A Sharper Choice
on North Korea
Engaging China for a Stable Northeast Asia
Independent Task Force Report No. 74
Mike Mullen and
Sam Nunn, Chairs
Adam Mount, Project Director
Task Force Members
Victor D. Cha*
Georgetown University
Roberta Cohen
Committee for Human Rights
in North Korea
Joseph R. DeTrani
Daniel Morgan Academy
Nicholas Eberstadt*
American Enterprise Institute
Robert J. Einhorn
Brookings Institution
Bonnie S. Glaser*
Center for Strategic and
International Studies
Mary Beth Long*
Foundation for Defense
of Democracies
Catherine B. Lotrionte
Georgetown University
Evan S. Medeiros*
Eurasia Group
Adam Mount
Center for American Progress
Independent Task Force Report 1
Executive Summary 3
Findings 12
A Changing Region 12
A Deteriorating Position 18
Recommendations 27
A Sharper Choice 27
Conclusion 44
Additional and Dissenting Views 45
Endnotes 51
Task Force Members 61
Task Force Observers 71
Contents
Independent Task Force Report
Executive Summary
Since 1953, when an armistice put an end to the major military operations
of the Korean War, the Democratic People¡¯s Republic of Korea (DPRK),
the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States Forces Korea have
been trapped in an increasingly dangerous cycle in which North Korea
provokes a militarized crisis until minor concessions settle the situation at
a new normal. The U.S.-ROK alliance has succeeded in preventing these
recurrent crises from igniting a war, but this cycle of provocation hides
perilous long-term trends. North Korea¡¯s accelerating nuclear and missile
programs pose a grave and expanding threat to the territory of U.S.
allies, to U.S. personnel stationed in the region, and to the continental
United States. More generally, North Korea¡¯s behavior has endangered
the emergence of a stable and prosperous Northeast Asia.
The United States and its allies have failed to meet their critical objectives:
to roll back North Korea¡¯s expanding nuclear and ballistic missile
programs and prevent it from spreading nuclear and missile technology
to dangerous actors around the world. China¡¯s reluctance to pressure
the DPRK has allowed the regime to further destabilize a region critical
to U.S. national interests, to systematically perpetrate crimes against
humanity, and to threaten the safety of U.S. allies. The countervailing
diplomatic, economic, and military steps required to deter and contain
the North Korean regime threaten to aggravate U.S. tensions with
China just as the United States and its regional partners are attempting
to encourage China¡¯s rise to remain consistent with a peaceful, prosperous,
and just regional order.
Yet developments in the past year have altered the North Korea problem
in important ways. In March 2016, the United Nations (UN) Security
Council—ith China¡¯s consent—nanimously passed Resolution
2270 to significantly strengthen the sanctions regime that restricts
arms transfers and limits trade with North Korea. Pyongyang¡¯s actions
and Beijing¡¯s reticence have also provided incentive for closer military
4 A Sharper Choice on North Korea
cooperation between the United States and its allies, including on missile
defense. Additionally, South Korean President Park Geun-hye has
made concerted efforts to improve the ROK¡¯s bilateral relations with
both China and Japan, and a new round of regional diplomacy has
improved coordination over the North Korean nuclear problem.1 Yet
North Korea is also accelerating the development of a capability to
strike the continental United States, as well as U.S. allies, with a nuclear
warhead delivered by an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).2
These developments present the U.S. president with an exigent threat
of a North Korea that can strike at the United States—ut also with new
opportunities to halt the cycle of provocation and prevent North Korea
from achieving this capability.
China¡¯s policy toward the DPRK will critically affect the fate of the
region. If China, the United States, and U.S. allies can work together to
pressure North Korea to abandon its nuclear program and mitigate its
threatening military posture, a stable, prosperous Northeast Asia led
by China and U.S. allies can emerge; if they cannot, the DPRK¡¯s recklessness
will further strain the U.S.-China relationship and destabilize
a region vital to both countries¡¯ interests. For this reason, encouraging
a transformation of China¡¯s policy toward North Korea should be
the next administration¡¯s top priority in its relations with China. This
transformation should be accomplished through a sequence of steps
to gradually increase the pressure on China to support a cooperative
approach, which could result in the peaceful resolution of the armistice,
the elimination of nuclear capability, and the eventual reunification of
the Korean Peninsula.
In this context, the Council on Foreign Relations convened an Independent
Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward North Korea to assess the
efficacy of existing policy and offer recommendations to U.S. policymakers
on reducing the threat from North Korea for the remainder of
President Barack Obama¡¯s presidency, as well as for the next administration.
The Task Force assesses that the current policy of strategic
patience will not halt the recurrent and dangerous cycle of provocation
or ensure a stable regional security order into the future. If allowed to
continue, current trends will predictably, progressively, and gravely
threaten U.S. national security interests and those of its allies.
Halting these alarming and negative trends requires a new strategy
toward North Korea and the region, one guided by a broader organizing
principle: to bring about a stable and prosperous Northeast Asia
Executive Summary 5
that U.S. allies have a hand in leading. In the long run, achieving this
vision requires that the Korean Peninsula be free of nuclear weapons
and respectful of human rights, whether by genuine transformation of
the North Korean regime or by unification. U.S. policy toward North
Korea will have to be integrated with broader U.S. strategy for maritime
Asia, or both are likely to fail.
The United States should present North Korea with a sharper choice:
seek a negotiated settlement to return to compliance with UN resolutions
on nuclear weapons or face severe and escalating costs. These
steps should be carefully and deliberately sequenced to calibrate pressure
on North Korea—o credibly signal to Pyongyang that the United
States and its allies will continually increase pressure until serious talks
resume, to ensure that the regime has an opportunity to respond to specific
pressure tactics at designated junctures, and to maximize opportunities
to work with China.
The United States should act immediately to secure its interests and
those of its allies against the grave and growing North Korean nuclear
and missile threats by expanding U.S.-ROK-Japan cooperation to
actively and strictly enforce sanctions on North Korea and by strengthening
its joint deterrence profile.
On a parallel course, the United States and its allies should offer
restructured negotiations that provide genuine incentives for North
Korea to participate in substantive talks while increasing pressure by
strictly enforcing the new sanctions in UN Security Council Resolution
2270, targeting North Korean illicit activity, and encouraging other
nations in the region—ncluding China—o join this effort. If Pyongyang
refuses this proposal, the United States should seek new multilateral
sanctions to restrict the regime¡¯s funding sources and enact
additional military measures to strengthen allied deterrence of military
attacks. New nuclear tests or military attacks by North Korea should
accelerate this timetable. North Korea should not be allowed to use
talks as a way of detracting attention from bad behavior, as has been the
case in the past. Abrogation of the testing ban, new attacks, or stalled
talks should result in their termination.
The United States should also make a new approach to China. To
enlist China in the effort to bring about a stable and nonnuclear Korean
Peninsula, U.S. officials should propose a dialogue on the future of the
Korean Peninsula to demonstrate that it is in both countries¡¯ security
interests to find a comprehensive resolution to the problem. A unified
6 A Sharper Choice on North Korea
response to North Korea stands the greatest chance of finding a lasting
solution on the peninsula and of forging a stable and prosperous Northeast
Asia, and is by far the preferable course of action.
As long as North Korea retains a nuclear capability, the U.S.-China
relationship will be strained. To the extent that Beijing declines to cooperate
or this effort does not show results, the United States and its allies
will have no choice but to greatly accelerate efforts with Japan and South
Korea to bring about a Korean Peninsula without nuclear weapons.
Findings and Recommendations
The Task Force reached ten findings and six recommendations. These
support five broad principles for U.S. policy: promote a stable and prosperous
Northeast Asia, restructure negotiations, protect human rights,
enforce sanctions and escalate financial pressure, and strengthen deterrence
and defense.
