior to discussion of the nuclear issue,

an approach that U.S. officials have rejected. A peace agreement has

been a top priority for the Kim Jong-un regime, which sees it as a way

of loosening the countryí»s isolation, improving its security environment,

and winning international acceptance of its nuclear, missile, and

conventional military capabilities. At the beginning of January 2016, in

response to an offer from the North Korean delegation to the United

Nations, U.S. diplomats agreed to participate in negotiations that would

formally end the Korean War, provided that denuclearization was í░part

of any such discussion.í▒32 North Korea rejected this proposal, insisting

that the two sides first negotiate a peace treaty. The United States

has also repeatedly refused to suspend U.S.-ROK military exercises in

return for a DPRK nuclear test freeze.33

The United States has offered to discuss resumption of formal negotiations

with North Korea at any time, but maintains that comprehensive

negotiations can only take place if the regime demonstrates it is

willing to work toward complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization

(CVID).34 For its part, China has repeatedly called for the

resumption of the Six Party Talks and reportedly increased pressure on

its North Korean ally to return to the negotiating table and abandon

Findings

20 A Sharper Choice on North Korea

its nuclear program. However, the United States has rejected Chinaí»s

suggestion to separate peace talks and negotiations on the nuclear issue

due to fears that North Korea could stagnate on the latter and seek to

progress solely on the former.35

Many believe that though denuclearization should remain a primary

goal of U.S. policy and the eventual objective of any negotiations, an

attempt to condition Six Party Talks on a complete freeze of the program

would, in practice, prevent resumption of talks.36 Moreover,

some observers now believe that an exclusive focus on denuclearization

impedes negotiations on other measures that could improve stability on

the peninsula and contain the spread of nuclear materials and technology.

37 However, it seems clear that recent exchanges over the agenda

of multilateral talks have uncovered new issues that could potentially

be leveraged to restart them, including the possibility of a freeze on

nuclear tests, the scale of U.S.-ROK exercises, and the possibility of an

eventual peace agreement.

6. The Task Force finds that the North Korean state continues to commit

grave crimes against humanity, but may be sensitive to international

pressure to live up to UN standards on human rights.

The growing quantity of information now escaping North Korea has

revealed the extent of the regimeí»s unconscionable crimes against

humanity and the fundamental human rights of its citizens.38 In March

2013, the UN Human Rights Council established a commission of

inquiry (COI) on human rights in North Korea. After interviewing

more than three hundred victims, witnesses, and experts, the group

reported í░systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations,í▒

which í░in many instances . . . entailed crimes against humanity.í▒39 The

commission found that North Koreaí»s atrocities include í░extermination,

murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions

and other sexual violence, persecution on political, religious, racial

and gender grounds, the forcible transfer of populations, the enforced

disappearance of persons and the inhumane act of knowingly causing

prolonged starvation.í▒40 It found that citizens are also subject to an

í░almost complete denial of the right to freedom of thought, conscience,

and religioní▒; deprivation of information; constant surveillance; economic

and gender discrimination; and deliberate geographic segregation

for the purposes of control, among other abuses.41 Using overhead

Findings 21

imagery, the commission estimated that í░between 80,000 and 120,000

[people] are currently detained in four large political prison camps.í▒42

Despite these violations, the DPRK inexplicably remains a member

of the United Nations and is party to four international human rights

treaties, as well as the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions.

43 In this regard, North Korea has enjoyed the protection of Russia

and China, which often deny the authority of international legal bodies

to investigate, sanction, and prosecute crimes against humanity. South

Korea and others have questioned why the regime is allowed to retain its

status as a member of the United Nations.44

Surprisingly, after years of ignoring UN resolutions and reports,

North Korea actively engaged with UN bodies following the issuance

of the COI findings. North Korean diplomats worked to have provisions

on crimes against humanity and accountability excised from

General Assembly resolutions. When this failed, North Korea again

turned away. In advance of a Human Rights Council meeting in September

2015, a foreign ministry spokesman claimed that the meeting

was a í░political maneuver aimed at overthrowing our regime,í▒ claiming

that the í░evidence is nothing more than lies from North Korean

defectors.í▒45 In the same period, North Korea extended an invitation

to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, but then failed to

make the visit possible.46 The foreign minister later announced that

North Korea would not cooperate with the council. This newfound

sensitivity may be tied to repeated attempts by the Kim Jong-un regime

to convince other nations to improve economic and political relations

with his country and to treat it as a responsible member of the international

community.47

7. The Task Force finds that the recent expansion of the sanctions regime

is a necessary step in exerting pressure on North Korea. However,

expanded and sustained efforts are required to ensure that they are rigorously

implemented and have the desired effects, including measures to

provide amenable states with material assistance and to pressure those

that illegally trade with or finance North Korea.

North Korea continues to resist a range of international sanctions over

its nuclear and missile programs. Previous UN Security Council resolutions

prohibited member states from buying or selling heavy weapons,

including armored vehicles and aircraft, as well as conducting financial

22 A Sharper Choice on North Korea

transactions that could assist North Korea in developing nuclear weapons

and ballistic missiles. Under these resolutions, member states are

required to inspect and seize cargo entering the DPRK if it may relate

to prohibited military activities.48 The sanctions regime, which developed

over the course of a decade in response to repeated North Korean

violations, is calibrated to restrain North Koreaí»s military advancement

by denying it access to foreign technology and financing necessary to

undertake research, development, and procurement of advanced systems.

The sanctions have largely succeeded in shrinking North Koreaí»s

customer base for conventional arms export, yet they have failed to

shift the regimeí»s calculus on its nuclear and missile programs, which

continue to develop through mostly indigenous resources.

Since 2006, North Korea has developed an extensive clandestine

network of diplomats and foreign nationals to circumvent the sanctions

regime.49 There are indications that a range of countries and

terrorist organizations continue to deal with North Korea for aircraft

maintenance (Ethiopia), ammunition (Tanzania), personnel training

(Uganda), rockets (Hamas and Hezbollah via Iran), and others.50 In

addition, there is evidence that North Korea has recently cooperated

with Iran and Syria in the development and transfer of a wide variety of

ballistic missiles, as well as nuclear technology.51

Immediately following North Koreaí»s nuclear test in January 2016,

the U.S. government moved to tighten unilateral sanctions on North

Korea. The extensive sanctions that helped keep Iran at the negotiation

table and resulted in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

convinced many that U.S. sanctions toward North Korea were comparatively

lenient.52 In response, the president issued a new Executive

Order that markedly expanded the governmentí»s authority to designate

North Korean officials for sanctions.53 Soon after, the U.S. Congress

overwhelmingly passed HR 757, the North Korea Sanctions and Policy

Enhancement Act of 2016, which imposes mandatory sanctions on

individuals and entities who aid North Korea in a variety of illicit activities,

including trade in í░significant arms or related materiel,í▒ censorship,

money laundering, cyberattacks, and—or the first time—uman

rights abuses.54 On June 1, 2016, the U.S. Department of the Treasury

designated North Korea as a primary money laundering concern under

Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act, further restricting the regimeí»s

access to the international financial system.55

Findings 23

On March 2, 2016, two months after North Korea conducted its fourth

nuclear test, the UN Security Council unanimously voted to adopt Resolution

2270, which is a significant expansion of the international sanctions

regime. The resolution expands the current prohibition on arms trade to

cover all items that would enable North Korea to improve its conventional

forces and extends lists of proliferation-sensitive items, individuals and

entities subject to asset freezes and travel bans, and prohibited luxury

goods sought by the regimeí»s elite. Furthermore, the resolution imposes

several new measures, including legally obligating UN member states to

í░inspect the cargo within or transiting through their territory, including

their airports, seaports, and free trade zones, that has originated in the

DPRK, or that is destined for the DPRK.í▒56 Additionally, member states

are prohibited from importing North Korean coal, iron, gold, rare earth

minerals, and other metals if the proceeds might benefit the regimeí»s

nuclear or missile programs. The resolution also includes major new

restrictions on diplomats, trade assistance, and financial services suspected

of aiding North Korean weapons programs.57

Resolution 2270 is an encouraging step, but its potential to affect the

North Korean regimeí»s behavior is contingent on strict implementation

of the new requirements. Cargo inspections are a significant barrier

not only to nuclear proliferation and illicit arms sales, but also to North

Koreaí»s few remaining legitimate exports. This step, combined with

financial and export restrictions, could make an appreciable dent in

North Koreaí»s economy, impeding the regimeí»s ability to fund nuclear

and missile development and continue operating its conventional

armed forces. However, these measures require significant attention

and funding to implement fully. They will tax the navies, ports, intelligence

services, diplomatic corps, and political will of a large group of

states, including critical transit hubs in Southeast Asia.

8. The Task Force finds that North Koreaí»s development of the capability

to deliver a nuclear warhead on a long-range ballistic missile would dramatically

increase its ability to threaten the United States and its allies.

After North Korea abandoned the February 2012 Leap Day Agreement,

the Obama administration adopted a policy of í░strategic patienceí▒

toward the DPRK.58 This policy has meant strengthening the U.S.-

ROK alliance against a range of military aggression while affirming a

willingness to resume negotiations with North Korea.

24 A Sharper Choice on North Korea

Yet North Koreaí»s nuclear program continues to advance steadily.59

In January 2016, North Korea claimed to have tested a hydrogen bomb,

though experts believe it was more likely a boosted fission device,

a type of weapon that increases yield by including some fusion fuel

in a normal fission explosive package. Two months later, the regime

claimed to have successfully developed a miniaturized nuclear warhead

that could be fitted to a ballistic missile.60 It then threatened to

test this warhead along with a vehicle that would allow the warhead to

survive reentry into the earthí»s atmosphere.61 Should this occur, the

test would cause North Korea to edge dangerously close to the critical

threshold in which it could credibly threaten to deliver a nuclear

weapon on a ballistic missile.62 However, the regime has yet to test a

ballistic missile that would be an effective delivery system (presumed

to be the KN-08 missile) or a reentry vehicle.63 The volatile spring

also saw two test fires of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, a

new engine configuration for an ICBM, a test of a new multiple launch

rocket artillery system (MLRS), a satellite launch, and five failed tests

of the Musudan intermediate-range missile, as well as one partial success

in June 2016 (figure 3).64

Based on publicly available information about North Korean fissile

material production, estimates suggest that North Korea could have

Total Projectiles Launched

Short-Range Ballistic

Missile

Surface-to-Air Missile

Satellite Launch Vehicle

Nuclear Test

Medium-Range

Ballistic Missile

Submarine-Launched

Ballistic Missile

Intermediate-Range

Ballistic Missile

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Figure 3: North Korean Nuclear and Missile Tests

(1998–016*)

*Current as of July 20, 2016

Findings 25

between thirteen and twenty-one nuclear weapons as of June 2016 and

still more fissile material under pessimistic assumptions about the program.

65 The five-megawatt electric (MWe) reactor at Yongbyon, which

was shut down in the mid-2000s during Six Party Talks, has resumed

operation since 2013.66 In June, observers in Seoul and Washington

detected signs that North Korea had begun another round of plutonium

reprocessing, increasing its stock available for warhead production and

expanding the DPRK arsenal by an estimated four to six weapons since

the beginning of 2015.67 Meanwhile, unclassified estimates assume that

the North Korean uranium enrichment program continues to develop,

though sources are uncertain about the existence or location of a

second enrichment facility beyond the centrifuge plant at Yongbyon,

which widens the confidence bounds of fissile material estimates.68

Alarmingly, North Korea has demonstrated a willingness to proliferate

nuclear equipment, expertise, and fissile material when it assisted

with construction of the Deir ez-Zor reactor in Syria.69 These advancements

in its nuclear and missile capabilities have brought North Korea

to a critical moment for U.S. defense planning.

9. The Task Force finds that although U.S.-ROK deterrence policy may have

succeeded in preventing major military attacks since 2010, the frequency

and severity of North Koreaí»s aggressive behavior will likely increase as

its nuclear and sub-conventional capabilities continue to develop.

As its nuclear weapons and missile programs continue to advance, North

Koreaí»s leadership may believe that it has new options to coerce and

aggress against the U.S.-ROK alliance.70 For example, Pyongyang may

presume that it can employ a nuclear weapon in a limited way to force

the U.S.-ROK alliance to back down from a militarized dispute or a limited

armed conflict.71 If the DPRK leadership thinks that it can prevail

at the nuclear level, it may also believe that the alliance will lack resolve

to respond decisively to military provocations at the sub-conventional

level, including limited attacks with indirect fire, or special forces, maritime,

or cyber operations like the November 2014 attack against Sony.

This, in turn, may lead the regime to attempt to blackmail the United

States and South Korea into conceding militarized disputes on favorable

terms.72 In some cases, such as the Sony hack, the United States

has lacked a coherent and resolute response, but new legal authority can

enable U.S. agencies to work with allies in developing a ready plan of

action for future intrusions.73

26 A Sharper Choice on North Korea

Although North Koreaí»s vast conventional forces remain a grave

threat to South Korea, the quality and readiness of these forces have

declined in recent years as the regime invests larger portions of its limited

available funding into its nuclear program.74 The Pentagon assesses

that the DPRKí»s Korean Peopleí»s Army í░retains the capability to inflict

serious damage on the ROK, despite significant resource shortfalls and

aging hardware.í▒75 Imports of heavy weapons, including mechanized

and armored vehicles, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, and modern ships

have halted as a result of UN sanctions and funding constraints. To compensate,

the regime has made significant investments in conventional

short-range surface-to-surface missiles, cyber capabilities, and its sizable

Special Operations forces (SOF). North Koreaí»s new MLRS system,

which Pyongyang has reportedly deployed widely along the demilitarized

zone (DMZ), increases its ability to threaten Seoul with artillery fires.76

These developments suggest that North Korea has developed an

increasingly sophisticated but risky operational concept, in which it

may attempt to carry out limited attacks in multiple sub-conventional

domains and potentially deter an allied response by threatening civilians

in Japan and South Korea with nuclear and conventional attacks. If so,

Pyongyang may feel increasingly empowered to launch more frequent

and more damaging provocations and to escalate the resulting crisis.

10. The Task Force finds that current trends, if allowed to continue, will predictably,

progressively, and gravely threaten U.S. national interests and

those of its allies.

With each passing year, North Korea develops its nuclear and missile

programs, continues to perpetrate its crimes against humanity, and

steadily destabilizes a region critical to U.S. national interests.77 As

North Korea advances its nuclear capabilities, each successive crisis

has greater potential for catastrophe. The regime in Pyongyang is

developing the capability to order a nuclear strike on an American city,

forcing a future U.S. president into an even more difficult position.

North Koreaí»s ability to evade sanctions increases by the year; Resolution

2270í»s expanded legal authority will do little to help if new sanctions

are not strictly enforced and adapted in future years.78 In short,

the options available to the United States are narrowing and North

Koreaí»s are expanding. Reversing these trends will require an urgent

shift in U.S. policy.

27

A SHARPER CHOICE

The Task Forceí»s finding that current trends will predictably, progressively,

and gravely threaten U.S. national interests requires a change in

U.S. policy toward North Korea. The strengthened sanctions passed in

early 2016 represent a significant shift in policy toward North Korea,

but will not be sufficient to compel the North Korean regime to abandon

its nuclear and missile programs, observe a stabilizing military

posture, and respect the human rights of its citizens. Barring a major

change on the peninsula, achieving these goals will require a broad

negotiated agreement. Cognizant that this agreement may not come

soon, the United States and its allies should prepare to deter and defend

against a hostile North Korea, including by expanding U.S.-ROK-Japan

cooperation on enhanced deterrent measures and actively enforcing

strict sanctions against North Korea.

To get North Korea back to the bargaining table, the United States

should commit itself to a sequence of steps that not only imposes escalating

costs on continued defiance, but also provides incentives for

cooperation. This sequence should be calibrated to credibly signal

to North Korea that the United States and its allies will continually

increase pressure until substantive talks resume on acceptable terms.

Collectively, these measures will sharpen North Koreaí»s choice, outlining

clear expectations and consequences that will result from defiance.

Careful sequencing maximizes opportunities to coordinate with China

and is important both to present opportunity and to demonstrate that

delay will become increasingly costly.

As an initial step, U.S. officials should propose restructured negotiations

that provide genuine incentives for Pyongyang to negotiate on a

series of expanding issues, culminating in complete and verifiable denuclearization

and a treaty that will end the Korean War. If Pyongyang

Recommendations

28 A Sharper Choice on North Korea

refuses to comply with this proposal, the United States should authorize

new military measures to deny North Korea the benefits of its

actions and to strengthen deterrence of military attacks, as well as to

impose new sanctions that more severely restrict the regimeí»s funding

sources. Escalating costs will not be easy; the United States and its allies

will likely pay a price for some of these measures, including possible

violent retribution from Pyongyang. Because it is not the policy of the

U.S. government to induce a collapse of the North Korean regime, these

policies will have to be calibrated carefully.