Finding
1. In its assessment of the status of the North Korean regime, the Task
Force finds that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has ruthlessly
consolidated power and there is low probability of regime collapse
in the near future. Over time, however, North Korean citizens¡¯
increasing access to information from the outside world, as well as
growing internal markets, could form the basis for a gradual transformation
of the totalitarian system.
PROMOTE A STABLE AND PROSPEROUS NORTHEAST ASIA
Findings
2. The Task Force finds that although China remains North Korea¡¯s
primary patron, it is increasingly willing to exert pressure to curb
the regime¡¯s erratic behavior.
3. The Task Force finds that South Korea¡¯s improving relations with
Japan and China present new opportunities for cooperation on
North Korea policy.
4. The Task Force finds that South Korea can be an effective representative
of shared U.S.-ROK interests, including deterrence signaling
to North Korea, coordination with China, and regional diplomacy
to promote sanctions enforcement.
Executive Summary 7
Recommendations
I. To ensure that U.S. policy remains consistent with the long-term
objective of a stable and prosperous Northeast Asia, the Task Force
recommends that the United States and its allies engage China as
soon as possible to plan for the future of the Korean Peninsula.
These talks, both trilateral and in a five-party format, should plan
for militarized crises, collapse scenarios, and the role of a unified
Korea in Northeast Asian security.
¡á¡á Five-party talks consisting of China, Japan, Russia, South Korea,
and the United States should begin as soon as possible to prepare a
common proposal for the next round of multilateral negotiations
and also to discuss other areas of regional concern. In this way, the
parties can accomplish the intended regional stability functions
of the Six Party Talks and help promote their resumption.
¡á¡á To convince China to participate, Washington and Seoul should
jointly reassure Beijing that Korean unification will not damage
its interests. These steps can include guarantees that Chinese
investments on the peninsula will remain intact or be compensated,
as well as a dialogue to de-conflict plans for border control,
refugees, port access, and military operations during collapse
scenarios. The United States and South Korea can also jointly
present conditions under which the alliance would consider revising
the number and disposition of U.S. forces on the peninsula.
Although the alliance should continue in any event, attenuation of
the threat may allow for a commensurate reduction of U.S. force
posture on the peninsula.
RESTRUCTURE NEGOTIATIONS
Finding
5. Although a negotiated agreement on complete and verifiable denuclearization
remains a preferable mechanism for resolving the
nuclear issue, the Task Force finds that negotiations are unlikely
to eliminate North Korea¡¯s nuclear or missile capabilities in the
near future. Nonetheless, a new diplomatic approach could potentially
freeze North Korea¡¯s nuclear and missile programs, establish
conditions for increasing pressure if North Korea rejects the proposal,
and lay the groundwork for eventual rollback of the regime¡¯s
nuclear capabilities.
8 A Sharper Choice on North Korea
Recommendations
II. The Task Force recommends that the United States move quickly
to propose restructured negotiations to limit North Korea¡¯s nuclear
and missile programs and work toward denuclearization and a comprehensive
peace agreement.
¡á¡á Under this model, the United States should undertake talks
subject to the following conditions: first, reaffirmation of the
principles of the 2005 Joint Statement, including a nonnuclear
peninsula, by all parties; second, progressive steps on the nuclear
issue at each stage in the negotiations; third, a moratorium on
tests of nuclear weapons and missiles with a range-payload capability
greater than existing Scud missiles. The United States and
the other members of the talks should avow that they will never
accept the DPRK as a nuclear state.
¡á¡á Early stages of the negotiations should focus on attaining a verified
freeze on the DPRK¡¯s nuclear capabilities. Additionally, the
parties may explore steps on conventional arms control (including
limits to the deployment of and exercises with conventional
forces), limitations on missile development, nonproliferation
of nuclear material or technology, or site-specific inspection of
North Korean nuclear facilities.
¡á¡á The eventual outcome of the talks is a comprehensive deal in which
North Korea, South Korea, and the United States, supported by
China, sign a peace agreement that will finally end the Korean
War and gradually normalize relations in exchange for complete
nuclear disarmament and progress on human rights.
PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS
Finding
6. The Task Force finds that the North Korean state continues to
commit grave crimes against humanity, but may be sensitive to
international pressure to live up to UN standards on human rights.
Recommendations
III. The Task Force recommends that the United States work with allies,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the United Nations
system to escalate pressure on North Korea to respect the human
rights of its citizens.
9
¡á¡á As a first step, U.S. diplomats should work with global partners
to signal that they will move to suspend North Korea¡¯s credentials
at the United Nations if it does not demonstrate real progress
on human rights. To avert this action, North Korea would have to
accept visits from UN human rights officials to demonstrate progress.
When it meets at the start of each General Assembly session,
the UN Credentials Committee can assess whether North Korea
has met the requirements.
¡á¡á U.S. policymakers should facilitate governmental and nongovernmental
efforts to allow information about the outside world to
reach the North Korean people.
¡á¡á The United States should support international efforts to seek
accountability for North Korean individuals and entities responsible
for crimes against humanity while expanding U.S. sanctions
against them.
ENFORCE SANCTIONS AND
ESCALATE FINANCIAL PRESSURE
Finding
7. The Task Force finds that the recent expansion of the sanctions
regime is a necessary step in exerting pressure on North Korea. However,
expanded and sustained efforts are required to ensure that they
are rigorously implemented and have the desired effects, including
measures to provide amenable states with material assistance and to
pressure those that illegally trade with or finance North Korea.
Recommendations
IV. The Task Force recommends that the United States invest in rigorous
enforcement of the sanctions regime and apply escalating pressure
on North Korea¡¯s illicit activities.
¡á¡á The United States should act quickly to support East and Southeast
Asian states in creating a standing multilateral mechanism to
coordinate implementation of Resolution 2270. This group should
facilitate the sharing of intelligence, coordinate enforcement operations,
and distribute resources donated by partners from outside
the region, including the United States. Given its sophistication in
circumventing previous sanctions, regional states should prioritize
interdiction and inspection of North Korean shipping.
Executive Summary
10 A Sharper Choice on North Korea
¡á¡á Should North Korea fail to reenter negotiations, the United
States should work with its allies to prepare future financial sanctions
and other measures that target the full range of the regime¡¯s
illicit activity, including steps to punish corruption, exporters of
slave labor, as well as foreign firms and banks that support these
activities, wherever they reside. The United States should allow
U.S. companies to bring legal action against sanctions violators
and facilitators.
STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE
Findings
8. The Task Force finds that North Korea¡¯s development of the capability
to deliver a nuclear warhead on a long-range ballistic missile
would dramatically increase its ability to threaten the United States
and its allies.
9. The Task Force finds that although U.S.-ROK deterrence policy
may have succeeded in preventing major military attacks since 2010,
the frequency and severity of North Korea¡¯s aggressive behavior
will likely increase as its nuclear and sub-conventional capabilities
continue to develop.
Recommendations
V. The Task Force recommends that the United States, South Korea,
and Japan move expeditiously to tighten collaboration and strengthen
their deterrence and defense posture.
¡á¡á To reduce North Korea¡¯s incentives to divide the three partners
with selective military strikes, they should issue a collective security
commitment declaring that an attack by North Korea against
any one of them is an attack against all.
¡á¡á The United States, South Korea, and Japan should, through joint
exercises and coordinated deployment, expand allied capacity in
defensive and offensive cyber operations, antisubmarine capabilities,
missile defense, special forces, and air and naval forces to
enforce new UN sanctions.
VI. The Task Force recommends that the United States, South Korea,
and Japan build capacity to intercept all missile launches with
a range-payload capability greater than existing Scud missiles
Executive Summary 11
originating from North Korea, whether they are declared to be ballistic
missile tests or civil space launch vehicles. In the event that
Pyongyang fails to reenter negotiations, or the negotiations fail, the
three partners should be prepared to declare and then implement
this policy.