Chinaí»s policy toward North Korea will critically affect this effort

and the fate of Northeast Asia. A transformed China policy toward

North Korea should be the central objective of U.S. policy toward

maritime Asia and of the U.S.-China relationship, which will shape

the region well into the twenty-first century. North Koreaí»s continued

development of nuclear weapons and destabilizing military actions will

suppress efforts to improve this relationship and prevent the emergence

of a stable and prosperous regional order. For these reasons, improved

U.S.-China relations require progress on the North Korean issue.

To convince China of its shared interest with the United States in

finding a comprehensive and lasting resolution to the North Korean

problem, U.S. officials should approach China with a new proposal

that outlines a sharper choice: work with the United States and its

allies to realize a stable, just, and nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, or

the United States and its allies will be forced to take additional steps to

achieve these results over time. This should be done through carefully

sequenced and calibrated steps designed to gradually but discernibly

increase the pressure toward successful resolution of the peace treaty,

denuclearization, and peaceful and gradual reunification of the Korean

Peninsula. Although Beijing is not likely to pressure Pyongyang over

human rights, China can help get North Korea back to the negotiating

table by withdrawing material support, enforcing sanctions, and applying

diplomatic pressure. For example, Beijing could act to curtail the

trade of energy resources and consumer goods from maritime shipping

and across the Tumen River, clamp down on criminal activity in

China that raises revenue for the regime, prevent North Koreaí»s cyber

division from using Chinese networks and territory to launch attacks

around the world, and signal continued willingness to cooperate with

the United States on North Korean issues at the United Nations.

Recommendations 29

To encourage China to participate and assuage its concern that a

moderate North Korea would hasten Chinaí»s encirclement by U.S.

forces, the United States should offer a new dialogue on the future of

the peninsula that includes discussions about the future disposition of

U.S. forces. This dialogue should attempt to coordinate planning in the

event of a collapse, crisis, or major attack and convey that it is not U.S.

policy to cause a collapse of the DPRK regime. As part of these talks,

U.S. officials can also assure China that its coercive diplomatic, economic,

and military policies are exceptional responses to the unique,

rapid, and explosive threat posed by North Korea.

Simultaneously, the United States should support President Parkí»s

call for five-party talks. This format—onsisting of China, Japan,

Russia, South Korea, and the United States—llows the parties to share

information about North Korea, to plan negotiating strategy for the

next round of multilateral talks, and to discuss the future security order

of Northeast Asia.

However, for practical and unavoidable reasons, major improvement

of the U.S.-China relationship will prove impossible without progress

on North Korea. U.S. officials should demonstrate to China that

North Koreaí»s failure to respond to this new approach will require the

United States to invest more heavily in the region—ighten its alliances,

enhance its military presence, and sanction entities that assist North

Korea—ll steps that will strain the U.S.-China relationship.

To ensure that U.S. policy on North Korea supports broader national

interests, each component of this policy—ong-range planning, negotiations

strategy, support for human rights, sanctions, and deterrence

and defense—eeds to remain consistent with a vision for a stable and

prosperous Northeast Asia that U.S. allies have a role in leading. If

North Korea policy becomes detached from regional policy, both are

likely to fail.

PROMOTE A STABLE AND PROSPEROUS NORTHEAST ASIA

I. The Task Force recommends that the United States and its allies engage

China as soon as possible to plan for the future of the Korean Peninsula.

These talks, both trilateral and in a five-party format, should plan for

militarized crises, collapse scenarios, and the role of a unified Korea in

Northeast Asian security.

30 A Sharper Choice on North Korea

To ensure that its North Korea strategy is consistent with a vision for

a stable and peaceful Northeast Asia, the United States should engage

regional states in joint planning for a stable Asia.79

Collapse of the Six Party process has also meant the loss of an important

consultative mechanism for regional stability. To recover some of

these functions and establish a venue to coordinate the resumption of

multilateral negotiations to denuclearize the peninsula, President Park

in January 2016 suggested convening the five parties that negotiate with

North Korea. Five-party talks on this model could help the parties share

their assessments of Pyongyangí»s likely negotiating strategy and perhaps

draw up a proposal to convince North Korea to return to talks.80

Moreover, the talks could allow the parties to share information on and

coordinate their responses to the possibility of an infectious pandemic

in North Korea, a nuclear accident, a humanitarian crisis, and other

scenarios that could yield instability and conflict on the peninsula.81

They might also agree to coordinate in preventing the spread of nuclear

weapons to new states, which is critical to the long-term stability of

Northeast Asia because proliferation would raise the risk of conflict

both with the nuclear aspirant and with North Korea. In this way, the

parties might decrease the likelihood that operations on and around the

peninsula could result in miscalculation or contact between their forces.

Although the likelihood of a collapse of the North Korean regime

has decreased in recent years, it remains a possibility under several scenarios

and would have large and unintended consequences for North

Koreaí»s neighbors. A vast outflow of impoverished North Korean refugees;

unsecured nuclear, chemical, and biological material along with

substantial caches of conventional weaponry; and the potential need to

conduct operations against a large, armed insurgency in difficult terrain

are just some of the potential challenges of a collapse scenario. U.S. officials

report that China has repeatedly declined to discuss its planning for

these scenarios with them, raising the likelihood that U.S. and Chinese

forces could find themselves working at cross-purposes at a time of elevated

tensions with their forces in close proximity. The Task Force recommends

that U.S. policymakers continue working with China on this

issue at each stage of U.S. policy and conduct detailed planning on possible

collapse scenarios in the context of the U.S.-ROK-Japan alliance.82

The United States and South Korea can seek to break the impasse

with China over long-range planning by embedding collapse planning in

a broader dialogue about the future of the Korean Peninsula. Together,

Recommendations 31

the allies should develop a set of reassurances that unification will not

damage Chinaí»s interests. For example, South Korea can work to assure

China that its economic interests in North Korea will be respected

during unification. It can guarantee that Chinese investments will either

remain in place or be compensated by the central government. Further

dialogues can de-conflict plans for border control, management of refugees,

port access, and other issues of concern. Combined Forces Command

officials can develop briefings about their plans for operations on

the peninsula to encourage Chinese officials in the Peopleí»s Liberation

Army to share their own planning. De-conflicting U.S.-ROK-China

military planning is critical to avoiding a wider conflict in the event that

UN forces have to operate in and around North Korea and therefore to

the vital national security interests of all three countries.

The United States has and will maintain a steadfast commitment to

ensure that South Korea remains free and secure. For the foreseeable

future, a sizable U.S. presence on the peninsula is necessary to defend

South Korea against the threat from its northern neighbor, and the

United States will not abrogate its alliance commitment in any event.

However, the United States and South Korea should jointly develop

and present to China conditions under which the alliance would consider

revising the number and disposition of U.S. forces on the peninsula.

They should make clear that force levels are and will be calibrated

to the severity of the threat from North Korea; if and when the threat

abates due to reform or replacement of the DPRK regime, the alliance

will consider a commensurate adjustment to U.S. force posture on the

peninsula. U.S. military presence on the peninsula is a guarantee of the

safety, freedom, and prosperity of South Korea and is not intended

to encircle or contain China. The imperative to defend against North

Korea does not entail an inherent interest in sustaining a certain force

level on the peninsula permanently. In any event, the U.S.-ROK military

alliance should remain and retain the right to deploy U.S. forces as circumstances

require.

This proposal aims to alleviate one of the primary obstacles to the

resolution of the North Korean problem. Beijing worries that the fall of

Pyongyang would lead to a unified peninsula under U.S. control, deepening

Chinaí»s encirclement and bringing the most powerful military

in the world to its border. However, if U.S. forces on the peninsula are

indexed to the threat level, it may encourage China to see North Korea

as more of an impediment to its long-term national security interests

32 A Sharper Choice on North Korea

and less of a necessary buffer against U.S. hegemony. This could incentivize

China to restrict North Koreaí»s ability to threaten its neighbors.

In this way, U.S.-ROK policy would encourage China to take a more

assertive role, rather than, from its perspective, punish it for doing so.

Although the United States will likely remain the guarantor of South

Korean security far into the twenty-first century, initiating this discussion

may help promote a stable Northeast Asia over the long run and

redound to the benefit of South Korea and Japan, as well as China.

The importance of South Korea and Japan in a stable and prosperous

Northeast Asia cannot be overstated. Developments in North Korea

critically affect the security of both countries and their standing in the

region. For this reason, U.S. policy on North Korea needs to promote

a regional order in which both states play a leading role in safeguarding

the rule of law, human rights, and strategic stability in a region critical to

U.S. interests. By jointly conducting military operations to deter North

Korea, planning for major scenarios on the peninsula, and engaging

in coordinated diplomacy with China on the North Korea issue, the

United States, South Korea, and Japan can promote a brighter future

for the region than they could in isolation.

RESTRUCTURE NEGOTIATIONS

II. The Task Force recommends that the United States move quickly to propose

restructured negotiations to limit North Koreaí»s nuclear and missile

programs and work toward denuclearization and a comprehensive

peace agreement.

Although a negotiated agreement to free the peninsula of nuclear weapons

will remain the primary objective of U.S. policy, the Task Force finds

that this goal has become improbable in the near future. Both to pursue

this goal and to promote national security interests, the Task Force recommends

that the United States propose restructuring negotiations

with North Korea on the expectation that intermediate agreements on

other issues can demonstrate the benefits of cooperation and establish

an incentive to achieve a wider agreement further down the line.

The first step in this model will be to find agreement on the enabling

conditions for talks. The next administration should review U.S. policy

on negotiations and communicate clear preconditions for the resumption

of formal multilateral negotiations. It should formally dispel the

mistaken perception that it places preconditions on informal talks with

Recommendations 33

North Korea and that it demands unilateral steps prior to the start of

formal negotiations. Instead, the United States should insist on three

conditions for resumption of talks. First, all parties should agree to reaffirm

the principles of the Joint Statement of 2005, including its commitment

to a nonnuclear peninsula and a stable and lawful regional order.83

Second, negotiations need to make consistent progress on the nuclear

issue at each stage in the negotiations to ensure that North Korea

cannot benefit by stalling on denuclearization. Third, because it will be

impossible to negotiate while the DPRK carries out nuclear and longrange

missile tests, the United States should insist on a moratorium on

all tests of nuclear explosives and missiles with a range-payload capability

greater than existing Scud missiles, whether declared to be ballistic

missiles or civil space launch vehicles. Because North Korea still has not

tested a long-range ballistic missile with a reentry vehicle, a test moratorium

will constitute a meaningful restraint on the program while

negotiators seek a verified freeze on its other aspects. In exchange and if

requested by Pyongyang, the U.S. and South Korean governments may,

for as long as negotiations are progressing, consent to supply nutritional

assistance to the North Korean civilian population, provided that

NGOs can certify that these supplies are not being diverted to the military;

U.S. and South Korean officials may also consider modifications

to the scale and content of U.S.-ROK joint military exercises.

Initial negotiations should focus on attaining a verified freeze in

North Koreaí»s nuclear capabilities. A complete verified freeze of the

nuclear program would require six restrictions: no nuclear tests; no

missile launches, whether declared to be ballistic missiles or civil space

launch vehicles with a range-payload capability greater than the DPRKí»s

existing Scud missiles; no plutonium reprocessing; no uranium enrichment;

suspension of reactor operations at Yongbyon; and readmission

of the IAEA to North Korea to monitor the nuclear elements of the

freeze, both at declared facilities and with the approval of the five parties

(China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, United States). Additionally,

the parties can explore conventional arms control measures; limitations

on missile development; steps to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons,

technology, and materials beyond North Koreaí»s borders; early

access for IAEA inspectors to specific North Korean nuclear facilities

that Pyongyang has declared to be for civilian purposes; and measures

to promote the welfare of North Koreaí»s citizens, starting with allowing

the International Committee of the Red Cross to access political prison

34 A Sharper Choice on North Korea

camps. In the initial phase, U.S., South Korean, and North Korean

negotiators can also begin to discuss the terms of a peace treaty that

will end the Korean War.

The eventual objective of these staged negotiations is to achieve North

Koreaí»s complete denuclearization and reentry into the Nuclear Nonproliferation

Treaty. In exchange, the regional powers would commit to sign

a comprehensive peace treaty, normalize relations, lift the appropriate

sanctions, and allow North Koreaí»s integration into the global financial

system. Full normalization of relations and sanctions relief will require

major progress on North Koreaí»s human rights position, including the

release of all political prisoners and their families, a full accounting and

voluntary repatriation of all persons abducted from foreign countries,

nondiscriminatory food aid distribution monitored by aid workers who

are guaranteed full nationwide access, freedom to leave the country

and return without punishment, and ending the information blockade

imposed on North Koreaí»s citizens by the government.84

The main negotiations can take place under the Six Party Talks

format, but certain issues can be resolved in smaller talks among North

and South Korea, the United States, and China. This format, in which

Korean representatives could be the primary negotiators, can be used

to negotiate preconditions prior to the start of talks as well as the terms

of an armistice that will be signed at the end of the process. Limiting

the membership of the negotiations on difficult issues may encourage

China to apply pressure on North Korea. The Task Force recommends

that U.S. negotiators remain open to other formats for talks that could

potentially be productive.

PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS

III. The Task Force recommends that the United States work with allies,

NGOs, and the United Nations system to escalate pressure on North

Korea to respect the human rights of its citizens.

Support for human rights is an integral component of U.S. foreign

policy, which holds that human rights must be inviolate and that support

for them is neither a bargaining chip nor a weapon. The United

States should not consent to normalize relations so long as North

Korea continues to perpetrate crimes against humanity. Exceptional

steps are necessary to reverse North Koreaí»s egregious, consistent, and

willful noncompliance with UN human rights resolutions and preserve

the integrity of the United Nations.

Recommendations 35

To this end, the Task Force recommends that as part of the initial

announcement of the new strategy, the United States should work

with its allies and partners to jointly signal their intention to execute a

campaign of continually escalating pressure on North Korea on human

rights issues as long as the DPRK remains noncompliant with UN

human rights resolutions.85 They should make it known that the DPRKí»s

continued defiance of UN human rights resolutions puts into question

the regimeí»s standing in that organization. In addition to designating

North Korean officials for sanctions under U.S. law, the United States

should work with its allies to present North Korea with a choice: make

rapid improvements to its human rights record or these countries will

support suspension of North Koreaí»s credentials at the United Nations.

Suspension of a stateí»s credentials is not the same as expulsion from

the organization: without credentials, a state may officially retain its

membership, but it is prohibited from attending or participating in

UN General Assembly proceedings. There is precedent for this step. In

1974, the General Assembly passed Resolution 3206, which endorsed

the recommendation of the Credentials Committee to suspend South

Africaí»s participation over its continued disregard for Security Council

resolutions condemning apartheid.86 The General Assembly also called

on the Security Council to consider full expulsion of South Africa from

the organization, but the measure was vetoed by France, the United

Kingdom, and the United States.87 South Africa retained this status

until 1994, when the countryí»s credentials were restored following its

transition to democracy.88

In the last two years, the commission of inquiry and increasing information

from within the regime have helped raise international awareness

about North Korean crimes against humanity. In 2014 and again

in 2015, the General Assembly recommended that the Security Council

refer the case of North Korea to the International Criminal Court

for prosecution of crimes against humanity, which diplomats expect

would be blocked by Russia and China.89 This flood of international

concern may permit action in the United Nations. As a first step, the

United States should work with its global allies to signal to North Korea

that they will support suspension of its credentials without rapid progress

on human rights. To prevent this suspension, North Korea will be

required to, within two years, receive a visit from the UN High Commissioner

for Human Rights and a mission from the UN Special Rapporteur

on Human Rights in the DPRK, and show substantial progress

in implementing its human rights obligations under UN treaties. These

36 A Sharper Choice on North Korea

steps may be agreed through the UN system or as part of multilateral

negotiations with China, South Korea, and the United States.

Each year, when the UN Credentials Committee meets at the start of

each General Assembly session, it can consult with UN human rights

officials to determine whether North Korea has met the above conditions

and should have its credentials reinstated.

Second, the United States should support enhanced information

operations carried out by South Korea and nongovernmental organizations,

which aim to inform North Koreaí»s population about the outside

world and, in so doing, could lay the groundwork for voluntary evolution

of the state. To do this, the U.S. Congress should appropriate funding

to support expanded Voice of America programming and NGOs

that are working to penetrate an increasingly porous censorship regime.

Priorities for funding include increased power for medium-wave radio

transmissions, more radio broadcasts, and cultivation of North Korean

defectors to serve as journalists for these stations. These broadcasts

should not focus on antigovernment political propaganda, but rather

should consist mainly of business and economic information, agricultural

instruction, weather forecasts, and information about daily life

outside of North Korea, including housing, food, and medicines, as well

as Korean pop music, talk radio, and gossip.

In addition, support should be provided to NGOs that require additional

funding for their efforts to deliver information to North Koreans

on USB drives. These USB drives can contain diverse sources from agriculture

and economics textbooks to novels and literature that convey

a portrait of everyday life free from the Kim regime. Over time, these

efforts could gradually undermine the regimeí»s monopoly on information,

strengthen emerging market forces, and cultivate the foundation

for a different system of government for the people of North Korea in

the future.

Last, the United States should materially support and join efforts to

gather information about the regimeí»s human rights violations to prepare

for the day when its worst offenders are brought to justice. In recent

years, this issue has received increased attention.90 In 2015, the United

Nations opened an office in Seoul to document human rights abuses

í░with a view to accountability.í▒91 South Koreaí»s new human rights act

provides for the establishment of a documentation center, which will

compile testimony and data in addition to that already uncovered by

the COI and various NGOs.92 In March 2016, the UN Human Rights

Recommendations 37

Council established a panel of experts í░to focus on issues of accountability.í▒

93 These efforts to prepare for accountability, including by continuing

to apply sanctions to North Korean officials who perpetrate

human rights abuses, could have a powerful deterrent effect today and

may also help undermine the regimeí»s internal legitimacy. The United

States should provide information to these organizations, along with

material, technical, and rhetorical support when possible.

ENFORCE SANCTIONS AND

eSCALATE FINANCIAL PRESSURE

IV. The Task Force recommends that the United States invest in rigorous

enforcement of the sanctions regime and apply escalating pressure on

North Koreaí»s illicit activities.

Severe economic pressure on the North Korean regime is a necessary

way to compel compliance with its nuclear, military, and human rights

obligations to the United Nations and a central instrument of U.S. and

international coercive power. However, sanctions alone are unlikely

to be enough. The Task Force recommends that the next administration

work with allies, countries in the region, and the U.S. Congress to

mount a more assertive and consistent campaign to sanction the full

range of North Koreaí»s illicit behavior. The sanctions authority granted

by Resolution 2270 is a good start, but the resolutioní»s effective impact

will depend on the extent to which the sanctions are enforced by states

in the region. Strictly enforcing Resolution 2270, including the mandate

to inspect all cargo entering or exiting North Korea, can not only apply

economic pressure to the regime, but also help limit corruption and

criminal activity that emanates from the regime and prevent the spread

of nuclear material and technology. New provocations should prompt

the Security Council to close loopholes in Resolution 2270, especially

the unenforceable provision that allows trade for the í░livelihood purposesí▒

but not for military purposes.94 Implementation of multilateral

sanctions should be accompanied by new rounds of U.S. financial sanctions

to apply escalating pressure to the regimeí»s source of funding.

To ensure that regional states have the resources necessary to

enforce the new sanctions, the United States should act quickly to assist

its partners in setting up a standing multilateral mechanism to coordinate

implementation of UN sanctions, including inspection of North

Korean cargo and, if necessary, interdiction at sea of ships suspected of

38 A Sharper Choice on North Korea

transporting it, beginning with the most suspect shipments. This group

should be specifically dedicated to the enforcement of the DPRK sanctions

and would ideally include all states in the region, including China.

For this mechanism to succeed, it must be perceived as a regional initiative,

not as an extension of UN or U.S. authority. For this reason, interested

outside parties like the United States and the European Union

could provide assistance to the effort in an advisory capacity. China

should be encouraged to take a prominent and constructive role in this

process, commensurate with its claims to regional responsibility. If it

demurs, the participating states can coordinate sanctions enforcement

and maritime interdiction on their own, including, if necessary, in the

Yellow Sea. Enforcement of the shipping restrictions may require the

United States to expand its naval capacity assigned to the mission and

the region.

The process can serve as a clearinghouse for resources necessary

for sanctions enforcement, including shipping information and intelligence,

as well as financial, material, legal, technical, and military assistance

to states that request it.95 This process could also promote strict

sanctions enforcement by serving as a mechanism to discipline reticent

or distracted countries that might otherwise allow implementation to

slip.96 The new organization should seek to reform openly noncompliant

states, such as Vietnam and Myanmar; motivate states with mixed

records, such as Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and

Taiwan; and reinforce states such as Singapore and the Philippines that

are actively working to meet their obligations. This new mechanism will

build on the experience of existing multilateral instruments such as the

Proliferation Security Initiative to specifically enforce the multifaceted

UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea.97

To ensure that the United States and its allies can continue to escalate

economic pressure on the regime, they should initiate a consistent

campaign to sanction and restrict the full range of North Koreaí»s criminal

activities. Financial crimes, money laundering, corruption, human

rights abuses, and malicious cyber activity have all received too little

attention from the international community and should be subject to

strict sanctions, financial pressure, and law enforcement. Efforts to

use financial measures such as Section 311 of the Patriot Act, as against

Banco Delta Asia in 2005, have been important but inconsistent. The

U.S. Treasuryí»s recent designation of North Korea as a í░primary money

laundering concerní▒ under Section 311 is a good starting point, as is

39

its June 2016 designation of senior North Korean officials for human

rights abuses, including Kim Jong-un.98 As long as North Korea continues

to refuse negotiations or conduct destabilizing provocations, the

United States should continue to designate new individuals and entities

for criminal activity as new information becomes available. The

U.S. government should also work with foreign partners to levy parallel

sanctions against these entities; a consistent and expanding multilateral

sanctions regime would be a powerful complement to efforts to

improve North Koreaí»s human rights and criminal practices through

the United Nations.99 In the United States, the next steps should be to

establish private rights of action so that private companies can bring

legal suits against the countries and companies doing business with

North Korea, and to work with China to identify, designate, and sanction

entities that conduct corrupt and criminal activities under Chinese

and international law.100

This is an area where the interests of the United States, its allies, and

China substantially overlap. North Korea is a source of corruption and

criminal activity for the entire region. In May 2016, reports emerged of

North Korean cyberattacks on Asian banks that made off with more than

$100 million.101 All states have an interest in restricting this kind of illegal

activity within their borders. The exchange of information through a

regional sanctions enforcement mechanism should provide tools for law

enforcement to crack down on Pyongyangí»s criminal exports.

Last, the United States should signal to other governments that it

will actively designate and sanction foreign companies and individuals

that facilitate North Koreaí»s illegal activities, which foster crime and

corruption across the region.

STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE

V. The Task Force recommends that the United States, South Korea, and

Japan move expeditiously to tighten collaboration and strengthen their

deterrence and defense posture.

Currently, the United States maintains strong alliances with both Japan

and South Korea. The Obama administration has pressed both allies to

participate in closer trilateral cooperation, which in 2010 led to a trilateral

statement that í░the DPRKí»s provocative and belligerent behavior

threatens all three countries and will be met with solidarity from all three

countries.í▒102 In light of North Koreaí»s increasing capability to threaten

Recommendations

40 A Sharper Choice on North Korea

the three partners in diverse ways, the attendant benefits of coordination,

and improved Japan-ROK relations, the Task Force recommends

expanding this declaration.

Specifically, the United States, South Korea, and Japan should issue

a collective security commitment declaring that a North Korean attack

against any one of these states is an attack against all.103 The three countries

should aspire to formalize this relationship as a trilateral alliance

vis-a-vis North Korea as fast as political conditions allow. Both steps will

help facilitate cooperation on issues of joint concern and make it clear that

North Korea cannot hope to prevent a collective reaction to attacks.104

For example, strategists have long worried that Pyongyang may attempt

to cover a limited attack by striking U.S. forces on Okinawa. This strike

could create tensions between South Korea and Japan that would inhibit

a unified response and allow the regime to deescalate the crisis. A resolute

collective security declaration would disabuse Pyongyang of this notion.

The three partners should immediately expand their defense cooperation

to explore an expanded intelligence-sharing arrangement, joint maritime

operations (including antisubmarine operations and counter-SOF missions),

and regular joint exercises. The three partners should also coordinate

to build capacity of naval operations to interdict and inspect North

Korean cargo and then to implement the mandate. In addition, they

should pursue a regional joint missile defense architecture to improve

tracking and interception of North Korean missiles (though it need not

be integrated with the entire U.S. National Missile Defense system). The

collective security declaration should also extend to a cyberattack against

critical infrastructure in all three countries, as the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) has done.105 Including this provision in the collective

security agreement would help the countries jointly assess threats

and provide for a commonality of doctrine for cyber operations, thereby

increasing the capability and credibility of a joint response. In issuing

their declaration, leaders of the three countries should be clear that the

declaration and increased trilateral cooperation is specifically directed at

the North Korean threat.

Coincident with their collective security declaration, the three partners

should clarify and declare their deterrent posture toward North

Korea. To deter Pyongyang from initiating dangerous new provocation

cycles, U.S., South Korean, and Japanese officials should jointly

signal that future aggression will be met with an active and proportionate

response, which may include strikes against military targets inside

Recommendations 41

North Korea. Although the U.S.-ROK alliance has never ruled out this

option, it has also never carried out such an operation. Halting the cycle

of provocation will require holding at risk North Korean units and positions

that believe they can strike at South Korean territory with impunity.

The joint statement should also reiterate that the DPRK has not

attained and will never be permitted to attain a condition of mutual

assured destruction with the three partners. Allied officials should

declare that although they do not intend to topple the North Korean

regime, widespread civilian casualties from invasion, indirect fire, or

the use of nuclear weapons could make this unavoidable.

While trilateral cooperation is under way, the United States and

South Korea should continue to strengthen their deterrence posture

toward North Korea to dissuade it from even more destabilizing behavior

in three ways.

First, although the United States will continue to extend nuclear

deterrence to South Korea, Seoul should not rely on this commitment to

deter aggression at low levels of conflict, nor on overflights by nuclearcapable

aircraft to reliably affect the regimeí»s behavior. The U.S.-ROK

alliance should maintain the capabilities necessary to conduct robust

counter-SOF and antisubmarine operations at high readiness, as well as

an enhanced network of sensors and intelligence assets to track North

Korean assets in the littorals and airspace around North Korea and deep

within the country itself. The Task Force strongly supports the deployment

of Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to supplement

existing ballistic missile defense capabilities, and recommends

that both countries be prepared to assist each other in mitigating the

negative effects of potential reprisals for the deployment.

Second, the U.S. and South Korean armed forces should jointly cultivate

resilience to cyberattacks, prepare to operate in an environment

of degraded information awareness, and prepare to assist South Korean

civilians who may be affected by these attacks.106 Civilian officials should

build on existing efforts to jointly develop plans to respond to different

types of cyberattacks, readying differential responses to attacks against

private industry, public utilities, government, and armed forces.107

Third, although it is not their intention to employ these capabilities

preventively, the United States, in close coordination with its allies, is

obliged to develop the ability to forcibly secure stocks of North Korean

fissile material in the event of a war or regime collapse and to strike at

the North Korean leadership in an emergency.108

42 A Sharper Choice on North Korea

VI. The Task Force recommends that the United States, South Korea, and

Japan build capacity to intercept all missile launches with a rangepayload

capability greater than existing Scud missiles originating from

North Korea, whether they are declared to be ballistic missile tests or

civil space launch vehicles. In the event that Pyongyang fails to reenter

negotiations, or the negotiations fail, the three partners should be prepared

to declare and then implement this policy.

To delay or prevent North Korea from achieving confidence in its ability

to strike the U.S. homeland, the United States should publicly initiate

trilateral cooperation to prepare to intercept all missile launches with a

range-payload capability greater than existing Scuds, whether the launch

is declared to be a ballistic missile test or a civil space launch vehicle.109

The United States and its allies should justify this action as a way of

enforcing UN Security Council Resolution 1718 and subsequent resolutions,

which North Korea has repeatedly violated by carrying out illegal

tests of ballistic missiles.110 Without a protracted and successful program

to test the KN-08 or another ICBM and its associated reentry vehicle,

Pyongyang will lack the capability to deliver a nuclear warhead with any

confidence. Preventing this threshold from being crossed would both

strengthen the hand of the U.S.-ROK-Japan partnership in controlling

escalation on the peninsula and forestall a threat to the U.S. homeland. In

announcing the policy, the partners should clearly specify that it applies

only to North Koreaí»s illegal missile program and should be accompanied

by the described measures to deter and defend against any and all

violent reprisals. If North Korea fails to accept the new offer for negotiations

and abide by its associated preconditions, the three partners should

implement this policy. The United States and its allies should explicitly

reserve the right in any case to intercept any projectile that they consider

an immediate kinetic threat to allied personnel, territory, or civilians.

Collectively, these recommendations aim to delay and deny North

Koreaí»s ability to carry out a nuclear strike on the continental United

States with confidence and hedge against the possibility that it does

attain this capability. The United States and its allies need to prepare

to meet their national security requirements under any eventuality,

including continued expansion of the North Korean missile and nuclear

arsenal, to deter and defend against aggression at the nuclear level and

at lower levels of escalation.

Recommendations 43

It is not currently the policy of the U.S. government to induce a collapse

of the North Korean regime. However, if North Koreaí»s nuclear

capabilities continue to expand and it continues to refuse to negotiate,

the U.S. administration will have to work with allies to reassess overall

strategy toward the regime and consider more assertive military and

political actions, including those that directly threaten the existence of

the regime and its nuclear and missile capabilities.

44

A comprehensive agreement that creates a nuclear-free and morally tolerable

North Korea has grown less likely each year. Yet a narrow margin

remains. To achieve an agreement will require protracted, costly, and

risky efforts to sharpen the choice North Korea faces—o offer greater

inducements for cooperation and impose heightened costs for continued

defiance. If the United States and its allies can convince China that

cooperation over North Korea is in its best interests, it may be possible

that China will help enforce new UN sanctions, compel North Korea

back to the negotiating table, force it to remain until an acceptable solution

is found, and then ensure that the terms are implemented. However,

the United States cannot trust that this outcome will come to pass

or wait for the situation to evolve of its own accord, particularly as the

nuclear threat grows; it needs to be ready to defend its national security

interests and those of its allies in the face of continued Chinese reticence

and North Korean intransigence.

Either route requires that the United States prioritize North Korea

as a critical national security issue. For too long, the difficulty of the

problem has inhibited creative thinking and concerted attention, and

the United States is currently paying a steep price measured in the safety

of the U.S. homeland, the security of U.S. allies, and an aggravated

relationship with a rising China. Prioritizing North Korea may mean

incurring costs to other U.S. objectives, but the rising threat to regional

stability and U.S. national security means that it cannot be overlooked.

The impending nuclear threshold where the DPRK can strike the U.S.

homeland with nuclear weapons, and evolving regional dynamics, may

mean that the next U.S. president might have the last chance to end the

North Korean threat and secure a stable, prosperous maritime Asia.

Conclusion

45

Of the many CFR Task Force reports on North Korea released over the

past two decades, this one in my view is the most reasoned and realistic,

and I am happy to endorse its general thrust.

I would also like to make four additional points:

1. Although there is obvious appeal to achieving a negotiated settlement

with the DPRK to the many threats it poses to the United

States, its allies, and the world, U.S. policymakers should recognize

how exceedingly unlikely such an outcome is today—r ever can

be, given the nature of the real, existing North Korean government.

U.S. objectives are regarded in Pyongyang as existential threats to

survival—nd governments simply do not trade away their survival.

It therefore verges on magical thinking to imagine that the

United Statesí» record of near-total failure in nuclear diplomacy with

North Korea over the past generation can somehow be dramatically

changed absent a change of negotiating partners in the DPRK.

2. The notion that we might achieve dramatically better negotiation

outcomes with North Korea through í░carefully and deliberately

sequenced [steps] to calibrate pressureí▒ and í░credibly signal[ling]í▒

is—et us speak plainly— fanciful conceit. Our North Korean

interlocutors did not take that game-theory course, and they do

not respond like oneí»s partners from that graduate school seminar

on bargaining. Instead of straining to devise a perfectly calibrated

menu of incentives and disincentives for bringing North Korea

í░back to the table,í▒ the United States should instead be concentrating

on something tangible and manifestly in its interest: namely,

threat reduction. Reducing North Koreaí»s capacity to harm the

United States and its allies does not require North Korean assent—

Washington can do this unilaterally, irrespective of Pyongyangí»s

inclination to parley with us. This indeed should be our top priority

in North Korea policy.