Finding
10. The Task Force finds that current trends, if allowed to continue, will
predictably, progressively, and gravely threaten U.S. national interests
and those of its allies.
This overall strategy seeks to prevent North Korea from attaining the
capability to carry out a nuclear strike on the continental United States,
but also hedges against the possibility that it does cross this threshold.
The proposed enhancements of allied deterrence and defense posture
will help ensure that the United States and its allies can meet their
national security needs in the years immediately following a successful
North Korean test of an ICBM capability. Although it does propose
increasing pressure on North Korea to return to the negotiating table,
this strategy does not seek to cause the North Korean regime to collapse,
an event that is most likely to occur as a result of the regime¡¯s
continued gross economic mismanagement and cruel and inhumane
treatment of its citizens.
However, if North Korea continues to develop its nuclear and longrange
missile capabilities and achieves the capability to strike the United
States, Washington will have to work with allies to reassess overall strategy
toward the regime. That policy review would consider more assertive
diplomatic and military steps, including some that directly threaten
the regime¡¯s nuclear and missile programs and, therefore, the regime
itself. At that juncture, these measures may be necessary to protect the
United States and its allies and to meet their immutable objective of a
stable, free, and nonnuclear Korean Peninsula.
12
A CHANGING REGION
Since the end of the Korean War, North Korea has perpetuated a brutal
and familiar pattern: the regime carries out a dangerous and often fatal
provocation and escalates tensions near to the point of war, following
which both sides deescalate the crisis and often agree to talks (figure 1).
In August 2015, for example, two South Korean soldiers were maimed
by land mines, resulting in a militarized standoff. The Park administration
succeeded in extracting a pro forma expression of regret, which
led to a brief detente and a reunion of families separated for decades
by the Korean War. In late 2015, the Obama administration reportedly
made a new attempt to restart negotiations with North Korea but was
rebuffed.3 Six days into the new year, North Korea conducted its fourth
nuclear test, which initiated a new round of international condemnation,
threats, and sanctions. Tensions remained high through the first
half of 2016 as North Korean leader Kim Jong-un threatened military
action in response to regular U.S.-ROK spring military exercises and
carried out an aggressive program of missile tests.4
This 2015 cycle of provocation is the latest iteration of a pattern that
has persisted for decades.5 During this time, the DPRK¡¯s diplomatic
and economic isolation from the rest of the world has deepened, and
only limited information about the outside world reaches North Korean
citizens, who continue to struggle with starvation, torture, internment,
and execution.
1. The Task Force finds that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has ruthlessly
consolidated power and there is low probability of regime collapse
in the near future. Over time, however, North Korean citizens¡¯ increasing
access to information from the outside world, as well as growing internal
markets, could form the basis for a gradual transformation of the totalitarian
system.
Findings
Findings 13
DPRK reveals it has
weaponized plutonium
DPRK abandons
nonaggression
agreements
DPRK prepares for
missile tests
January 17
January 29
February 16
July 26
August 5
August 16
July–ugust
October 30
November 23
August 4
August 20
August 22
August 24
September 7
DPRK sinks Cheonan, a South
Korean warship
ROK cuts off trade with
DPRK
Two South Korean
soldiers maimed by DPRK
landmines in DMZ
DPRK and ROK exchange
artillery fire across border
DPRK says it is open to
nuclear talks
Former president Bill
Clinton negotiates
freedom of U.S.
journalists
DPRK reopens border
with South Korea for
family reunions and
tourism
DPRK calls for better
relations with ROK
DPRK and ROK reopen
communication lines, begin
to discuss talks
DPRK and ROK hold talks
DPRK and ROK hold
talks
DPRK expresses
¡°egret¡±over landmine
incident, ROK ceases
broadcasts
DPRK and ROK agree
on family reunions
DPRK launches Taepodong-2
missile
DPRK leaves Six Party Talks and
restarts its nuclear program
UN Security Council passes new
sanctions
DPRK conducts second nuclear test
DPRK puts U.S. journalists on trial
April 5
April 13
April 14
May 14
May 24
March 26
May 23
Mid-August
August 21
January 2
January 12
February 8
United States and ROK
start major naval
exercises
DPRK and ROK
exchange artillery fire
DPRK shells ROK
territory Yeonpeong
Island, killing two South
Korean marines; ROK
returns fire
ROK begins loudspeaker
broadcasts, DPRK threatens
to attack them
DPRK orders forces to
wartime footing, redeploys
forces closer to the border
2010–011
2015
2009
Provocation
Crisis Intensifies
Crisis Abates
Figure 1: North Korea ¡¯s Cycles of Provocation
14 A Sharper Choice on North Korea
During North Korea¡¯s leadership transitions of 1997 and 2011, when
Kim Jong-il assumed power from his father and was then succeeded by
his son Kim Jong-un, some in the West predicted that the regime would
collapse, scattering refugees and fissile material across the region.6 In
both cases, the regime has endured and succeeded in maintaining centralized
authority in Pyongyang. Yet all is not business as usual in North
Korea; in 2016, the regime is still struggling to return to normalcy after
its new supreme leader initiated a series of gruesome purges that destabilized
the ruling elite.7 The young leader is attempting to revitalize the
state¡¯s party apparatus as a way of reasserting his control over its leadership.
North Korea¡¯s economy has largely failed to develop over the last
several decades. Pyongyang¡¯s centralized control has produced chronic
malnutrition, prevailed over a steady decline in imports and exports, and
prevented the emergence of a modern industrial or service economy.8
At the same time, some facets of daily life in North Korea have seen
gradual changes. Under Kim Jong-un, the regime has proved willing
to tolerate the emergence of unofficial markets, which, coupled with
a brisk cross-border trade with China, has allowed the North Korean
economy to grow at marginal rates of 1 to 2 percent, according to some
estimates (figure 2).9 Meanwhile, the regime has become permeable to
personal information technology, allowing ordinary citizens access to
outside information through foreign DVDs and radio broadcasts and
elites to also own USB drives and mobile phones. A recent survey of
defectors found that ¡°nearly half the study¡¯s sample reported having
watched a foreign DVD while in North Korea.¡±10 Others note the
explosion of active mobile phones in the country, which have climbed
past two million in a population of twenty-five million (though many
of these phones cannot make international calls).11 Gradual marketization
presents opportunities and challenges for U.S. policy. On the one
hand, it could widen North Korea¡¯s thin middle class and lead to gradual
evolution of the regime; on the other, the increasing complexity of its
economy affords North Korea greater ability to resist and circumvent
the international sanctions regime.
2. The Task Force finds that although China remains North Korea¡¯s primary
patron, it is increasingly willing to exert pressure to curb the
regime¡¯s erratic behavior.
Even as North Korea continues to revolve through its cycle of provocation
and conciliation, changes in the global context and in regional
Findings 15
politics present new opportunities to pressure the regime. Despite a
long and troubled history, China has continued to serve as a patron of
the North Korean regime—s a main trading partner and a defender
in the UN Security Council.12 China¡¯s primary interest with respect to
North Korea is the maintenance of regional stability: Beijing worries
that collapse of the regime could open the door to millions of refugees
streaming over the Tumen River border into China and deprive Beijing
of a geographical buffer against U.S. forces in the region.
In the last year, however, China has shown signs that it is willing to
apply pressure to prevent North Korea¡¯s most dangerous behavior.13
Chinese diplomats have repeatedly called for the resumption of Six
Party Talks, its commerce ministry has moved to enforce some of the
new sanctions, and Chinese state media have included pointed indications
of the party¡¯s displeasure with the Kim regime¡¯s intransigence.14
There are other signs as well: in the volatile days of August 2015, Chinese
social networking sites showed evidence that China¡¯s People¡¯s Liberation
Army deployed light armored formations to their border with
North Korea, and in December, a North Korean pop group abruptly
departed Beijing ahead of a prominent scheduled concert.15
0
250
500
750
1000
1250
1500
1750
2000
2250
2500
U.S. Dollars (millions)
China
Russia
South Korea
All Other
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2010
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Source: Nicholas Eberstadt, ¡°North Korea¡¯s ¡®Epic Economic Fail¡¯ in International Perspective,¡± Asan Institute
for Policy Studies, November 2015.