Additional and Dissenting Views

46 A Sharper Choice on North Korea

3. U.S. policymakers should be very careful in discussing any possible

í░peace treatyí▒ with North Korea. Do we actually understand why

such a treaty has been a top priority of North Korean policy for over

half a century? Pyongyang holds that the U.S.-ROK military alliance

must end, and U.S. troops in the peninsula must leave, once such a

document is signed. North Korea is not the only state longing for a

reduced U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia. Russia is another.

So is China. Incidentally, Americans ought to think long and hard

about the potential unintended consequences of confiding to Beijing

that í░attenuation of the [North Korean] threat may allow for a

commensurate reduction of U.S. force posture on the peninsula.í▒

We might be better served instead by explaining to Beijing that our

alliance with the ROK is intended to deal with threats in the post-

DPRK world, too.

4. Finally, let us be clear about the essence of the North Korean nuclear

threat: that threat is the North Korean government itself. So long as

the real existing North Korean government holds power, that threat

will continue. It is therefore incumbent upon the United States and

its allies to plan for a successful Korean reunification that does not

include the DPRK.

Nicholas Eberstadt

joined by Mary Beth Long and Walter L. Sharp

We agree with the reportí»s general recommendation that the United

States and South Korea should make efforts to reassure China that

Korean unification will not damage Chinaí»s interests. However, we take

issue with some of the specific proposals in this regard. Specifically, we

do not believe that it is necessary and is instead potentially harmful to

U.S. and alliance interests to í░jointly develop and present to China conditions

under which the alliance would consider revising the number

and disposition of U.S. forces on the peninsula.í▒

It is our view that providing such detailed reassurances to China

right now would not incentivize Beijing to restrict North Koreaí»s ability

to threaten its neighbors, as the report maintains. More important,

we believe that discussions about potential readjustments in force posture

would undermine U.S. and South Korean interests. Any mention

of possible troop reductions could create doubts among South Korean

Additional and Dissenting Views 47

elites and the public about the U.S. commitment to their security and,

thus, undermine domestic support in Korea for the U.S.-ROK alliance,

while gaining little from China for doing so.

First and foremost, discussion about the future U.S. force posture,

including U.S. troop reductions, should be conducted within the alliance

and based on prevailing circumstances, not uncertain future

projections. It would be unwise and counterproductive to speculate

about how conditions on the Korean Peninsula might change and

posit different postures based on different scenarios for the purpose

of influencing Chinese policy. China is well aware that the U.S.-ROK

alliance is intended to deter and respond to threats from North Korea.

As part of a strategy of providing reassurances to China to assuage its

concerns about unification, it would be sufficient to convey to Beijing

that, should the North Korean threat disappear, the alliance would

consider how to respond, and future U.S. force posture would be a

part of that process—n close coordination and consultation with

South Korea.

Bonnie S. Glaser and Evan S. Medeiros

joined by Victor D. Cha, Mary Beth Long, and Walter L. Sharp

I was honored to participate in this Task Force, and I hope this effort

sparks debate about what steps our nation must soon take to change

Pyongyangí»s policy of provocation and a rapidly advancing nuclear

program, lest the United States face North Korea as an unpredictable

nuclear power.

There is much to applaud in this report. Significantly, the Task Force

acknowledges that for decades the United States has been trapped in an

increasingly dangerous and unproductive cycle in which North Korea

provokes a crisis to which the United States responds with demands for

discussions and, ultimately, with concessions. To break this cycle, the

Task Force endorses, among other things, a collective security commitment

declaring that an attack against South Korea or Japan is an attack

against all. It also suggests the United States and its allies adopt a policy

to intercept North Koreaí»s long-range missile launches, including tests.

In addition, the report rightly recommends that Kim Jong-uní»s ruthless

regime lose its United Nations credentials unless it demonstrates progress

in respecting human rights.

48 A Sharper Choice on North Korea

Regrettably, some elements of this report undermine these recommendations.

Although few would argue that a policy rejecting diplomacy

is a wise one, fewer still can claim that years of diplomatic efforts

have resulted in any indication that Kim Jong-un is less intent on acquiring

nuclear weapons. On the contrary, after decades of talks, North

Koreaí»s tests have accelerated to an unprecedented pace. The failure of

the talks to change North Korean behavior should raise questions about

the effectiveness of negotiations as a precursor to other policy options,

particularly those designed to unequivocally raise the costs of North

Korean aggression.

Without understanding why we might expect different results from

renewed negotiations, policymakers might consider a more creative

approach to sequencing that entails long-overdue responses to North

Korean provocations, including powerful sanctions and intercepts. At

a minimum, talks should resume only if and when North Korea indicates

an interest in negotiation and China is willing to apply meaningful

pressure for change. Moreover, restructuring talks on peripheral

issues while avoiding an unequivocal demand for a halt to nuclear testing

should be viewed as a dangerous return to the status quo. Even as a

threshold state only, North Korea still would be an impermissible threat

to our allies. And Iran and other nuclear aspirants are watching.

The report also lacks an appropriate sense of urgency. According to

the Director of National Intelligence, Pyongyang now í░tops the listí▒ of

nuclear and proliferation threats. Soon after Kim Jung-un took power,

hard-to-find, Chinese-designed mobile missile launchers were discovered

with weaponry that could reach U.S. bases in Japan. The DPRK

also is developing a submarine-launched ballistic missile capable of

reaching the continental United States. In addition, North Korea is

reportedly expanding its uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon,

and has successfully launched a satellite with a three-stage rocket that, if

reconfigured, could reach the West Coast. The question now is whether

a new U.S. president must set limits beyond which the North Korean

nuclear program may not go.

Mary Beth Long

joined by Walter L. Sharp

I strongly agree with the policy thrusts and sequenced strategy recommendations

reached by the group. However, in Recommendations II

Additional and Dissenting Views 49

and VI, I believe the conditions for ending talks with North Korea are

not comprehensive enough and the concessions suggested during talks

are offered prematurely.

Recommendation II states, í░The United States should undertake talks

subject to the following conditions . . . a moratorium on tests of nuclear

weapons and missiles with a range-payload capability greater than existing

Scud missiles.í▒ I believe the condition should include all ballistic missile

tests governed by current UN Security Council resolutions. Short

and intermediate tests threaten South Korea, Japan, and Guam. They also

increase the knowledge needed to obtain a long-range missile capability. I

also believe this condition needs to include a moratorium of all kinetic and

cyberattacks on South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Additionally,

Recommendation VI states, í░The United States, South Korea, and Japan

[should] build capacity to intercept all missile launches with a rangepayload

capability greater than existing Scud missiles originating from

North Korea.í▒ Again, I do not believe this intercept capability should

be limited to long-range missiles. The ROK and Japan need to develop a

capability to defeat all missiles and rockets launched from North Korea in

order to protect both military and population centers. Bottom line is the

United States should cut off talks if North Korea attacks with any means,

and the U.S.-ROK alliance needs an airtight capability to defeat all North

Korea missiles and rockets.

Recommendation II also states, í░Parties may explore steps on conventional

arms control (including limits to the deployment of and

exercises with [U.S. and ROK] conventional forces).í▒ I do not believe

we should consider this concession until we have verified that North

Korea has completely eliminated its nuclear and missile capability and

that this elimination is irreversible. ROK and U.S. deployments and

exercises are designed to deter North Korea and prepare to defend if

deterrence fails. Until the threat is eliminated, we should not reduce

our preparedness. Further, until North Korea becomes a nation that

abides by international norms and has granted its citizens the human

rights they deserve, a collapse and regime change is possible. We should

increase, not decrease, deployment and exercises that prepare the alliance

for instability in North Korea.

In summary, we should agree to talks with North Korea, but only

if it stops all provocations and agrees to and rapidly moves toward a

nuclear-free peninsula. Unfortunately, history shows that North Korea

has never lived up to these conditions. Therefore, we must maintain the

50 A Sharper Choice on North Korea

U.S.-ROK allianceí»s ability to deter and defend against North Korean

actions and attacks.

Walter L. Sharp

joined by Mary Beth Long

While I concur with and fully endorse the findings and recommendations

of the report, I do not believe that the Task Forceí»s final recommendation

to í░strengthen deterrence and defenseí▒ goes far enough with respect to

the actual consequences of further North Korean nuclear weapons and

long-range missile development. The Kim Jong-un regime is continuing

its aggressive effort to develop and deploy a long-range, nuclear-capable

missile, which will eventually enable the DPRK to hold at risk the

western continental United States. While this does not, in itself, constitute

an existential threat, it does represent a sufficiently grave danger to

U.S. interests and to the population of the western United States that it

cannot go unchallenged, much less be tolerated.

It appears, at this point, inevitable that North Korea will soon

achieve (if it has not already) sufficient miniaturization and hardening

of its nuclear warhead design to facilitate successful launch and reentry

atop an intercontinental missile. Thus, it is my personal view that if the

DPRK continues to test and moves to deploy a missile system capable

of ranging the continental United States, the U.S. government should

respond by stating unequivocally that any evidence of preparations to

make such a system operational would constitute a serious and unacceptable

threat to U.S. national security and would immediately make

all such missile launch sites a legitimate target for U.S. military force.

Given the apparent North Korean determination to move ahead with

deploying a long-range missile—nd, quite possibly, with additional

nuclear tests intended, in part, to confirm successful miniaturization—y

I think it is essential for the United States to be explicit about its intentions

in the event that DPRK were to move ahead with efforts to induct

a nuclear-capable ICBM system.

Mitchel B. Wallerstein

joined by Mary Beth Long and Walter L. Sharp

51

1. For a summary of recent diplomacy, see Stephan Haggard, í░Diplomatic Update,í▒

North Korea: Witness to Transformation (blog), Peterson Institute for International

Economics, June 22, 2016, http://piie.com/blogs/north-korea-witness-transformation/

diplomatic-update-0.

2. There is no certainty when North Korea will cross the threshold. In April, 2016,

the South Korean government determined that Pyongyang could mount a nuclear

warhead on a medium-range missile. Choe Sang-Hun, í░South Korea Says North Has

Capacity to Put Nuclear Warhead on a Missile,í▒ New York Times, April 5, 2016, http://

www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-warhead-rodongmissile.

html.

3. Alastair Gale and Carol E. Lee, í░U.S. Agreed to North Korea Peace Talks Before

Latest Nuclear Test,í▒ Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/

articles/u-s-agreed-to-north-korea-peace-talks-1456076019.

4. Choe Sang-Hun, í░North Koreaí»s Kim Jong-un Tells Military to Have Nuclear Warheads

on Standby,í▒ New York Times, March 3, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/

world/asia/north-koreas-kim-jong-un-tells-military-to-have-nuclear-warheads-onstandby.

html.

5. The canonical history of North-South relations can be found in Don Oberdorfer, The

Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York: Basic Books, 2013). For a critical look

at the cycle of provocation, see Van Jackson, Rival Reputations: Coercion and Credibility in

US-North Korea Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

6. For recent thinking on the possibility of collapse, see Bruce W. Bennett and Jennifer

Lind, í░The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements,í▒

International Security 36, no. 2, October 2011, pp. 84–19; Bruce W. Bennett, í░Preparing

for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapseí▒ (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation,

2013), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/

RR331/RAND_RR331.pdf; Bruce E. Bechtol, North Korea and Regional Security in the

Kim Jong-Un Era: A New International Security Dilemma (London: Palgrave Macmillan,

2014).

7. Ken E. Gause, í░North Korean House of Cards: Leadership Dynamics Under Kim

Jong-un,í▒ Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2015, http://www.hrnk.

org/uploads/pdfs/Gause_NKHOC_FINAL_WEB.pdf. In February 2016, the regime

reportedly executed Ri Yong-gil, chief of the Korean Peopleí»s Army General Staff.

Yonhap News Agency, í░N. Koreaí»s Military Chief Executed on Corruption Charges:

Sources,í▒ February 10, 2016, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2016/02/10

/50/0401000000AEN20160210005051315F.html.

8. Nicholas Eberstadt, í░North Koreaí»s í«Epic Economic Failí» in International Perspective,í▒

Asan Institute for Policy Studies, November 2015, http://www.aei.org/publication/

north-koreas-epic-economic-fail-in-international-perspective/.

Endnotes

52 Endnotes

9. Hazel Smith, North Korea: Markets and Military Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2015); Marcus Noland, í░Why Is North Korea Growing?í▒ North

Korea: Witness to Transformation (blog), Peterson Institute for International

Economics, October 20, 2015, http://blogs.piie.com/nk/?p=14552 Eric Talmadge,

í░North Koreaí»s Creeping Economic Reforms Show Signs of Paying Off,í▒ Guardian,

March 5, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/05/north-koreaeconomic-

reforms-show-signs-paying-off; Anna Fifield, í░North Koreaí»s Growing

Economy—nd Americaí»s Misconceptions About It,í▒ Washington Post, March 13,

2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/north-koreas-growingeconomy-

and-americas-misconceptions-about-it/2015/03/13/b551d2d0-c1a8-11e4-

a188-8e4971d37a8d_story.html.

10. Nat Ketchum and Jane Kim, í░A Quiet Opening: North Koreans in a Changing

Media Environment,í▒ InterMedia, http://www.intermedia.org/wp-content/

uploads/2013/05/A_Quiet_Opening_FINAL_InterMedia.pdf.

11. Yonho Kim, í░Cell Phones in North Korea,í▒ US-Korea Institute at SAIS, 2014, http://

uskoreainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Kim-Yonho-Cell-Phones-in-

North-Korea.pdf í░North Korea Media and IT Infrastructure Report,í▒ North Korea

Strategy Center, 2015, http://en.nksc.co.kr/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NKSCNorth-

Korea-Media-and-IT-Infrastructure-Report.pdf.

12. For more on the history of the China-DPRK relationship, see Jonathan D. Pollack, No

Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security (London: International

Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011).

13. Jonathan D. Pollack, í░China and North Korea: The Long Goodbye?í▒ Order from

Chaos (blog), Brookings Institution, March 28, 2016, http://www.brookings.edu/

blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/03/28-china-north-korea-sanctions-pollack.

14. BBC News, í░China Restricts North Korea Trade Over Nuclear Tests,í▒ April 5, 2016,

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35969412. For one recent example, see

Elizabeth Shim, í░China, North Korea Exchange War of Words Through Media,í▒ United

Press International, April 8, 2016, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/

2016/04/08/China-North-Korea-exchange-war-of-words-through-media/9191460137544/.

15. China later denied the deployment. See Ben Blanchard, í░China Denies Rushing Forces

to Border During Korean Tensions,í▒ Reuters, August 27, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/

article/us-china-northkorea-idUSKCN0QW12Y20150827 Van Jackson and Adam

Mount, í░An Opening on North Korea?í▒ National Interest, November 2, 2015, http://

nationalinterest.org/feature/opening-north-korea-14225 and Jane Perlez, í░Mystery

Cloaks a North Korean Pop Bandí»s Canceled Beijing Dates,í▒ December 21, 2015, http://

www.nytimes.com/2015/12/22/world/asia/north-korea-china-moranbong.html.

16. For this abortive effort, see Morgan Winsor, í░China-North Korea Relations:

Will Kim Jong-Un Visit Xi Jinping in Beijing?í▒ International Business Times,

October 13, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/china-north-korea-relations-will-kimjong-

un-visit-xi-jinping-beijing-2139030.

17. China Radio International Online, í░China to Never Allow War or Chaos on Korean

Peninsula: Xi,í▒ April 28, 2016, http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0428/c90000-9051184.html.

18. Andrea Berger, í░From Paper to Practice: The Significance of New UN Sanctions

on North Korea,í▒ Arms Control Today, May 2016, http://www.armscontrol.org/

ACT/2016_05/Features/From-Paper-to-Practice-The-Significance-of-New-UNSanctions-

on-North-Korea.

19. Paul Boutin, í░Is China Cutting Off North Korea? New Analysis of Satellite Images Say

No,í▒ Medium.com, July 26, 2016, http://medium.com/planet-stories/is-china-cuttingoff-

north-korea-new-analysis-of-satellite-images-say-no-bd7cccb2143#.dr5071fs5;

Endnotes 53

Jeffrey Lewis, í░No, China Isní»t Punishing North Korea,í▒ Armscontrolwonk.com,

July 26, 2016, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1201736/no-china-isntpunishing-

north-korea/. For an alternative view, see Beyond Parallel, í░Images

Suggest Decrease in Sino-NK Border Trade,í▒ Center for Strategic and International

Studies, July 1, 2016, http://beyondparallel.csis.org/decrease-in-trade-after-nucleartest/

Josh Rogin, í░Satellite Imagery Suggests China Is Secretly Punishing North

Korea,í▒ Washington Post, July 1, 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/

global-opinions/satellite-imagery-suggests-china-is-secretly-punishing-northkorea/

2016/06/30/8638d8d6-3ee8-11e6-80bc-d06711fd2125_story.html.

20. Elizabeth Shim, í░Top North Korea Official Ri Su Yong in Beijing to Boost Cooperation,í▒

United Press International, May 31, 2016, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-

News/2016/05/31/Top-North-Korea-official-Ri-Su-Yong-in-Beijing-to-boostcooperation/

9201464707248/. For the nuclear remarks, see Jane Perlez, í░North Korea

Tells China of í«Permanentí» Nuclear Policy,í▒ New York Times, May 31, 2016, http://www.

nytimes.com/2016/06/01/world/asia/china-north-korea-ri-su-yong.html.

21. Jenny Jun, Scott LaFoy, and Ethan Sohn, í░North Koreaí»s Cyber Operations: Strategy

and Responses,í▒ Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2, 2015,

http://csis.org/files/publication/151216_Cha_NorthKoreasCyberOperations_Web.

pdf Taylor Brooks, í░Why China Needs to Rein In North Koreaí»s Hackers,í▒ Christian

Science Monitor, February 5, 2016, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-

Voices/2016/0205/Opinion-Why-China-needs-to-rein-in-North-Korea-s-hackers.

22. Choe Sang-Hun, í░Japan and South Korea Settle Dispute Over Wartime í«Comfort

Women,í»í▒ New York Times, December 28, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/29/

world/asia/comfort-women-south-korea-japan.html.

23. Michael Auslin, í░A New Era in South Korean-Japanese Relations Begins,í▒ American

Enterprise Institute, December 30, 2015, https://www.aei.org/publication/a-new-erain-

south-korean-japanese-relations-begins/.

24. í░Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement Concerning the Nuclear and Missile

Threats Posed by North Korea Among the Ministry of National Defense of the

Republic of Korea, the Ministry of Defense of Japan, and the Department of Defense

of the United States of America,í▒ U.S. Department of Defense, December 29, 2014,

http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/Trilateral-Information-Sharing-Arrangement.

pdf. KJ Kwon and Dugald McConnell, í░outh Korea, Japan to Join U.S. Missile-

Defense Exercise,í▒CNN.com, May 17, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/16/asia/

south-korea-japan-missile-defense-exercise/.

25. Victor Cha, í░Path Less Chosun,í▒ Foreign Affairs, October 8, 2015, http://www.

foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-10-08/path-less-chosun; for an earlier such

effort, see Sam King and Ting Shi, í░Xi, Park Urge Resuming Talks on North Korea

Nuke Program,í▒ Bloomberg Business, July 3, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/

articles/2014-07-02/xi-arrival-in-south-korea-marked-by-north-korean-missile-tests.

26. Elizabeth Shim, í░South Korea, China Oppose North Koreaí»s Nuclear Program in

Joint Statement,í▒ United Press International, September 2, 2015, http://www.upi.com/

Top_News/World-News/2015/09/02/South-Korea-China-oppose-North-Koreasnuclear-

program-in-joint-statement/7331441208150/.

27. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peopleí»s Republic of China, í░Xi Jinping Meets With

President Park Geun-hye of ROK,í▒ April 1, 2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/

zxxx_662805/t1353045.shtml. Kim Deok-hyun, í░Nuclear Envoys From S. Korea,

China Hold Talks on N. Korea,í▒ Yonhap News Agency, June 8, 2016, http://english.

yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2016/06/08/74/0301000000AEN201606080098003

15F.html.

54 Endnotes

28. Mark Fitzpatrick, í░Leap Day in North Korea,í▒ Foreign Policy, February 29, 2012, http://

foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/29/leap-day-in-north-korea/.

29. Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ian E. Rinehart, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, í░North Korea: U.S.

Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation,í▒ CRS Report R41259, January

15, 2016, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf.

30. Jane Perlez, í░North Korea Tells China of í«Permanentí» Nuclear Policy.í▒ See also Eric

Talmadge, í░North Korea: We Woní»t Abandon Nukes With US Gun to Our Head,í▒

Associated Press, June 24, 2016, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/2db82c19afc844cd976

9085bbed84da6/north-korea-we-wont-abandon-nukes-us-gun-our-head.

31. Kim Deok-hyun, í░N. Korean Nuclear Envoy Says Six-Party Talks Are í«Dead,í▒ Yonhap

News Agency, June 22, 2016, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2016/06/22/5

2/0301000000AEN20160622010400315F.html.

32. Alastair Gale and Carol E. Lee, í░U.S. Agreed to North Korea Peace Talks Before

Latest Nuclear Test,í▒ Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/

articles/u-s-agreed-to-north-korea-peace-talks-1456076019.

33. Colleen McCain Nelson and Kwanwoo Jun, í░Obama Expresses Skepticism Over

North Korean Offer,í▒ Wall Street Journal, April 24, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/

merkel-expresses-concern-over-syria-after-meeting-with-obama-1461514013.

34. For a perspective on the recent history of negotiations, see Leon V. Sigal, í░Getting

What We Need With North Korea,í▒ Arms Control Today, April 2016, http://

www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2016_04/Features/Getting-What-We-Need-With-

North-Korea.

35. Megan Cassella and Doina Chiacu, í░U.S. Rejected North Korea Peace Talks Offer

Before Nuclear Test: State Department,í▒ Reuters, February 22, 2015, http://www.

reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-idUSKCN0VU0XE.

36. Scott Snyder, í░North Koreaí»s Denuclearization: Is It Possible?í▒ Forbes, November 19, 2015,

http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottasnyder/2015/11/19/north-koreas-denuclearizationis-

it-possible/.

37. Scott Snyder, í░Addressing North Koreaí»s Nuclear Problem,í▒ Council on Foreign

Relations, November 19, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/north-korea/addressing-northkoreas-

nuclear-problem/p37258; and James M. Acton, í░Focus on Nonproliferation—

Not Disarmament—n North Korea,í▒ Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace, February 14, 2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/14/focus-onnonproliferation-

not-disarmament-in-north-korea.

38. Roberta Cohen í░Human Rights in North Korea: Addressing the Challenges,í▒ International

Journal of Korean Unification Studies 22, no. 2, December 2013, pp. 29–2. http://

www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/RCohen_north_korea_Dec2013.pdf.

39. United Nations, United Nations Human Rights Council, í░Report of the Commission

of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic Peopleí»s Republic of Korea,í▒ A/

HRC/25/63, February 7, 2014, p. 6, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/

RegularSessions/Session25/Documents/A-HRC-25-63_en.doc.

40. Ibid., 14.

41. Ibid., 7.

42. Ibid., 12.

43. For a list of human rights treaties that count North Korea as a signatory, see í░North

Korea, International Treaties Adherence,í▒ Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project,

Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, October

2010. http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/international_treaties.php?id_state=50.

44. í░South Korea Questions North Koreaí»s Qualifications as U.N. Member,í▒

Korea Times, February 19, 2016. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/

nation/2016/02/485_198416.html.

Endnotes 55

45. Elizabeth Shim, í░North Korea Defends Human Rights Record Ahead of U.N.

Meeting,í▒ United Press International, September 10, 2015, http://www.upi.com/Top_

News/World-News/2015/09/10/North-Korea-defends-human-rights-record-aheadof-

UN-meeting/3581441909773/?src=r.

46. Lee Yeon Cheol, í░Official: UN, N. Korea Discuss Possible Human Rights Visit,í▒ Voice

of America, October 29, 2015, http://www.voanews.com/content/un-north-koreadiscuss-

possible-human-rights-visit/3028431.html.

47. Matt Sciavenza, í░North Koreaí»s Unsuccessful Charm Offensive,í▒ Atlantic,

November 17, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/11/

north-koreas-charm-offensive-un-international-criminal-court/382849/.

48. í░UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea,í▒ Arms Control Association, March

2016, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-

North-Korea.

49. Andrea Berger, í░Target Markets: North Koreaí»s Military Customers,í▒ Whitehall

Papers 84, no. 1, December 14, 2015, http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rwhi20/84/1#.

VtyYK_nSd4p.

50. United Nations, Security Council, í░Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant

to Resolution 1874 (2009),í▒ S/2016/157, February 24, 2016, http://www.un.org/ga/search/

view_doc.asp?symbol=s/2016/157 Joshua Stanton, í░Arsenal of Terror: North Korea,

State Sponsor of Terrorism,í▒ Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, April 27,

2015, https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/4_27_15_Stanton_ArsenalofTerror.pdf.

51. Paul K. Kerr, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, and Steven A. Hildreth, í░Iran-North Korea-Syria

Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Cooperation,í▒ CRS Report to Congress R43480, April

16, 2014, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/225867.pdf; Joshua Pollack,

í░Ballistic Trajectory: The Evolution of North Koreaí»s Ballistic Missile Market,í▒

Nonproliferation Review 18, no. 2, July 2011, pp. 411–9, http://www.nonproliferation.

org/wp-content/uploads/npr/npr_18-2_pollack_ballistic-trajectory.pdf.

52. Joshua Stanton, í░North Korea: The Myth of Maxed-Out Sanctions,í▒ Fletcher

Security Review 2, no. 1, January 21, 2015, http://www.fletchersecurity.org/#!stanton/

c1vgi Bruce Klingner, í░Time to Get North Korean Sanctions Right,í▒ Heritage

Foundation, November 4, 2013, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/11/

time-to-get-north-korean-sanctions-right.

53. White House, í░Imposing Additional Sanctions With Respect to North Korea,í▒

Executive Order 13687, January 2, 2016. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/

2015/01/02/executive-order-imposing-additional-sanctions-respect-northkorea.

54. North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, HR 757, 114th Cong.

(2016), http://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr757/BILLS-114hr757ih.pdf.

55. U.S. Department of the Treasury, í░Treasury Takes Actions to Further Restrict North

Koreaí»s Access to the U.S. Financial System,í▒ press release, June 1, 2016, http://www.

treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0471.aspx.

56. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2270, S/RES/2270, March 2, 2016, http://

www.mofa.go.jp/files/000149964.pdf.

57. Andrea Berger, í░The New UNSC Sanctions Resolution on North Korea: A Deep Dive

Assessment,í▒ 38 North, March 2, 2016, http://38north.org/2016/03/aberger030216/

Richard Nephew, í░UN Security Councilí»s New Sanctions on the DPRK,í▒ 38 North,

March 2, 2016, http://38north.org/2016/03/rnephew030216/.

58. White House, í░National Security Strategy, 2015,í▒ February 2015, http://www.

whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf.

59. Joel S. Wit and Young Ahn Sun, í░North Koreaí»s Nuclear Futures: Technology

and Strategy,í▒ US-Korea Institute at SAIS, 2015, http://38north.org/wp-content/

56 Endnotes

uploads/2015/02/NKNF-NK-Nuclear-Futures-Wit-0215.pdf Mitchel B. Wallerstein,

í░The Price of Inattention: A Survivable North Korean Nuclear Threat?í▒ Washington

Quarterly 38, no. 3, November 4, 2015, pp. 21–5, http://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.

elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Fall2015_Wallerstein.pdf.

60. Anna Fifield, í░North Korea Says It Can Fit Nuclear Warheads on Ballistic

Missiles,í▒ Washington Post, March 8, 2016. http://www.washingtonpost.com/

world/south-korea-imposes-new-sanctions-on-north-tells-pyongyang-it-mustchange/

2016/03/08/15b0d29e-490a-4697-9742-3c81dde5eb5f_story.html.

61. Yonhap News Agency, í░N. Korea to í«Sooní» Conduct Nuke Warhead, Ballistic Missile

Tests,í▒ March 15, 2016, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2016/03/15/0401

000000AEN20160315001400320.html.

62. For public debate over miniaturization, see David E. Sanger, í░US Commander Sees

Key Nuclear Step by North Korea,í▒ New York Times, October 24, 2014, http://www.

nytimes.com/2014/10/25/world/asia/us-commander-sees-key-nuclear-step-bynorth-

korea.html; and Jeffrey Lewis, í░North Koreaí»s Nuclear Weapons: The Great

Miniaturization Debate,í▒ 38 North, February 5, 2015, http://38north.org/2015/02/

jlewis020515/.

63. For an analysis of the KN-08, see John Schilling, í░A Revised Assessment of the North

Korean KN-08 ICBM,í▒ Science & Global Security 21 (2013): pp. 210–6.

64. On the submarine-launched ballistic missile tests, see John Schilling, í░A New

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile for North Korea,í▒ 38 North, April 26, 2016,

http://38north.org/2016/04/jschilling042516/; on the new MLRS artillery system, see

Anna Fifield, í░North Korea Has New Rocket System That Could Strike Seoul This Year,

South Korea Warns,í▒ Washington Post, April 6, 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.

com/world/south-korea-says-north-has-large-caliber-rocket-system-could-strikeseoul-

this-year/2016/04/06/38cd0f52-fbce-11e5-a569-2c9e819c14e4_story.html

for the ICBM engine test, see John Schilling, í░North Koreaí»s Large Rocket Engine

Test: A Significant Step Forward for Pyongyangí»s ICBM Program,í▒ 38 North, April

11, 2016, http://38north.org/2016/04/schilling041116/ on the satellite launch, see

Michael Elleman, í░North Korea Launches Another Large Rocket: Consequences and

Options,í▒ 38 North, February 10, 2016, http://38north.org/2016/02/melleman021016/;

on the failed Musudan IRBM test, see Anna Fifield, í░North Koreaí»s Missile Launch

Has Failed, Southí»s Military Says,í▒ Washington Post, April 15, 2016, http://www.

washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/north-koreas-missile-has-failed-officialsfrom-

south-say/2016/04/14/8eb2ce53-bc38-40d0-9013-5655bed26764_story.

html on the successful test, see John Schilling, í░A Partial Success for the Musudan,í▒ 38

North, June 23, 2016, http://38north.org/2016/06/jschilling062316/.

65. David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, í░Plutonium, Tritium, and Highly

Enriched Uranium Production at the Yongbyon Nuclear Site,í▒ Institute for Science

and International Security, June 14, 2016, http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/

documents/Pu_HEU_and_tritium_production_at_Yongbyon_June_14_2016_

FINAL.pdf; Wit and Ahn, í░North Koreaí»s Nuclear Futuresí▒; Albright and Kelleher-

Vergantini, í░Update on North Koreaí»s Reactors, Enrichment Plant, and Possible

Isotope Separation Facility,í▒ Institute for Science and International Security,

February 1, 2016, http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Yongbyon_

January_2016_Update_Final.pdf.

66. Additionally, North Korea has reportedly restarted its 4MWth IRT research reactor

using domestically produced uranium. David Albright and Serena Kelleher Vergantini,

í░North Koreaí»s IRT Reactor: Has It Restarted? Is It Safe?í▒ Institute for Science and

International Security, March 9, 2016. Warhead estimate available in Albright and

Kelleher-Vergatini, í░Plutonium, Tritium, and Highly Enriched Uranium Production

at the Yongbyon Nuclear Site.í▒

Endnotes 57

67. Jonathan Landay, David Brunnstrom, and Matt Spetalnick, í░North Korea Restarts

Plutonium Production for Nuclear Bombs –U.S. Official,í▒ Reuters, June 8, 2016, http://

www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-usa-exclusive-idUSKCN0YT2I1;

Yonhap News Agency, í░S. Korea Closely Watching N.K. Nuclear Activity With

Serious Concern: Goví»t,í▒ June 8, 2016, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/20

16/06/08/0301000000AEN20160608000451315.html.

68. For a perspective on Chinaí»s assessment, see Jeremy Page and Jay Solomon,

í░China Warns North Korean Nuclear Threat Is Rising,í▒ Wall Street Journal,

April22,2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-warns-north-korean-nuclear-threatis-

rising-1429745706.

69. Kerr, Nikitin, and Hildreth, í░Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and Nuclear

Cooperationí▒; Justin McCurry, í░North Korea í«Is Exporting Nuclear Technology,í»í▒

Guardian, May 28, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/28/

north-korea-exporting-nuclear-technology.

70. Van Jackson, í░Alliance Military Strategy in the Shadow of North Koreaí»s Nuclear

Futures,í▒ U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, September 2015, http://38north.org/wpcontent/

uploads/2015/09/NKNF-Jackson-Alliance-09151.pdf Robert Carlin and

Robert Jervis, í░Nuclear North Korea: How Will It Behave?í▒ U.S.-Korea Institute at

SAIS, October 2015, http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/CarlinJervisfinal.

pdf.