*Unit: 2013 producer-price-index-adjusted illustrative U.S. dollars (millions)
Figure 2: Proportion of North Korean Balance of Trade
by Countr y, 1994–013*
16 A Sharper Choice on North Korea
In this context, North Korea¡¯s January 2016 nuclear test could be seen
as a public defiance of Chinese President Xi Jinping, just as China had
been extending its hand in an attempt to mend poor relations.16 North
Korea¡¯s disruptive behavior over the past year underscores the threat
that North Korean policies pose to China¡¯s national security interests
and its standing in the region. It is in this context that President Xi in
April 2016 told a group of foreign diplomats that his country ¡°will never
allow war or chaos on the peninsula,¡± a warning that seemed to apply
to all parties.17 Further provocations will only strengthen the hand of
those in Beijing who support taking a firmer line with Pyongyang.
However, there have also been troubling trends in China-DPRK
relations. Beijing¡¯s strategy for sanctions and diplomatic contacts evidently
intends to maximize its leverage over Pyongyang. U.S. officials
should not be surprised if China selectively implements Resolution
2270, modulating the volume of cross-border trade in response to diplomatic
developments.18 Despite the new sanctions, there is little hard
evidence that China has placed serious limits on the volume of trade, in
part because a great deal of it can pass through loopholes in Resolution
2270 for freight that is ¡°exclusively for livelihood purposes.¡±19 There are
other indications that China continues to look for ways to improve ties.
Although North Korean politburo member Ri Su-Yong told Chinese
officials that North Korea¡¯s policy of expanding its nuclear capabilities
is ¡°permanent,¡± his invitation to Beijing to meet with President Xi was
probably meant to repair relations.20 China reportedly continues to
allow North Korean hackers to operate from its territory.21
China¡¯s assessment of its interests in North Korea will critically influence
the fate of the Kim Jong-un regime and the efficacy of U.S. policy
toward it. U.S. officials cannot depend on China to fully implement
Resolution 2270 or to share their views. However, there are indications
that factions in China increasingly perceive North Korea as a threat to
stability rather than a requirement for it. If so, Beijing may gradually
become more willing to discipline Pyongyang for aggressive behavior
and its nuclear program. For this reason, encouraging this shift in Beijing¡¯s
calculus should be a primary objective of U.S. policy toward the
region. The United States and its allies should approach this by laying
out a sequence of steps, including diplomatic, political, economic, and
military, that gradually increase the pressure to resolve the major issues
with respect to the Korean Peninsula.
Findings 17
3. The Task Force finds that South Korea¡¯s improving relations with
Japan and China present new opportunities for cooperation on North
Korea policy.
In the last year, Japan-ROK relations have made significant steps
toward recovery. A November 2015 summit between President Park
Geun-hye and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe succeeded in
breaking an almost four-year impasse between the two countries. This
brief meeting set the stage for a late December agreement in which
Prime Minister Abe apologized to South Korea for Japanese soldiers¡¯
forcing Korean women into sexual slavery during World War II, and
the Japanese government pledged to fund a foundation administered
by the Korean government that would pay reparations to survivors.22
The historic agreement has now paved the way for broader Japan-ROK
coordination on a range of issues, including defense.23 Although South
Korea and Japan, along with the United States, already cooperate on
some defense issues—ncluding the 2014 Trilateral Information Sharing
Arrangement on North Korea¡¯s nuclear and missile threats, which
led to a plan to conduct joint missile defense exercises in June 2016—
there is ample room to deepen the relationship, which should be done
under any future circumstances.24
For their part, China and South Korea have jointly committed to
urgent steps to limit North Korea¡¯s nuclear program.25 In September
2015, while Kim Jong-un remained ensconced in Pyongyang, President
Park attended a military parade in Beijing to commemorate the end of
World War II and met with President Xi. In a joint appearance, Park
thanked Xi for his country¡¯s role in defusing the August crisis; looking
forward, both leaders warned the DPRK against new military aggression
and called for resumption of the Six Party Talks.26 Despite concerns
over U.S. missile defense assets in South Korea, China and the
ROK have maintained frequent and high-level coordination over the
North Korean nuclear issue in 2016.27
4. The Task Force finds that South Korea can be an effective representative
of shared U.S.-ROK interests, including deterrence signaling to North
Korea, coordination with China, and regional diplomacy to promote
sanctions enforcement.
China continues to see the United States as a geostrategic adversary
attempting to encircle and isolate it, and North Korea justifies
18 A Sharper Choice on North Korea
its own vast military as necessary to defend against a U.S. invasion.
As a result, U.S. involvement in the region can sometimes provoke
strongly negative responses from China and the DPRK. As South
Korea improves its relations with Japan and China, it can increasingly
play a leadership role in regional deliberations over the North Korean
issue. In direct discussions with its northern neighbor, South Korea
continues to possess a greater range of policy options than the United
States, including the economic, informational, and cultural levers it
has used to favorable effect in the recent past. Furthermore, because
South Korea is more vulnerable to a North Korean attack, threats that
come from Seoul may have greater credibility and be less inflammatory
than those from U.S. officials. The alliance¡¯s successful management
of the August 2015 crisis may prove a useful model: South Korea
took the lead on deterrent threats, and the Park administration was
able to patiently negotiate a favorable resolution. Last, some potentially
valuable forms of regional cooperation will be impossible if they
are seen to be imposed by states outside the region; South Korea is
well positioned to lead efforts of this kind. Direct U.S.-DPRK negotiations
may sometimes be necessary to serve allied interests, but U.S.
officials should not automatically assume that they are the best representatives
of allied policy.
A DETERIORATING POSITION
5. Although a negotiated agreement on complete and verifiable denuclearization
remains a preferable mechanism for resolving the nuclear issue,
the Task Force finds that negotiations are unlikely to eliminate North
Korea¡¯s nuclear or missile capabilities in the near future. Nonetheless,
a new diplomatic approach could potentially freeze North Korea¡¯s
nuclear and missile programs, establish conditions for increasing pressure
if North Korea rejects the proposal, and lay the groundwork for
eventual rollback of the regime¡¯s nuclear capabilities.
As North Korea¡¯s nuclear capabilities have grown, multilateral negotiations
aimed at securing a denuclearized peninsula have ground to a
halt. Since the collapse of the 1994 Agreed Framework, international
negotiators have focused their attention on the Six Party Talks, a group
that includes representatives from China, Japan, North Korea, Russia,
South Korea, and the United States. The group¡¯s best chance at resuming
19
negotiations on a denuclearization agreement was announced on February
29, 2012, when North Korea agreed to suspend nuclear and missile
tests, halt the production of fissile material, and allow International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors back into the country.28 In
exchange, the United States offered security assurances and nutritional
assistance that would be delivered to malnourished women and children
in North Korea. Just over a month after this Leap Day Agreement,
North Korea carried out a failed attempt to launch a satellite into orbit,
an effort widely seen as a test of ballistic missile technology. As a result,
the agreement collapsed; the United States suspended its aid efforts and
wider talks did not take place.29
In the years since the failed agreement, the possibility of resuming
the Six Party Talks has receded further. North Korean diplomats
have reneged on previous willingness to negotiate a denuclearization
agreement and have instead begun to insist that the DPRK is a legitimate
nuclear power that will not consider restrictions to its nuclear
program.30 In June 2016, North Korea¡¯s deputy nuclear envoy reportedly
told a forum in Beijing that the Six Party Talks are ¡°dead.¡±31 North
Korean diplomats insist that Washington and Pyongyang should
negotiate a peace agreement prior to discussion of the nuclear issue,
an approach that U.S. officials have rejected. A peace agreement has
been a top priority for the Kim Jong-un regime, which sees it as a way
of loosening the country¡¯s isolation, improving its security environment,
and winning international acceptance of its nuclear, missile, and
conventional military capabilities. At the beginning of January 2016, in
response to an offer from the North Korean delegation to the United
Nations, U.S. diplomats agreed to participate in negotiations that would
formally end the Korean War, provided that denuclearization was ¡°part
of any such discussion.¡±32 North Korea rejected this proposal, insisting
that the two sides first negotiate a peace treaty. The United States
has also repeatedly refused to suspend U.S.-ROK military exercises in
return for a DPRK nuclear test freeze.33
The United States has offered to discuss resumption of formal negotiations
with North Korea at any time, but maintains that comprehensive
negotiations can only take place if the regime demonstrates it is
willing to work toward complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization
(CVID).34 For its part, China has repeatedly called for the
resumption of the Six Party Talks and reportedly increased pressure on
its North Korean ally to return to the negotiating table and abandon
Findings
20 A Sharper Choice on North Korea
its nuclear program. However, the United States has rejected China¡¯s
suggestion to separate peace talks and negotiations on the nuclear issue
due to fears that North Korea could stagnate on the latter and seek to
progress solely on the former.35
Many believe that though denuclearization should remain a primary
goal of U.S. policy and the eventual objective of any negotiations, an
attempt to condition Six Party Talks on a complete freeze of the program
would, in practice, prevent resumption of talks.36 Moreover,
some observers now believe that an exclusive focus on denuclearization
impedes negotiations on other measures that could improve stability on
the peninsula and contain the spread of nuclear materials and technology.
37 However, it seems clear that recent exchanges over the agenda
of multilateral talks have uncovered new issues that could potentially
be leveraged to restart them, including the possibility of a freeze on
nuclear tests, the scale of U.S.-ROK exercises, and the possibility of an
eventual peace agreement.
6. The Task Force finds that the North Korean state continues to commit
grave crimes against humanity, but may be sensitive to international
pressure to live up to UN standards on human rights.
The growing quantity of information now escaping North Korea has
revealed the extent of the regime¡¯s unconscionable crimes against
humanity and the fundamental human rights of its citizens.38 In March
2013, the UN Human Rights Council established a commission of
inquiry (COI) on human rights in North Korea. After interviewing
more than three hundred victims, witnesses, and experts, the group
reported ¡°systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations,¡±
which ¡°in many instances . . . entailed crimes against humanity.¡±39 The
commission found that North Korea¡¯s atrocities include ¡°extermination,
murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions
and other sexual violence, persecution on political, religious, racial
and gender grounds, the forcible transfer of populations, the enforced
disappearance of persons and the inhumane act of knowingly causing
prolonged starvation.¡±40 It found that citizens are also subject to an
¡°almost complete denial of the right to freedom of thought, conscience,
and religion¡±; deprivation of information; constant surveillance; economic
and gender discrimination; and deliberate geographic segregation
for the purposes of control, among other abuses.41 Using overhead
Findings 21
imagery, the commission estimated that ¡°between 80,000 and 120,000
[people] are currently detained in four large political prison camps.¡±42
Despite these violations, the DPRK inexplicably remains a member
of the United Nations and is party to four international human rights
treaties, as well as the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions.
43 In this regard, North Korea has enjoyed the protection of Russia
and China, which often deny the authority of international legal bodies
to investigate, sanction, and prosecute crimes against humanity. South
Korea and others have questioned why the regime is allowed to retain its
status as a member of the United Nations.44
Surprisingly, after years of ignoring UN resolutions and reports,
North Korea actively engaged with UN bodies following the issuance
of the COI findings. North Korean diplomats worked to have provisions
on crimes against humanity and accountability excised from
General Assembly resolutions. When this failed, North Korea again
turned away. In advance of a Human Rights Council meeting in September
2015, a foreign ministry spokesman claimed that the meeting
was a ¡°political maneuver aimed at overthrowing our regime,¡± claiming
that the ¡°evidence is nothing more than lies from North Korean
defectors.¡±45 In the same period, North Korea extended an invitation
to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, but then failed to
make the visit possible.46 The foreign minister later announced that
North Korea would not cooperate with the council. This newfound
sensitivity may be tied to repeated attempts by the Kim Jong-un regime
to convince other nations to improve economic and political relations
with his country and to treat it as a responsible member of the international
community.47
7. The Task Force finds that the recent expansion of the sanctions regime
is a necessary step in exerting pressure on North Korea. However,
expanded and sustained efforts are required to ensure that they are rigorously
implemented and have the desired effects, including measures to
provide amenable states with material assistance and to pressure those
that illegally trade with or finance North Korea.
North Korea continues to resist a range of international sanctions over
its nuclear and missile programs. Previous UN Security Council resolutions
prohibited member states from buying or selling heavy weapons,
including armored vehicles and aircraft, as well as conducting financial
22 A Sharper Choice on North Korea
transactions that could assist North Korea in developing nuclear weapons
and ballistic missiles. Under these resolutions, member states are
required to inspect and seize cargo entering the DPRK if it may relate
to prohibited military activities.48 The sanctions regime, which developed
over the course of a decade in response to repeated North Korean
violations, is calibrated to restrain North Korea¡¯s military advancement
by denying it access to foreign technology and financing necessary to
undertake research, development, and procurement of advanced systems.
The sanctions have largely succeeded in shrinking North Korea¡¯s
customer base for conventional arms export, yet they have failed to
shift the regime¡¯s calculus on its nuclear and missile programs, which
continue to develop through mostly indigenous resources.
Since 2006, North Korea has developed an extensive clandestine
network of diplomats and foreign nationals to circumvent the sanctions
regime.49 There are indications that a range of countries and
terrorist organizations continue to deal with North Korea for aircraft
maintenance (Ethiopia), ammunition (Tanzania), personnel training
(Uganda), rockets (Hamas and Hezbollah via Iran), and others.50 In
addition, there is evidence that North Korea has recently cooperated
with Iran and Syria in the development and transfer of a wide variety of
ballistic missiles, as well as nuclear technology.51
Immediately following North Korea¡¯s nuclear test in January 2016,
the U.S. government moved to tighten unilateral sanctions on North
Korea. The extensive sanctions that helped keep Iran at the negotiation
table and resulted in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
convinced many that U.S. sanctions toward North Korea were comparatively
lenient.52 In response, the president issued a new Executive
Order that markedly expanded the government¡¯s authority to designate
North Korean officials for sanctions.53 Soon after, the U.S. Congress
overwhelmingly passed HR 757, the North Korea Sanctions and Policy
Enhancement Act of 2016, which imposes mandatory sanctions on
individuals and entities who aid North Korea in a variety of illicit activities,
including trade in ¡°significant arms or related materiel,¡± censorship,
money laundering, cyberattacks, and—or the first time—uman
rights abuses.54 On June 1, 2016, the U.S. Department of the Treasury
designated North Korea as a primary money laundering concern under
Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act, further restricting the regime¡¯s
access to the international financial system.55
Findings 23
On March 2, 2016, two months after North Korea conducted its fourth
nuclear test, the UN Security Council unanimously voted to adopt Resolution
2270, which is a significant expansion of the international sanctions
regime. The resolution expands the current prohibition on arms trade to
cover all items that would enable North Korea to improve its conventional
forces and extends lists of proliferation-sensitive items, individuals and
entities subject to asset freezes and travel bans, and prohibited luxury
goods sought by the regime¡¯s elite. Furthermore, the resolution imposes
several new measures, including legally obligating UN member states to
¡°inspect the cargo within or transiting through their territory, including
their airports, seaports, and free trade zones, that has originated in the
DPRK, or that is destined for the DPRK.¡±56 Additionally, member states
are prohibited from importing North Korean coal, iron, gold, rare earth
minerals, and other metals if the proceeds might benefit the regime¡¯s
nuclear or missile programs. The resolution also includes major new
restrictions on diplomats, trade assistance, and financial services suspected
of aiding North Korean weapons programs.57
Resolution 2270 is an encouraging step, but its potential to affect the
North Korean regime¡¯s behavior is contingent on strict implementation
of the new requirements. Cargo inspections are a significant barrier
not only to nuclear proliferation and illicit arms sales, but also to North
Korea¡¯s few remaining legitimate exports. This step, combined with
financial and export restrictions, could make an appreciable dent in
North Korea¡¯s economy, impeding the regime¡¯s ability to fund nuclear
and missile development and continue operating its conventional
armed forces. However, these measures require significant attention
and funding to implement fully. They will tax the navies, ports, intelligence
services, diplomatic corps, and political will of a large group of
states, including critical transit hubs in Southeast Asia.