71. Brad Roberts, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA:

Stanford University Press, 2015), pp. 58–0.

72. Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, í░The Next Korean War,í▒ Foreign Affairs, April 1,

2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2013-04-01/next-koreanwar

Elbridge Colby, í░Nuclear Security in the Third Offset Strategy: Avoiding a

Nuclear Blind Spot in the Pentagoní»s New Initiative,í▒ Center for a New American

Security, February 2015, http://www.cnas.org/avoiding-nuclear-blindspot-offsetstrategy#.

V6zbzfkrK70 Adam Mount, í░The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Restraint,í▒

Survival 57, no. 4 (July 22, 2015):pp. 53–6, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10

80/00396338.2015.1069991.

73. White House, í░Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant

Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities,í▒ Executive Order 13694, April 1, 2015. http://

www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cyber_eo.pdf.

74. For an extensive assessment, see Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin, í░The

Changing Military Balance in the Koreas and Northeast Asia,í▒ Center for Strategic

and International Studies, June 2015, http://csis.org/files/publication/150325_Korea_

Military_Balance.pdf.

75. Office of the Secretary of Defense, í░Military and Security Developments Involving

the Democratic Peopleí»s Republic of Korea: Report to Congress,í▒ U.S. Department

of Defense, January 2016, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/

Military_and_Security_Developments_Involving_the_Democratic_Peoples_

Republic_of_Korea_2015.PDF.

76. í░North Korea Deploys 300 New MLRS Along Front Line: Sources,í▒ Yonhap News

Agency, April 24, 2016, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2016/04/24/43/03

01000000AEN20160424001100315F.html.

77. Agreement is growing in Washington that strategic patience has failed. For one recent

view, see Joel S. Wit, í░Trapped in No-Maní»s-Land: The Future of US Policy Toward

North Korea,í▒ US-Korea Institute at SAIS, June 2016, http://38north.org/wp-content/

uploads/2016/06/NKNF_Wit-2016-06.pdf.

78. Jim Walsh and John Park, í░To Stop the Missiles, Stop North Korea, Inc.,í▒ New York

Times, March 10, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/10/opinion/to-stop-themissiles-

stop-north-korea-inc.html.

58 Endnotes

79. In one proposal for a sustainable U.S. defense posture in East Asia, Andrew

Krepinevich proposes cultivating anti-access/area-denial capabilities in allied states

along the first island chain. Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., í░How to Deter China: The Case

for Archipelagic Defense,í▒ Foreign Affairs 94, no. 2, 2015. For an alternative view, see

Michael D. Swaine, í░The Real Challenge in the Pacific,í▒ Foreign Affairs 94, no. 3, 2015.

80. Reuters, í░South Koreaí»s Park Seeks 5-Party Talks on Northí»s Nuclear Program,í▒

January 21, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-parkidUSKCN0V009D;

The U.S. Department of Stateí»s Special Representative

for North Korea Policy, Sung Kim, supported the idea in testimony to the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee. United States Senate Committee on

Foreign Relations, í░The Persistent North Korea Denuclearization and Human

Rights Challenge,í▒ October 20, 2015, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/

the-persistent-north-korea-denuclearization-and-human-rights-challenge_102015.

81. For an analysis of the humanitarian dimension of DPRK crisis scenarios, see Roberta

Cohen, í░Human Rights and Humanitarian Planning for Crisis in North Korea,í▒

International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall/Winter 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/~/

media/research/files/articles/2016/02/18-human-rights-north-korea-cohen/robertacohen--

nk--art-reunification.pdf.

82. See Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History for a critical look at the

cycle of provocation, see Jackson, Rival Reputations.

83. Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, September 18, 2005,

http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm.

84. These conditions are broadly consistent with those listed in Sec. 402 of the North

Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, HR 757.

85. For an argument for prioritizing human rights in U.S. North Korea policy, see Dan Aum,

Greg Scarlatoiu, and Amanda Mortwedt Oh, í░Crimes Against Humanity in North

Korea: The Case for U.S. Leadership and Action,í▒ Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice

and Human Rights, 2014, http://www.icasinc.org/2014/2014l/2014ldxa.pdf.

86. Spyros Blavoukos and Dimitris Bourantonis, í░The Presidency of the UNGA and

the Case of South Africa (1974),í▒ in Chairing Multilateral Negotiations: The Case of

the United Nations (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp.45–2; United Nations General

Assembly, Resolution 3206, í░Credentials of representatives to the twenty-ninth session

of the General Assembly,í▒ September 30, 1974, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/

RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/738/09/IMG/NR073809.pdf?OpenElement.

87. United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 3207, í░Relationship Between the United

Nations and South Africa,í▒ September 30, 1974, http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/

RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/738/09/IMG/NR073809.pdf?OpenElement.

88. For a discussion of the legal basis for this step, see Dan Ciobanu, í░Credentials

of Delegations and Representation of Member States at the United Nations,í▒

International and Comparative Law Quarterly 25, no. 2, April 1976, pp. 351–1; Alden

Abbott, Filiberto Augusti, Peter Brown, and Elizabeth Rode, í░The General Assembly,

29th Session: The Decredentialization of South Africa,í▒ Harvard International Law

Journal 16, no. 3, Summer 1975, pp. 576–8.

89. United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 69/188, í░Situation of Human Rights

in the Democratic Peopleí»s Republic of Korea,í▒ December 18, 2014, http://www.

un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/69/188; United Nations General

Assembly, A/C.3/70/L.35, í░Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic Peopleí»s

Republic of Korea,í▒ October 30, 2015, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/

cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_c3_70_L35.pdf

Somini Sengupta, í░United Nations Security Council Examines North Koreaí»s Human

Rights,í▒ New York Times, December 22, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/23/

Endnotes 59

world/asia/united-nations-security-council-examines-north-koreas-humanrights.

html Michelle Nichols, í░China, Russia Fail to Stop U.N. Meeting on Rights

in North Korea,í▒ Reuters, December 10, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/

us-northkorea-rights-un-idUSKBN0TT2RU20151210.

90. Nick Cumming-Bruce, í░U.N. Seeks Ways to Try North Koreans for Human Rights

Abuses,í▒ New York Times, March 23, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/24/

world/asia/un-seeks-ways-to-try-north-koreans-for-human-rights-abuses.

html?_r=0.

91. UN News Centre, í░New UN Office Opens in Seoul to Monitor Human Rights Issues in

DPR Korea,í▒ June 23, 2015, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51223#.

VxZiaPkrK71.

92. Ha-young Choi, í░S. Korea Passes North Korean Human Rights Law,í▒ NK News, March 3,

2016, http://www.nknews.org/2016/03/s-korea-passes-north-korean-human-rights-law/.

93. United Nations Human Rights Council, Resolution A/HRC/31/L.25, í░Situation of

Human Rights in the Democratic Peopleí»s Republic of Korea,í▒ March 21, 2016, http://

ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/31/L.25.

94. For more on this exemption, see Stephan Haggard, í░Once Again, Sanctions

Enforcement,í▒ North Korea: Witness to Transformation (blog), Peterson Institute for

International Economics, July 5, 2016, http://piie.com/blogs/north-korea-witnesstransformation/

once-again-sanctions-enforcement.

95. Material assistance may consist of equipment needed for inspection or compensation

for services lost by severing illegal contracts with North Korean entities. Legal assistance

could place pro bono advisors in member countries to assist with the complex process

to bring domestic legal codes into compliance with international obligations, to ensure

that countries have the legal authority act when the time comes. Technical assistance may

include efforts to train and equip regional coast guards and port authorities.

96. Disciplining the behavior of member states is a primary function of all international

institutions. See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 1984); Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal,

í░The Rational Design of International Institutions,í▒ International Organization 55, no.

4, 2001.

97. For more information on PSI, see Mary Beth Nikitin, í░Proliferation Security Initiative

(PSI),í▒ CRS Report to Congress RL34327, June 15, 2012, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/

nuke/RL34327.pdf Emma Belcher, í░The Proliferation Security Initiative: Lessons for

Using Nonbinding Agreements,í▒ International Institutions and Global Governance

working paper, Council on Foreign Relations, July 2011, http://www.cfr.org/

proliferation/proliferation-security-initiative/p25394.

98. U.S. Department of the Treasury, í░Treasury Sanctions North Korean Senior Officials

and Entities Associated with Human Rights Abuses,í▒ July 6, 2016, http://www.

treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0506.aspx.

99. For example, in 2016, the European Union moved to impose additional sanctions

on Burundi for human rights reasons. Robin Emmott, í░EU Ready to Impose More

Sanctions on Burundi,í▒ Reuters, February 15, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/

idUSKCN0VO0XC/.

100. For more on Chinaí»s role in enforcing DPRK sanctions, see í░John S. Park, í░The Key to

the North Korean Targeted Sanctions Puzzle,í▒ Washington Quarterly 37, no. 3, Fall 2014,

http://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Park_Fall2014.pdf.

101. Elias Groll, í░Bank Thefts Show North Koreaí»s Hacking Prowess,í▒ Foreign Policy,

May 27, 2016, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/27/bank-thefts-show-northkoreas-

hacking-might/ Nicole Perlroth and Michael Corkery, í░North Korea Linked to

Digital Attacks on Global Banks,í▒ New York Times, May 26, 2016, http://www.nytimes.

60 Endnotes

com/2016/05/27/business/dealbook/north-korea-linked-to-digital-thefts-fromglobal-

banks.html.

102. U.S. Department of State, í░Trilateral Statement Japan, Republic of Korea, and the United

States,í▒ December 6, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/12/152431.htm.

103. For a provocative explanation of why U.S. alliances in Asia lack this level of formalism

and permanence, see Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, í░Why Is There No

NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,í▒

International Organization 56, no. 3, 2002.

104. On the history and advantages of collective security declarations, see Charles A.

Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, í░The Promise of Collective Security,í▒ International

Security 20, no. 1, 1995.

105. In June 2016, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg declared that a cyberattack

could trigger Article 5, which mandates a collective response to an attack on a NATO

member. Colin Clark, í░NATO Declares Cyber a Domain,í▒ Breaking Defense, June

14, 2016, http://breakingdefense.com/2016/06/nato-declares-cyber-a-domain-natosecgen-

waves-off-trump/. See also Franklin D. Kramer, Robert J. Butler, and Catherine

Lotrionte, í░Cyber, Extended Deterrence, and NATO,í▒ Atlantic Council, May 2016,

http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Cyber_Extended_Deterrence_

and_NATO_web_0526.pdf. An overview of NATOí»s cyber policy is available at: North

Atlantic Treaty Organization, í░Cyber Defence,í▒ June 23, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/

en/natohq/topics_78170.htm.

106. For more on North Koreaí»s cyber capabilities and responses, see Jun, LaFoy, and Sohn,

í░North Koreaí»s Cyber Operations.í▒

107. Reginald Brothers and Jae-Yoo Choi, í░Joint Statement of Intent Between the

Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate,

United States of America and the Ministry of Science, ICT, and Future Planning

(MSIP), Republic of Korea,í▒ May 2, 2016, http://static.politico.com/e6/

a1/08b6339f465ea51e2f87f1ec3e2e/us-south-korea-joint-cyber-agreement.pdf.

108. Anna Fifield, í░In Drills, U.S., South Korea Practice Striking Northí»s Nuclear Plants,

Leaders,í▒ Washington Post, March 7, 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/

in-drills-us-south-korea-practice-striking-norths-nuclear-plants/2016/03/06/

46e6019d-5f04-4277-9b41-e02fc1c2e801_story.html.

109. For an ROK appraisal of the Scud-Extended Range, see Jeong Yong-soo and Kang Jinkyu,

í░Northí»s Scud-ER can reach U.S. base in Japan,í▒ JoongAng Daily, June 28, 2016,

http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3020543.

110. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1718, December 14, 2006, http://www.

un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1718%282006%29.

61

Task Force members are asked to join a consensus signifying that

they endorse í░the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the

group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation.í▒

They participate in the Task Force in their individual, not their institutional,

capacities.

Victor D. Cha is a senior advisor and inaugural holder of the Korea

chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), as

well as director of Asian studies and D.S. Song-KF chair at Georgetown

Universityí»s Department of Government and School of Foreign

Service. From 2004 to 2007, he served as director for Asian affairs at

the White House on the National Security Council (NSC). Cha was

also the deputy head of delegation for the United States at the Six Party

Talks in Beijing and received two Outstanding Service Commendations

during his tenure at the NSC. He is the award-winning author of

Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security

Triangle, winner of the 2000 Ohira Book Prize; Nuclear North Korea:

A Debate on Engagement Strategies, with Dave Kang; Beyond the Final

Score: The Politics of Sport in Asia The Impossible State: North Korea, Past

and Future, selected by Foreign Affairs as a 2012 Best Book on Asia and

the Pacific; and Powerplay: Origins of the American Alliance System in

Asia. Cha is a former John M. Olin national security fellow at Harvard

University, a two-time Fulbright Scholar, and a Hoover national fellow,

CISAC fellow, and William J. Perry fellow at Stanford University. He

holds Georgetown Universityí»s Deaní»s Teaching Award for 2010 and

the Distinguished Research Award for 2011. He serves as an independent

consultant and has testified before Congress on Asian security

issues. Cha holds a BA, an MIA, and a PhD from Columbia University,

as well as an MA from Oxford University.

Task Force Members

62 Task Force Members

Roberta Cohen is a specialist in human rights, humanitarian, and refugee

issues and a leading expert on internally displaced persons and on

human rights conditions in North Korea. For more than a decade, she

was a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and codirector of the

Brookings Project on Internal Displacement together with the representative

of the UN secretary-general on internally displaced persons.

Together, they won the Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World

Order. She is co-chair emeritus of the Committee for Human Rights in

North Korea, a distinguished group of foreign policy, human rights, and

Asia experts; the author of more than one hundred articles and op-eds

in the human rights field; a senior fellow at Georgetown Universityí»s

Institute for the Study of International Migration; and a member of the

committee on conscience of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum.

Earlier, she served as deputy assistant secretary of state for human

rights and senior advisor to U.S. delegations to the UN Commission

on Human Rights and General Assembly. She is a graduate of Barnard

College and Johns Hopkins Universityí»s School of Advanced International

Studies, and she received an honorary doctorate from the faculty

of law at the University of Bern in Switzerland.

Joseph R. DeTrani is the president of Daniel Morgan Academy. He previously

served as president of the Intelligence and National Security Alliance

and now serves on their board of advisors. DeTrani was a former

senior advisor to the director of national intelligence (DNI), director of

the National Counter Proliferation Center, and intelligence community

mission manager for North Korea. He also served at the U.S. Department

of State as the special envoy for Six Party Talks with North Korea,

and as the U.S. representative to the Korea Energy Development Organization.

DeTrani had a distinguished career with the Central Intelligence

Agency, serving as a member of the Senior Executive Service, director of

East Asia operations, director for European operations, director of the

office of technical services, director of public affairs, director of the crime

and narcotics center, and executive assistant to Director of Central Intelligence

William Casey. DeTrani served in the U.S. Air Force and is a graduate

of New York University. He received a certificate in Chinese from

the State Department Foreign Language School in Taiwan and attended

Harvard Universityí»s International Security Program for executives. He

has published numerous articles dealing with North Korea, China, Iran,

cyber espionage, and nonproliferation issues.

Task Force Members 63

Nicholas Eberstadt holds the Henry Wendt chair in political economy

at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC, and is

a senior advisor to the National Bureau of Asian Research in Seattle.

Eberstadt is an authority on issues of demography, development, and

international security, and has published hundreds of articles in popular

and scholarly journals on these topics over the course of the past

four decades, as well as over twenty books and monographs. He has

written extensively about North Korea; his studies include The Population

of North Korea (coauthor), The End of North Korea, The North

Korean Economy Between Crisis and Catastrophe, and The North Korean

Economyí»s í░Epic Economic Failí▒ in International Perspective. Eberstadt

is a founding member of the U.S. Committee for Human Rights

in North Korea. Previously, he has served as a member of the Presidentí»s

Council on Bioethics, the board of scientific counselors for the

U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, and the World Economic

Forumí»s Global Agenda Councils. He consults and advises with a

range of offices within the U.S. government and has been invited to

offer expert testimony before Congress on a wide range of issues.

Eberstadt earned his AB, MPA, and a PhD at Harvard as well as an

MSc from the London School of Economics.