8. The Task Force finds that North Korea¡¯s development of the capability
to deliver a nuclear warhead on a long-range ballistic missile would dramatically
increase its ability to threaten the United States and its allies.
After North Korea abandoned the February 2012 Leap Day Agreement,
the Obama administration adopted a policy of ¡°strategic patience¡±
toward the DPRK.58 This policy has meant strengthening the U.S.-
ROK alliance against a range of military aggression while affirming a
willingness to resume negotiations with North Korea.
24 A Sharper Choice on North Korea
Yet North Korea¡¯s nuclear program continues to advance steadily.59
In January 2016, North Korea claimed to have tested a hydrogen bomb,
though experts believe it was more likely a boosted fission device,
a type of weapon that increases yield by including some fusion fuel
in a normal fission explosive package. Two months later, the regime
claimed to have successfully developed a miniaturized nuclear warhead
that could be fitted to a ballistic missile.60 It then threatened to
test this warhead along with a vehicle that would allow the warhead to
survive reentry into the earth¡¯s atmosphere.61 Should this occur, the
test would cause North Korea to edge dangerously close to the critical
threshold in which it could credibly threaten to deliver a nuclear
weapon on a ballistic missile.62 However, the regime has yet to test a
ballistic missile that would be an effective delivery system (presumed
to be the KN-08 missile) or a reentry vehicle.63 The volatile spring
also saw two test fires of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, a
new engine configuration for an ICBM, a test of a new multiple launch
rocket artillery system (MLRS), a satellite launch, and five failed tests
of the Musudan intermediate-range missile, as well as one partial success
in June 2016 (figure 3).64
Based on publicly available information about North Korean fissile
material production, estimates suggest that North Korea could have
Total Projectiles Launched
Short-Range Ballistic
Missile
Surface-to-Air Missile
Satellite Launch Vehicle
Nuclear Test
Medium-Range
Ballistic Missile
Submarine-Launched
Ballistic Missile
Intermediate-Range
Ballistic Missile
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Figure 3: North Korean Nuclear and Missile Tests
(1998–016*)
*Current as of July 20, 2016
Findings 25
between thirteen and twenty-one nuclear weapons as of June 2016 and
still more fissile material under pessimistic assumptions about the program.
65 The five-megawatt electric (MWe) reactor at Yongbyon, which
was shut down in the mid-2000s during Six Party Talks, has resumed
operation since 2013.66 In June, observers in Seoul and Washington
detected signs that North Korea had begun another round of plutonium
reprocessing, increasing its stock available for warhead production and
expanding the DPRK arsenal by an estimated four to six weapons since
the beginning of 2015.67 Meanwhile, unclassified estimates assume that
the North Korean uranium enrichment program continues to develop,
though sources are uncertain about the existence or location of a
second enrichment facility beyond the centrifuge plant at Yongbyon,
which widens the confidence bounds of fissile material estimates.68
Alarmingly, North Korea has demonstrated a willingness to proliferate
nuclear equipment, expertise, and fissile material when it assisted
with construction of the Deir ez-Zor reactor in Syria.69 These advancements
in its nuclear and missile capabilities have brought North Korea
to a critical moment for U.S. defense planning.
9. The Task Force finds that although U.S.-ROK deterrence policy may have
succeeded in preventing major military attacks since 2010, the frequency
and severity of North Korea¡¯s aggressive behavior will likely increase as
its nuclear and sub-conventional capabilities continue to develop.
As its nuclear weapons and missile programs continue to advance, North
Korea¡¯s leadership may believe that it has new options to coerce and
aggress against the U.S.-ROK alliance.70 For example, Pyongyang may
presume that it can employ a nuclear weapon in a limited way to force
the U.S.-ROK alliance to back down from a militarized dispute or a limited
armed conflict.71 If the DPRK leadership thinks that it can prevail
at the nuclear level, it may also believe that the alliance will lack resolve
to respond decisively to military provocations at the sub-conventional
level, including limited attacks with indirect fire, or special forces, maritime,
or cyber operations like the November 2014 attack against Sony.
This, in turn, may lead the regime to attempt to blackmail the United
States and South Korea into conceding militarized disputes on favorable
terms.72 In some cases, such as the Sony hack, the United States
has lacked a coherent and resolute response, but new legal authority can
enable U.S. agencies to work with allies in developing a ready plan of
action for future intrusions.73
26 A Sharper Choice on North Korea
Although North Korea¡¯s vast conventional forces remain a grave
threat to South Korea, the quality and readiness of these forces have
declined in recent years as the regime invests larger portions of its limited
available funding into its nuclear program.74 The Pentagon assesses
that the DPRK¡¯s Korean People¡¯s Army ¡°retains the capability to inflict
serious damage on the ROK, despite significant resource shortfalls and
aging hardware.¡±75 Imports of heavy weapons, including mechanized
and armored vehicles, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, and modern ships
have halted as a result of UN sanctions and funding constraints. To compensate,
the regime has made significant investments in conventional
short-range surface-to-surface missiles, cyber capabilities, and its sizable
Special Operations forces (SOF). North Korea¡¯s new MLRS system,
which Pyongyang has reportedly deployed widely along the demilitarized
zone (DMZ), increases its ability to threaten Seoul with artillery fires.76
These developments suggest that North Korea has developed an
increasingly sophisticated but risky operational concept, in which it
may attempt to carry out limited attacks in multiple sub-conventional
domains and potentially deter an allied response by threatening civilians
in Japan and South Korea with nuclear and conventional attacks. If so,
Pyongyang may feel increasingly empowered to launch more frequent
and more damaging provocations and to escalate the resulting crisis.
10. The Task Force finds that current trends, if allowed to continue, will predictably,
progressively, and gravely threaten U.S. national interests and
those of its allies.
With each passing year, North Korea develops its nuclear and missile
programs, continues to perpetrate its crimes against humanity, and
steadily destabilizes a region critical to U.S. national interests.77 As
North Korea advances its nuclear capabilities, each successive crisis
has greater potential for catastrophe. The regime in Pyongyang is
developing the capability to order a nuclear strike on an American city,
forcing a future U.S. president into an even more difficult position.
North Korea¡¯s ability to evade sanctions increases by the year; Resolution
2270¡¯s expanded legal authority will do little to help if new sanctions
are not strictly enforced and adapted in future years.78 In short,
the options available to the United States are narrowing and North
Korea¡¯s are expanding. Reversing these trends will require an urgent
shift in U.S. policy.
27
A SHARPER CHOICE
The Task Force¡¯s finding that current trends will predictably, progressively,
and gravely threaten U.S. national interests requires a change in
U.S. policy toward North Korea. The strengthened sanctions passed in
early 2016 represent a significant shift in policy toward North Korea,
but will not be sufficient to compel the North Korean regime to abandon
its nuclear and missile programs, observe a stabilizing military
posture, and respect the human rights of its citizens. Barring a major
change on the peninsula, achieving these goals will require a broad
negotiated agreement. Cognizant that this agreement may not come
soon, the United States and its allies should prepare to deter and defend
against a hostile North Korea, including by expanding U.S.-ROK-Japan
cooperation on enhanced deterrent measures and actively enforcing
strict sanctions against North Korea.
To get North Korea back to the bargaining table, the United States
should commit itself to a sequence of steps that not only imposes escalating
costs on continued defiance, but also provides incentives for
cooperation. This sequence should be calibrated to credibly signal
to North Korea that the United States and its allies will continually
increase pressure until substantive talks resume on acceptable terms.
Collectively, these measures will sharpen North Korea¡¯s choice, outlining
clear expectations and consequences that will result from defiance.
Careful sequencing maximizes opportunities to coordinate with China
and is important both to present opportunity and to demonstrate that
delay will become increasingly costly.
As an initial step, U.S. officials should propose restructured negotiations
that provide genuine incentives for Pyongyang to negotiate on a
series of expanding issues, culminating in complete and verifiable denuclearization
and a treaty that will end the Korean War. If Pyongyang
Recommendations
28 A Sharper Choice on North Korea
refuses to comply with this proposal, the United States should authorize
new military measures to deny North Korea the benefits of its
actions and to strengthen deterrence of military attacks, as well as to
impose new sanctions that more severely restrict the regime¡¯s funding
sources. Escalating costs will not be easy; the United States and its allies
will likely pay a price for some of these measures, including possible
violent retribution from Pyongyang. Because it is not the policy of the
U.S. government to induce a collapse of the North Korean regime, these
policies will have to be calibrated carefully.
China¡¯s policy toward North Korea will critically affect this effort
and the fate of Northeast Asia. A transformed China policy toward
North Korea should be the central objective of U.S. policy toward
maritime Asia and of the U.S.-China relationship, which will shape
the region well into the twenty-first century. North Korea¡¯s continued
development of nuclear weapons and destabilizing military actions will
suppress efforts to improve this relationship and prevent the emergence
of a stable and prosperous regional order. For these reasons, improved
U.S.-China relations require progress on the North Korean issue.
To convince China of its shared interest with the United States in
finding a comprehensive and lasting resolution to the North Korean
problem, U.S. officials should approach China with a new proposal
that outlines a sharper choice: work with the United States and its
allies to realize a stable, just, and nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, or
the United States and its allies will be forced to take additional steps to
achieve these results over time. This should be done through carefully
sequenced and calibrated steps designed to gradually but discernibly
increase the pressure toward successful resolution of the peace treaty,
denuclearization, and peaceful and gradual reunification of the Korean
Peninsula. Although Beijing is not likely to pressure Pyongyang over
human rights, China can help get North Korea back to the negotiating
table by withdrawing material support, enforcing sanctions, and applying
diplomatic pressure. For example, Beijing could act to curtail the
trade of energy resources and consumer goods from maritime shipping
and across the Tumen River, clamp down on criminal activity in
China that raises revenue for the regime, prevent North Korea¡¯s cyber
division from using Chinese networks and territory to launch attacks
around the world, and signal continued willingness to cooperate with
the United States on North Korean issues at the United Nations.
Recommendations 29
To encourage China to participate and assuage its concern that a
moderate North Korea would hasten China¡¯s encirclement by U.S.
forces, the United States should offer a new dialogue on the future of
the peninsula that includes discussions about the future disposition of
U.S. forces. This dialogue should attempt to coordinate planning in the
event of a collapse, crisis, or major attack and convey that it is not U.S.
policy to cause a collapse of the DPRK regime. As part of these talks,
U.S. officials can also assure China that its coercive diplomatic, economic,
and military policies are exceptional responses to the unique,
rapid, and explosive threat posed by North Korea.
Simultaneously, the United States should support President Park¡¯s
call for five-party talks. This format—onsisting of China, Japan,
Russia, South Korea, and the United States—llows the parties to share
information about North Korea, to plan negotiating strategy for the
next round of multilateral talks, and to discuss the future security order
of Northeast Asia.
However, for practical and unavoidable reasons, major improvement
of the U.S.-China relationship will prove impossible without progress
on North Korea. U.S. officials should demonstrate to China that
North Korea¡¯s failure to respond to this new approach will require the
United States to invest more heavily in the region—ighten its alliances,
enhance its military presence, and sanction entities that assist North
Korea—ll steps that will strain the U.S.-China relationship.
To ensure that U.S. policy on North Korea supports broader national
interests, each component of this policy—ong-range planning, negotiations
strategy, support for human rights, sanctions, and deterrence
and defense—eeds to remain consistent with a vision for a stable and
prosperous Northeast Asia that U.S. allies have a role in leading. If
North Korea policy becomes detached from regional policy, both are
likely to fail.
PROMOTE A STABLE AND PROSPEROUS NORTHEAST ASIA
I. The Task Force recommends that the United States and its allies engage
China as soon as possible to plan for the future of the Korean Peninsula.
These talks, both trilateral and in a five-party format, should plan for
militarized crises, collapse scenarios, and the role of a unified Korea in
Northeast Asian security.
30 A Sharper Choice on North Korea
To ensure that its North Korea strategy is consistent with a vision for
a stable and peaceful Northeast Asia, the United States should engage
regional states in joint planning for a stable Asia.79
Collapse of the Six Party process has also meant the loss of an important
consultative mechanism for regional stability. To recover some of
these functions and establish a venue to coordinate the resumption of
multilateral negotiations to denuclearize the peninsula, President Park
in January 2016 suggested convening the five parties that negotiate with
North Korea. Five-party talks on this model could help the parties share
their assessments of Pyongyang¡¯s likely negotiating strategy and perhaps
draw up a proposal to convince North Korea to return to talks.80
Moreover, the talks could allow the parties to share information on and
coordinate their responses to the possibility of an infectious pandemic
in North Korea, a nuclear accident, a humanitarian crisis, and other
scenarios that could yield instability and conflict on the peninsula.81
They might also agree to coordinate in preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons to new states, which is critical to the long-term stability of
Northeast Asia because proliferation would raise the risk of conflict
both with the nuclear aspirant and with North Korea. In this way, the
parties might decrease the likelihood that operations on and around the
peninsula could result in miscalculation or contact between their forces.
Although the likelihood of a collapse of the North Korean regime
has decreased in recent years, it remains a possibility under several scenarios
and would have large and unintended consequences for North
Korea¡¯s neighbors. A vast outflow of impoverished North Korean refugees;
unsecured nuclear, chemical, and biological material along with
substantial caches of conventional weaponry; and the potential need to
conduct operations against a large, armed insurgency in difficult terrain
are just some of the potential challenges of a collapse scenario. U.S. officials
report that China has repeatedly declined to discuss its planning for
these scenarios with them, raising the likelihood that U.S. and Chinese
forces could find themselves working at cross-purposes at a time of elevated
tensions with their forces in close proximity. The Task Force recommends
that U.S. policymakers continue working with China on this
issue at each stage of U.S. policy and conduct detailed planning on possible
collapse scenarios in the context of the U.S.-ROK-Japan alliance.82
The United States and South Korea can seek to break the impasse
with China over long-range planning by embedding collapse planning in
a broader dialogue about the future of the Korean Peninsula. Together,
Recommendations 31
the allies should develop a set of reassurances that unification will not
damage China¡¯s interests. For example, South Korea can work to assure
China that its economic interests in North Korea will be respected
during unification. It can guarantee that Chinese investments will either
remain in place or be compensated by the central government. Further
dialogues can de-conflict plans for border control, management of refugees,
port access, and other issues of concern. Combined Forces Command
officials can develop briefings about their plans for operations on
the peninsula to encourage Chinese officials in the People¡¯s Liberation
Army to share their own planning. De-conflicting U.S.-ROK-China
military planning is critical to avoiding a wider conflict in the event that
UN forces have to operate in and around North Korea and therefore to
the vital national security interests of all three countries.