Robert J. Einhorn is a senior fellow with the Brookings Institutioní»s

arms control and nonproliferation initiative. Before coming to Brookings

in May 2013, Einhorn served as the U.S. Department of Stateí»s

special advisor for nonproliferation and arms control, a position created

by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2009. Between 2001 and

2009, Einhorn was a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and

International Studies, where he directed the proliferation prevention

program. Before coming to CSIS, he was assistant secretary of state for

nonproliferation (1999–001), deputy assistant secretary of state for

political-military affairs (1992–9), and a member of the State Department

Policy Planning Staff (1986–2). Between 1972 and 1986, he held

various positions at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

(ACDA), including as ACDAí»s representative to the strategic arms

reduction talks with the Soviet Union. Einhorn holds a BA in government

from Cornell University and a MA in public affairs and international

relations from Princeton Universityí»s Woodrow Wilson School

of Public and International Affairs.

64 Task Force Members

Bonnie S. Glaser is a senior advisor for Asia and the director of the

China power project at CSIS, where she works on issues related to Chinese

foreign policy and U.S. security interests in Asia. She is concomitantly

a nonresident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, Australia,

a senior associate with CSIS Pacific Forum, and a consultant for the U.S.

government on East Asia. From 2008 to mid-2015, Glaser was a senior

advisor with the CSISí»s Freeman chair in China studies, and from 2003

to 2008, she was a senior associate in the CSIS international security

program. Prior to joining CSIS, she served as a consultant for various

U.S. government offices, including the U.S. Departments of Defense

and State. Glaser is a regular contributor to the Pacific Forum quarterly

web journal Comparative Connections. She is currently a board member

of the U.S. committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the

Asia Pacific, and a member of both the Council on Foreign Relations and

the Institute of International Strategic Studies. She served as a member

of the U.S. Department of Defenseí»s Defense Policy Board China panel

in 1997. Glaser received her BA in political science from Boston University

and her MA with concentrations in international economics and

Chinese studies from Johns Hopkins Universityí»s School of Advanced

International Studies.

Mary Beth Long is a nonresident senior fellow at the Foundation for

Defense of Democracies and was a senior subject matter expert to

the supreme allied commander of NATO from 2013 to 2015. She is the

founder and chief executive officer of Metis Solutions, recognized in

2014 by Inc. Magazineí»s 5,000 list as the 201st fastest-growing private

company and the twelfth top government service company. She also

consults for several Fortune 50 companies. Long was the first woman to

be confirmed by the U.S. Senate as assistant secretary of defense in the

Office of the Secretary of Defense (2007–009), specifically as assistant

secretary for international security affairs. Long chaired NATOí»s highlevel

group responsible for nuclear policy (2007–009). She is a regular

contributor to CNN, Bloomberg, Fox News, BBC, and NPR on foreign

policy issues and the intelligence community. She is a licensed lawyer,

and from 1999 until 2004 was an associate specializing in civil litigation

matters at Williams & Connolly LLP. Long earned her JD from Washington

and Lee University School of Law.

Task Force Members 65

Catherine B. Lotrionte is the director and founder of the Cyber Project

in Georgetown Universityí»s School of Foreign Service, where she

teaches and writes on international and national security law, international

affairs, and technology. In 2002, she was appointed by General

Brent Scowcroft as counsel to the presidentí»s foreign intelligence

advisory board at the White House, a position she held until 2006. In

2002, she served as a legal counsel for the joint inquiry committee of the

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, investigating the 9/11 terrorist

attacks. Prior to that, Lotrionte was assistant general counsel in the

Office of General Counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency and also

served in the U.S. Department of Justice. She is an internationally recognized

expert on international law and cyber conflict. Lotrionte holds

an MA and a PhD from Georgetown University and a JD from New

York University, and is the author of numerous publications, including

two forthcoming books, Cyber Policy: An Instrument of International

Relations, Intelligence and National Power and U.S. National Security Law

in the Post–old War Era. She is a frequent speaker at cyber conferences

worldwide and has founded and hosted the annual International Conference

on Cyber Engagement at Georgetown University since 2011.

Lotrionte currently serves on the World Economic Forumí»s Global

Agenda Council on Cybersecurity and the CSIS cyber task force, and

she is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Evan S. Medeiros leads Eurasia Groupí»s research on Asia. Most

recently, he served as special assistant to the president and senior director

for Asian affairs on the National Security Council, where he served

as President Obamaí»s top advisor on the Asia Pacific and coordinated

U.S. policy in the region across the areas of diplomacy, defense policy,

economic policy, and intelligence affairs. In 2009, he joined the NSC

staff as director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolian affairs, and was

actively involved in U.S.-China relations throughout his nearly six-year

NSC tenure. From 2002 to 2009, Medeiros served as a senior political

scientist at the RAND Corporation, specializing in research on the

international politics of East Asia, Chinaí»s foreign and national security

policies, U.S.-China relations, and Chinese defense and security

issues. From 2007 to 2008, he was policy advisor to the special envoy

for China and the U.S.-China strategic economic dialogue at the Treasury

Department, serving Secretary Henry Paulson. Prior to joining

66 Task Force Members

RAND, Medeiros was a senior research associate at the Monterey Institute

of International Studies, a visiting fellow at the Institute of American

Studies at the China Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, and

an adjunct lecturer at Chinaí»s Foreign Affairs College. He holds a PhD

from the London School of Economics and Political Science, an MPhil

from the University of Cambridge (where he was a Fulbright Scholar),

an MA from the University of Londoní»s School of Oriental and African

Studies, and a BA from Bates College in Maine. He travels to Asia frequently

and speaks, reads, and writes Mandarin Chinese.

Adam Mount is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress.

Previously, he was a Stanton nuclear security fellow at the Council

on Foreign Relations and prior to that worked on nuclear elimination

contingencies at the RAND Corporation. Mountí»s writing has been

published by Foreign Affairs, Survival, the Nonproliferation Review,

Democracy, and other outlets. He is the coauthor with Lawrence J.

Korb of the Center for American Progress report í░Setting Priorities

for Nuclear Modernization,í▒ the author of the Deep Cuts Commission

working paper í░Anticipatory Arms Control,í▒ and a columnist at the

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, where he writes on nuclear strategy and

force structure. He has spoken widely on strategic issues, including in

testimony before the House Armed Services subcommittee on strategic

forces. He holds a PhD in government from Georgetown University.

Mike Mullen is a retired U.S. Navy admiral who served as the seventeenth

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mullen, who spent four

years as chairman—he top military advisor to Presidents George W.

Bush and Barack Obama—rought bold and original thinking to the

work of strengthening the U.S. military and advocating for those who

serve. Mullen oversaw the end of the combat mission in Iraq and the

development of a new military strategy for Afghanistan, while promoting

international partnerships, new technologies, and new counterterrorism

tactics culminating in the killing of Osama bin Laden. A 1968

graduate from the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Mullen sought

high-risk positions to develop his leadership skills. He served as chief

of naval operations prior to assuming duties as chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. Now retired from the U.S. Navy, Mullen serves on the

boards of General Motors, Sprint, and the Bloomberg Family Foundation,

and teaches at Princeton Universityí»s Woodrow Wilson School.

Task Force Members 67

He is known for his honesty and candor, and for his efforts on behalf of

service members, veterans, and their families.

Sam Nunn is co-chairman and chief executive officer of the Nuclear

Threat Initiative (NTI). He served as a U.S. senator from Georgia for

twenty-four years (1972–6). In addition to his work with NTI, Nunn

has continued his service in the public policy arena as a distinguished

professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia

Tech and as chairman of the board of the Center for Strategic and

International Studies in Washington, DC. Nunn attended Georgia

Tech, Emory University, and Emory Law School, where he graduated

with honors in 1962. After active duty service in the U.S. Coast Guard,

he served six years in the U.S. Coast Guard Reserve. He first entered

politics as a member of the Georgia House of Representatives in 1968.

During his tenure in the U.S. Senate, Nunn served as chairman of the

Senate Armed Services Committee and the permanent subcommittee

on investigations. He also served on the intelligence and small business

committees. His legislative achievements include the landmark Department

of Defense Reorganization Act, drafted with the late Senator

Barry Goldwater, and the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction

program, which provided assistance for more than twenty years

to Russia and the former Soviet republics for securing and destroying

their excess nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

Gary Samore is the executive director for research at the Belfer Center

for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School.

In December 2015, he was appointed as a member of the Secretary of

Energy advisory board under Secretary Ernest Moniz. He is also a nonresident

senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and member of the

advisory board for United Against Nuclear Iran, a nonprofit organization

that seeks to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. He

served for four years as President Obamaí»s White House coordinator

for arms control and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including

as U.S. sherpa for the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington,

DC, and the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, South Korea. As

WMD coordinator, he served as the principal advisor to the president

on all matters relating to arms control and the prevention of WMD proliferation

and terrorism, and coordinated U.S. government activities,

initiatives, and programs to promote international arms control efforts.

68 Task Force Members

Samore was a National Science Foundation fellow at Harvard University,

where he received his MA and PhD in government in 1984. While

at Harvard, he was a predoctoral fellow at what was then the Harvard

Center for Science and International Affairs, later to become the Belfer

Center for Science and International Affairs.

Walter L. Sharp graduated from West Point in 1974 and was commissioned

an armor officer. He has earned a master of science degree in

operations research and system analysis from Rensselaer Polytechnic

Institute. Sharp commanded the United Nations Command, Republic

of Korea –United States Combined Forces Command, and United

States Forces Korea from June 3, 2008, to July 14, 2011. Earlier in his

career, Sharpí»s command positions included: squadron commander,

1st Squadron, 7th U.S. Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood Texas;

regimental commander, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk,

Louisiana; assistant division commander for maneuver 2nd Infantry

Division, Camp Red Cloud, South Korea; and division commander,

3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia. He commanded troops

in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Operation Uphold Democracy in

Haiti, and SFORí»s Multinational Division (North) in Bosnia. Sharp had

four assignments at the Pentagon on the Joint Staff. He was the deputy

director, J5 for Western Hemisphere/global transnational issues; vice

director, J8 for force structure, resources, and assessment; director for

strategic plans and policy, J5; and director of the Joint Staff. He is consulting

for several U.S. and Korean companies; serves on the board of

directors for NEXEO Solutions, ARTIS, and the Korea Society; and

is involved in strategy and policy discussions at several DC-area think

tanks concerning strategy and policy for Northeast Asia and especially

Korea.

Mitchel B. Wallerstein was appointed as president of Baruch College

of the City University of New York in August 2010. Baruch College

is home to the nationí»s largest collegiate business school, the Zicklin

School of Business, as well as prominent schools of arts and sciences

and public affairs. From 2003 to 2010, he served as the dean of Syracuse

Universityí»s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, which

is the nationí»s number-one ranked graduate school of public and international

affairs. Prior to leading the Maxwell School, Wallerstein was

vice president of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation

Task Force Members 69

from 1998 to 2003, where he directed the foundationí»s international

programs. Before that, he served from 1993 to 1998 as deputy assistant

secretary of defense for counterproliferation policy and senior defense

representative for trade security policy. During his five-year tenure, he

dealt with nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons proliferation, as

well as national security export controls; he also helped to found and

subsequently co-chaired the senior defense group on proliferation at

NATO. In January 1997, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry awarded

Wallerstein the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public

Service, and he subsequently received the Bronze Palm to that award in

April 1998. Wallerstein is a long-time member of the Council on Foreign

Relations. In 2006, he was elected a fellow of the National Academy

of Public Administration, and in 2015, he was similarly elected a

fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Robert F. Willard is president and chief executive officer of the Institute

of Nuclear Power Operations. In May 2012, Willard completed a

distinguished U.S. Navy career as the commander, U.S. Pacific Command,

Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii. Willard is a Los Angeles native and

a 1973 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. He has a masterí»s degree

in engineering management from Old Dominion University and is

an Massachusetts Institute of Technology Seminar XXI alumnus. An

F-14 aviator, Willard served in a variety of West Coast fighter squadrons:

VF-24, VF 124, VF-2, and VF-51 aboard the aircraft carriers USS

Constellation, USS Ranger, USS Kitty Hawk and USS Carl Vinson. He

was operations officer and executive officer of Navy Fighter Weapons

School (TOPGUN). He later commanded the í░Screaming Eaglesí▒ of

Fighter Squadron 51. Following nuclear-power training, Willard served

as executive officer of USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70), commanded the

amphibious flagship USS Tripoli (LPH 10) in the Persian Gulf during

í░Operation Vigilant Warrior,í▒ for which Tripoli received a Navy Unit

Commendation, and commanded the aircraft carrier USS Abraham

Lincoln (CVN 72). As a flag officer, Willard twice served on the Joint

Staff, was deputy and chief of staff for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, commanded

Carrier Group Five aboard USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63), and commanded

the U.S. Seventh Fleet. Willard became the thirty-fourth vice

chief of naval operations in March 2005, assumed command of the U.S.

Pacific Fleet in May 2007, and became the commander of U.S. Pacific

Command in October 2009. His decorations include the Defense

70 Task Force Members

Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of

Merit, and various other awards.

Juan Carlos Zarate is the chairman and cofounder of the Financial

Integrity Network, the chairman and senior counselor for the Foundation

for Defense of Democraciesí» Center on Sanctions and Illicit

Finance, a visiting lecturer of law at the Harvard Law School, and the

senior national security analyst for CBS News. He served as the deputy

assistant to the U.S. president and deputy national security advisor

for combating terrorism from 2005 to 2009, and was responsible for

developing and implementing the U.S. governmentí»s counterterrorism

strategy and policies related to transnational security threats. Zarate

was the first assistant secretary of the Treasury for terrorist financing

and financial crimes; he led domestic and international efforts to attack

terrorist financing as well as the innovative use of the U.S. Treasuryí»s

national security-related powers. Zarate sits on several boards, including

HSBCí»s financial system vulnerabilities committee, the Vaticaní»s

Financial Information Authority, and the board of advisors to the director

of the National Counterterrorism Center. He is the author of Treasuryí»s

War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare, Forging

Democracy, and a variety of articles.

71

Task Force Observers

Observers participate in Task Force discussions, but are not asked to

join the consensus. They participate in their individual, not institutional,

capacities.

Nate Adler is a professional staff member on the Senate Select Committee

on Intelligence. He was formerly the defense and foreign policy

advisor to Senator John D. Rockefeller IV and a Rosenthal fellow on

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where he focused on U.S.

foreign policy in East Asia. Adler received an MPA in international

relations at Princeton University and an AM in East Asian studies at

Harvard University. A San Francisco native, Adler is a term member at

the Council on Foreign Relations and was a Fulbright Scholar to South

Korea in 2005.

Patrick Costello is the director of Washington External Affairs at the

Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. In this capacity, he

leads the Congress and U.S. Foreign Policy Program, CFRí»s diplomatic

program and executive branch initiative, and regularly works with the

policymaking community and the foreign diplomatic corps on a wide

range of foreign policy and economic issues. Costello worked in Congress

as an aide to former Representative Jon Porter, serving as the primary

foreign policy and economic policy advisor. After leaving Capitol

Hill, Costello was a government relations counselor with International

Business-Government Counsellors where he directed congressional

relations, and provided strategic advice, analysis, and direct representation.

Prior to joining CFRí»s Washington office, he was a senior associate

at the Whitaker Group, a consultancy and project development firm

specializing in Africa. Originally from Boston, Massachusetts, Costello

earned a bachelorí»s degree from the University of Massachusetts. He

also earned a postgraduate certificate from Exeter College, University

72 Task Force Observers

of Oxford, and a masterí»s degree from Kingí»s College London. Costello

has also done graduate study at the National Defense University. He

was a 2011 Future Leader with the Foreign Policy Initiative, named an

Atlantik-Brucke Young Leader in 2014, and is currently a term member

of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Anya Schmemann (observer, ex officio) is Washington director of

Global Communications and Media Relations and director of the Independent

Task Force Program at the Council on Foreign Relations in

Washington, DC. She recently returned to CFR after serving as assistant

dean of communications and outreach at American Universityí»s School

of International Service. Previously, Schmemann managed communications

at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the

Harvard Kennedy School and administered the Caspian studies program

there. She coordinated a research project on Russian security issues at

the EastWest Institute in New York and was assistant director of CFRí»s

Center for Preventive Action in New York, focusing on the Balkans and

Central Asia. She received a BA in government and an MA in Russian,

East European, and Central Asian Studies, both from Harvard University.

She was a Truman national security fellow and a nonresident senior

fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and was a term member

and is now a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Sydney Seiler is the senior advisor on North Korea to the Office of the

Director of National Intelligence. Prior to this position he served as

the State Department special envoy for the Six Party Talks, where he

coordinated U.S. efforts on denuclearization of North Korea through

the Six Party Talks framework and led day-to-day negotiations with Six

Party partners. Seiler served as the director for Korea on the National

Security Council staff from April 2011 to August 2014. In that position,

Seiler advised the president and senior White House officials on

South and North Korea issues, and planned, directed, and coordinated

policy on Korea. A member of the senior national intelligence service

who has worked on Korean Peninsula issues for thirty-four years, Seiler

served previously as the acting and deputy DNI national intelligence

manager for North Korea, and had a variety of assignments across the

intelligence community to include the Central Intelligence Agency and

the National Security Agency. He participated in numerous rounds

of Six Party Talks and bilateral U.S.-DPRK talks, and has served over

Task Force Observers 73

twelve years in the Republic of Korea. Seiler received his MA degree

in Korean studies from Yonsei Universityí»s Graduate School of International

Studies and is a graduate of the Korean language programs of

the Defense Language Institute and Yonsei University. He is the author

of the book Kim Il-Song 1941–948: The Creation of a Legend, the Building

of a Regime, and is a recipient of the National Intelligence Superior

Service Medal.

Sheila A. Smith, an expert on Japanese politics and foreign policy, is

senior fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. She

is the author of Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising

China and Japaní»s New Politics and the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Her current

research focuses on how geostrategic change in Asia is shaping Japaní»s

strategic choices. She joined CFR from the East-West Center in 2007

and was a visiting scholar at Keio University in 2007–008, where she

researched Japaní»s foreign policy toward China, supported by the Abe

fellowship. Smith has been a visiting researcher at leading Japanese foreign

and security policy think tanks and universities, including the Japan

Institute of International Affairs, the Research Institute for Peace and

Security, the University of Tokyo, and the University of the Ryukyus.

Smith is vice chair of the U.S. advisors to the U.S.-Japan Conference on

Cultural and Educational Interchange and serves on the advisory committee

for the U.S.-Japan Network for the Future program run by the

Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation. She teaches as an adjunct

professor at Georgetown University and serves on the board of its

Journal of Asian Affairs. She earned her MA and PhD degrees from the

department of political science at Columbia University.

Scott Snyder is senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program

on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, where

he had served as an adjunct fellow from 2008 to 2011. Snyderí»s latest

books include the coauthored volume The Japan-South Korea Identity

Clash: East Asian Security and the United States and Middle-Power Korea:

Contributions to the Global Agenda. Snyder is also the coeditor of North

Korea in Transition: Politics, Economy, and Society and the editor of Global

Korea: South Koreaí»s Contributions to International Security. He served

as the project director for CFRí»s Independent Task Force No. 64 on

policy toward the Korean Peninsula. He currently writes for the CFR

blog Asia Unbound. Prior to joining CFR, Snyder was a senior associate

74 Task Force Observers

in the international relations program of the Asia Foundation, where he

founded and directed the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy and served as the

Asia Foundationí»s representative in Korea (2000–004). He was also a

senior associate at Pacific Forum CSIS. Snyder has worked as an Asia

specialist in the research and studies program of the U.S. Institute of

Peace and as acting director of Asia Societyí»s contemporary affairs program.

He was a Pantech visiting fellow at Stanford Universityí»s Shorenstein

Asia-Pacific Research Center (2005–006), and received an Abe

fellowship, administered by the Social Sciences Research Council, from

1998 to 1999. Snyder received a BA from Rice University and an MA

from the regional studies East Asia program at Harvard University, and

was a Thomas G. Watson fellow at Yonsei University in South Korea.

75

Working With a Rising India: A Joint Venture for the New Century

Charles R. Kaye and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Chairs; Alyssa Ayres, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 73 (2015)

The Emerging Global Health Crisis: Noncommunicable Diseases in Low- and Middle-Income

Countries

Mitchell E. Daniels Jr. and Thomas E. Donilon, Chairs; Thomas J. Bollyky, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 72 (2014)

North America: Time for a New Focus

David H. Petraeus and Robert B. Zoellick, Chairs; Shannon K. Oí»Neil, Project Director

Independent Task Force No. 71 (2014)

Defending an Open, Global, Secure, and Resilient Internet

John D. Negroponte and Samuel J. Palmisano, Chairs; Adam Segal, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 70 (2013)

U.S.-Turkey Relations: A New Partnership

Madeleine K. Albright and Stephen J. Hadley, Chairs; Steven A. Cook, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 69 (2012)

U.S. Education Reform and National Security

Joel I. Klein and Condoleezza Rice, Chairs; Julia Levy, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 68 (2012)

U.S. Trade and Investment Policy

Andrew H. Card and Thomas A. Daschle, Chairs; Edward Alden and Matthew J. Slaughter,

Project Directors

Independent Task Force Report No. 67 (2011)

Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations

Samuel W. Bodman and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairs; Julia E. Sweig, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 66 (2011)

U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan

Richard L. Armitage and Samuel R. Berger, Chairs; Daniel S. Markey, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 65 (2010)

U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula

Charles L. Pritchard and John H. Tilelli Jr., Chairs; Scott A. Snyder, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 64 (2010)

Independent Task Force Reports

Published by the Council on Foreign Relations

76 Independent Task Force Reports

U.S. Immigration Policy

Jeb Bush and Thomas F. McLarty III, Chairs; Edward Alden, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 63 (2009)

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy

William J. Perry and Brent Scowcroft, Chairs; Charles D. Ferguson, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 62 (2009)

Confronting Climate Change: A Strategy for U.S. Foreign Policy

George E. Pataki and Thomas J. Vilsack, Chairs; Michael A. Levi, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 61 (2008)

U.S.-Latin America Relations: A New Direction for a New Reality

Charlene Barshefsky and James T. Hill, Chairs; Shannon Oí»Neil, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 60 (2008)

U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Course

Carla A. Hills and Dennis C. Blair, Chairs; Frank Sampson Jannuzi, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 59 (2007)

National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil Dependency

John Deutch and James R. Schlesinger, Chairs; David G. Victor, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 58 (2006)

Russiaí»s Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do

John Edwards and Jack Kemp, Chairs; Stephen Sestanovich, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 57 (2006)

More than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach Toward Africa

Anthony Lake and Christine Todd Whitman, Chairs; Princeton N. Lyman and J. Stephen

Morrison, Project Directors

Independent Task Force Report No. 56 (2006)

In the Wake of War: Improving Post-Conflict Capabilities

Samuel R. Berger and Brent Scowcroft, Chairs; William L. Nash, Project Director; Mona K.

Sutphen, Deputy Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 55 (2005)

In Support of Arab Democracy: Why and How

Madeleine K. Albright and Vin Weber, Chairs; Steven A. Cook, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 54 (2005)

Building a North American Community

John P. Manley, Pedro Aspe, and William F. Weld, Chairs; Thomas dí»Aquino, Andres

Rozental, and Robert Pastor, Vice Chairs; Chappell H. Lawson, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 53 (2005)

Iran: Time for a New Approach

Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert M. Gates, Chairs; Suzanne Maloney, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 52 (2004)

Independent Task Force Reports 77

An Update on the Global Campaign Against Terrorist Financing

Maurice R. Greenberg, Chair; William F. Wechsler and Lee S. Wolosky, Project Directors

Independent Task Force Report No. 40B (Web-only release, 2004)

Renewing the Atlantic Partnership

Henry A. Kissinger and Lawrence H. Summers, Chairs; Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 51 (2004)

Iraq: One Year After

Thomas R. Pickering and James R. Schlesinger, Chairs; Eric P. Schwartz, Project Consultant

Independent Task Force Report No. 43C (Web-only release, 2004)

Nonlethal Weapons and Capabilities

Paul X. Kelley and Graham Allison, Chairs; Richard L. Garwin, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 50 (2004)

New Priorities in South Asia: U.S. Policy Toward India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan

(Chairmení»s Report)

Marshall Bouton, Nicholas Platt, and Frank G. Wisner, Chairs; Dennis Kux and Mahnaz

Ispahani, Project Directors

Independent Task Force Report No. 49 (2003)

Cosponsored with the Asia Society

Finding Americaí»s Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy

Peter G. Peterson, Chair; Kathy Bloomgarden, Henry Grunwald, David E. Morey, and

Shibley Telhami, Working Committee Chairs; Jennifer Sieg, Project Director; Sharon

Herbstman, Project Coordinator

Independent Task Force Report No. 48 (2003)

Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared

Warren B. Rudman, Chair; Richard A. Clarke, Senior Adviser; Jamie F. Metzl,

Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 47 (2003)

Iraq: The Day After (Chairsí» Update)

Thomas R. Pickering and James R. Schlesinger, Chairs; Eric P. Schwartz, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 43B (Web-only release, 2003)

Burma: Time for Change

Mathea Falco, Chair

Independent Task Force Report No. 46 (2003)

Afghanistan: Are We Losing the Peace?

Marshall Bouton, Nicholas Platt, and Frank G. Wisner, Chairs; Dennis Kux and Mahnaz

Ispahani, Project Directors

Chairmaní»s Report of an Independent Task Force (2003)

Cosponsored with the Asia Society

Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge

Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, Chairs; Eric Heginbotham, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 45 (2003)

78 Independent Task Force Reports

Chinese Military Power

Harold Brown, Chair; Joseph W. Prueher, Vice Chair; Adam Segal, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 44 (2003)

Iraq: The Day After

Thomas R. Pickering and James R. Schlesinger, Chairs; Eric P. Schwartz, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 43 (2003)

Threats to Democracy: Prevention and Response

Madeleine K. Albright and Bronislaw Geremek, Chairs; Morton H. Halperin, Director;

Elizabeth Frawley Bagley, Associate Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 42 (2002)

America—till Unprepared, Still in Danger

Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, Chairs; Stephen E. Flynn, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 41 (2002)

Terrorist Financing

Maurice R. Greenberg, Chair; William F. Wechsler and Lee S. Wolosky, Project Directors

Independent Task Force Report No. 40 (2002)

Enhancing U.S. Leadership at the United Nations

David Dreier and Lee H. Hamilton, Chairs; Lee Feinstein and Adrian Karatnycky, Project

Directors

Independent Task Force Report No. 39 (2002)

Cosponsored with Freedom House

Improving the U.S. Public Diplomacy Campaign in the War Against Terrorism

Carla A. Hills and Richard C. Holbrooke, Chairs; Charles G. Boyd, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 38 (Web-only release, 2001)

Building Support for More Open Trade

Kenneth M. Duberstein and Robert E. Rubin, Chairs; Timothy F. Geithner, Project Director;

Daniel R. Lucich, Deputy Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 37 (2001)

Beginning the Journey: China, the United States, and the WTO

Robert D. Hormats, Chair; Elizabeth Economy and Kevin Nealer, Project Directors

Independent Task Force Report No. 36 (2001)

Strategic Energy Policy Update

Edward L. Morse, Chair; Amy Myers Jaffe, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 33B (2001)

Cosponsored with the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University

Testing North Korea: The Next Stage in U.S. and ROK Policy

Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, Chairs; Robert A. Manning, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 35 (2001)

The United States and Southeast Asia: A Policy Agenda for the New Administration

J. Robert Kerrey, Chair; Robert A. Manning, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 34 (2001)

Independent Task Force Reports 79

Strategic Energy Policy: Challenges for the 21st Century

Edward L. Morse, Chair; Amy Myers Jaffe, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 33 (2001)

Cosponsored with the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University

A Letter to the President and a Memorandum on U.S. Policy Toward Brazil

Stephen Robert, Chair; Kenneth Maxwell, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 32 (2001)

State Department Reform

Frank C. Carlucci, Chair; Ian J. Brzezinski, Project Coordinator

Independent Task Force Report No. 31 (2001)

Cosponsored with the Center for Strategic and International Studies

U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 21st Century: A Follow-on Report

Bernard W. Aronson and William D. Rogers, Chairs; Julia Sweig and Walter Mead, Project

Directors

Independent Task Force Report No. 30 (2000)

Toward Greater Peace and Security in Colombia: Forging a Constructive U.S. Policy

Bob Graham and Brent Scowcroft, Chairs; Michael Shifter, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 29 (2000)

Cosponsored with the Inter-American Dialogue

Future Directions for U.S. Economic Policy Toward Japan

Laura Dí»Andrea Tyson, Chair; M. Diana Helweg Newton, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 28 (2000)

First Steps Toward a Constructive U.S. Policy in Colombia

Bob Graham and Brent Scowcroft, Chairs; Michael Shifter, Project Director

Interim Report (2000)

Cosponsored with the Inter-American Dialogue

Promoting Sustainable Economies in the Balkans

Steven Rattner, Chair; Michael B.G. Froman, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 27 (2000)

Non-Lethal Technologies: Progress and Prospects

Richard L. Garwin, Chair; W. Montague Winfield, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 26 (1999)

Safeguarding Prosperity in a Global Financial System:

The Future International Financial Architecture

Carla A. Hills and Peter G. Peterson, Chairs; Morris Goldstein, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 25 (1999)

Cosponsored with the International Institute for Economics

U.S. Policy Toward North Korea: Next Steps

Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, Chairs; Michael J. Green, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 24 (1999)

80 Independent Task Force Reports

Reconstructing the Balkans

Morton I. Abramowitz and Albert Fishlow, Chairs; Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 23 (Web-only release, 1999)

Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions

Michel Rocard, Chair; Henry Siegman, Project Director; Yezid Sayigh and Khalil Shikaki,

Principal Authors

Independent Task Force Report No. 22 (1999)

U.S. Policy Toward Northeastern Europe

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Chair; F. Stephen Larrabee, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 21 (1999)

The Future of Transatlantic Relations

Robert D. Blackwill, Chair and Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 20 (1999)

U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 21st Century

Bernard W. Aronson and William D. Rogers, Chairs; Walter Russell Mead, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 19 (1999)

After the Tests: U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan

Richard N. Haass and Morton H. Halperin, Chairs

Independent Task Force Report No. 18 (1998)

Cosponsored with the Brookings Institution

Managing Change on the Korean Peninsula

Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, Chairs; Michael J. Green, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 17 (1998)

Promoting U.S. Economic Relations with Africa

Peggy Dulany and Frank Savage, Chairs; Salih Booker, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 16 (1998)

U.S. Middle East Policy and the Peace Process

Henry Siegman, Project Coordinator

Independent Task Force Report No. 15 (1997)

Differentiated Containment: U.S. Policy Toward Iran and Iraq

Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, Chairs; Richard W. Murphy, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 14 (1997)

Russia, Its Neighbors, and an Enlarging NATO

Richard G. Lugar, Chair; Victoria Nuland, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 13 (1997)

Rethinking International Drug Control: New Directions for U.S. Policy

Mathea Falco, Chair

Independent Task Force Report No. 12 (1997)

Independent Task Force Reports 81

Financing Americaí»s Leadership: Protecting American Interests and Promoting American Values

Mickey Edwards and Stephen J. Solarz, Chairs; Morton H. Halperin, Lawrence J. Korb,

and Richard M. Moose, Project Directors

Independent Task Force Report No. 11 (1997)

Cosponsored with the Brookings Institution

A New U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan

Richard N. Haass, Chair; Gideon Rose, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 10 (1997)

Arms Control and the U.S.-Russian Relationship

Robert D. Blackwill, Chair and Author; Keith W. Dayton, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 9 (1996)

Cosponsored with the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom

American National Interest and the United Nations

George Soros, Chair

Independent Task Force Report No. 8 (1996)

Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence

Maurice R. Greenberg, Chair; Richard N. Haass, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 7 (1996)

Lessons of the Mexican Peso Crisis

John C. Whitehead, Chair; Marie-Josee Kravis, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 6 (1996)

Managing the Taiwan Issue: Key Is Better U.S. Relations with China

Stephen Friedman, Chair; Elizabeth Economy, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 5 (1995)

Non-Lethal Technologies: Military Options and Implications

Malcolm H. Wiener, Chair

Independent Task Force Report No. 4 (1995)

Should NATO Expand?

Harold Brown, Chair; Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 3 (1995)

Success or Sellout? The U.S.-North Korean Nuclear Accord

Kyung Won Kim and Nicholas Platt, Chairs; Richard N. Haass, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 2 (1995)

Cosponsored with the Seoul Forum for International Affairs

Nuclear Proliferation: Confronting the New Challenges

Stephen J. Hadley, Chair; Mitchell B. Reiss, Project Director

Independent Task Force Report No. 1 (1995)

Note: Task Force reports are available for download from CFRí»s website, www.cfr.org.

For more information, email publications@cfr.org.

└╠└Ř▒█ ┼Ű└¤┴ě║˝└žăě ┴▀▒╣╣«┴Ž żţÂ╗░ď ăěż▀ă¤│¬
┤┘└Ż▒█ ║¤ăĐă┘░˙ ┤Ű║¤┴Ž└š