The United States has and will maintain a steadfast commitment to
ensure that South Korea remains free and secure. For the foreseeable
future, a sizable U.S. presence on the peninsula is necessary to defend
South Korea against the threat from its northern neighbor, and the
United States will not abrogate its alliance commitment in any event.
However, the United States and South Korea should jointly develop
and present to China conditions under which the alliance would consider
revising the number and disposition of U.S. forces on the peninsula.
They should make clear that force levels are and will be calibrated
to the severity of the threat from North Korea; if and when the threat
abates due to reform or replacement of the DPRK regime, the alliance
will consider a commensurate adjustment to U.S. force posture on the
peninsula. U.S. military presence on the peninsula is a guarantee of the
safety, freedom, and prosperity of South Korea and is not intended
to encircle or contain China. The imperative to defend against North
Korea does not entail an inherent interest in sustaining a certain force
level on the peninsula permanently. In any event, the U.S.-ROK military
alliance should remain and retain the right to deploy U.S. forces as circumstances
require.
This proposal aims to alleviate one of the primary obstacles to the
resolution of the North Korean problem. Beijing worries that the fall of
Pyongyang would lead to a unified peninsula under U.S. control, deepening
China¡¯s encirclement and bringing the most powerful military
in the world to its border. However, if U.S. forces on the peninsula are
indexed to the threat level, it may encourage China to see North Korea
as more of an impediment to its long-term national security interests
32 A Sharper Choice on North Korea
and less of a necessary buffer against U.S. hegemony. This could incentivize
China to restrict North Korea¡¯s ability to threaten its neighbors.
In this way, U.S.-ROK policy would encourage China to take a more
assertive role, rather than, from its perspective, punish it for doing so.
Although the United States will likely remain the guarantor of South
Korean security far into the twenty-first century, initiating this discussion
may help promote a stable Northeast Asia over the long run and
redound to the benefit of South Korea and Japan, as well as China.
The importance of South Korea and Japan in a stable and prosperous
Northeast Asia cannot be overstated. Developments in North Korea
critically affect the security of both countries and their standing in the
region. For this reason, U.S. policy on North Korea needs to promote
a regional order in which both states play a leading role in safeguarding
the rule of law, human rights, and strategic stability in a region critical to
U.S. interests. By jointly conducting military operations to deter North
Korea, planning for major scenarios on the peninsula, and engaging
in coordinated diplomacy with China on the North Korea issue, the
United States, South Korea, and Japan can promote a brighter future
for the region than they could in isolation.
RESTRUCTURE NEGOTIATIONS
II. The Task Force recommends that the United States move quickly to propose
restructured negotiations to limit North Korea¡¯s nuclear and missile
programs and work toward denuclearization and a comprehensive
peace agreement.
Although a negotiated agreement to free the peninsula of nuclear weapons
will remain the primary objective of U.S. policy, the Task Force finds
that this goal has become improbable in the near future. Both to pursue
this goal and to promote national security interests, the Task Force recommends
that the United States propose restructuring negotiations
with North Korea on the expectation that intermediate agreements on
other issues can demonstrate the benefits of cooperation and establish
an incentive to achieve a wider agreement further down the line.
The first step in this model will be to find agreement on the enabling
conditions for talks. The next administration should review U.S. policy
on negotiations and communicate clear preconditions for the resumption
of formal multilateral negotiations. It should formally dispel the
mistaken perception that it places preconditions on informal talks with
Recommendations 33
North Korea and that it demands unilateral steps prior to the start of
formal negotiations. Instead, the United States should insist on three
conditions for resumption of talks. First, all parties should agree to reaffirm
the principles of the Joint Statement of 2005, including its commitment
to a nonnuclear peninsula and a stable and lawful regional order.83
Second, negotiations need to make consistent progress on the nuclear
issue at each stage in the negotiations to ensure that North Korea
cannot benefit by stalling on denuclearization. Third, because it will be
impossible to negotiate while the DPRK carries out nuclear and longrange
missile tests, the United States should insist on a moratorium on
all tests of nuclear explosives and missiles with a range-payload capability
greater than existing Scud missiles, whether declared to be ballistic
missiles or civil space launch vehicles. Because North Korea still has not
tested a long-range ballistic missile with a reentry vehicle, a test moratorium
will constitute a meaningful restraint on the program while
negotiators seek a verified freeze on its other aspects. In exchange and if
requested by Pyongyang, the U.S. and South Korean governments may,
for as long as negotiations are progressing, consent to supply nutritional
assistance to the North Korean civilian population, provided that
NGOs can certify that these supplies are not being diverted to the military;
U.S. and South Korean officials may also consider modifications
to the scale and content of U.S.-ROK joint military exercises.
Initial negotiations should focus on attaining a verified freeze in
North Korea¡¯s nuclear capabilities. A complete verified freeze of the
nuclear program would require six restrictions: no nuclear tests; no
missile launches, whether declared to be ballistic missiles or civil space
launch vehicles with a range-payload capability greater than the DPRK¡¯s
existing Scud missiles; no plutonium reprocessing; no uranium enrichment;
suspension of reactor operations at Yongbyon; and readmission
of the IAEA to North Korea to monitor the nuclear elements of the
freeze, both at declared facilities and with the approval of the five parties
(China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, United States). Additionally,
the parties can explore conventional arms control measures; limitations
on missile development; steps to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons,
technology, and materials beyond North Korea¡¯s borders; early
access for IAEA inspectors to specific North Korean nuclear facilities
that Pyongyang has declared to be for civilian purposes; and measures
to promote the welfare of North Korea¡¯s citizens, starting with allowing
the International Committee of the Red Cross to access political prison
34 A Sharper Choice on North Korea
camps. In the initial phase, U.S., South Korean, and North Korean
negotiators can also begin to discuss the terms of a peace treaty that
will end the Korean War.
The eventual objective of these staged negotiations is to achieve North
Korea¡¯s complete denuclearization and reentry into the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty. In exchange, the regional powers would commit to sign
a comprehensive peace treaty, normalize relations, lift the appropriate
sanctions, and allow North Korea¡¯s integration into the global financial
system. Full normalization of relations and sanctions relief will require
major progress on North Korea¡¯s human rights position, including the
release of all political prisoners and their families, a full accounting and
voluntary repatriation of all persons abducted from foreign countries,
nondiscriminatory food aid distribution monitored by aid workers who
are guaranteed full nationwide access, freedom to leave the country
and return without punishment, and ending the information blockade
imposed on North Korea¡¯s citizens by the government.84
The main negotiations can take place under the Six Party Talks
format, but certain issues can be resolved in smaller talks among North
and South Korea, the United States, and China. This format, in which
Korean representatives could be the primary negotiators, can be used
to negotiate preconditions prior to the start of talks as well as the terms
of an armistice that will be signed at the end of the process. Limiting
the membership of the negotiations on difficult issues may encourage
China to apply pressure on North Korea. The Task Force recommends
that U.S. negotiators remain open to other formats for talks that could
potentially be productive.
PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS
III. The Task Force recommends that the United States work with allies,
NGOs, and the United Nations system to escalate pressure on North
Korea to respect the human rights of its citizens.
Support for human rights is an integral component of U.S. foreign
policy, which holds that human rights must be inviolate and that support
for them is neither a bargaining chip nor a weapon. The United
States should not consent to normalize relations so long as North
Korea continues to perpetrate crimes against humanity. Exceptional
steps are necessary to reverse North Korea¡¯s egregious, consistent, and
willful noncompliance with UN human rights resolutions and preserve
the integrity of the United Nations.
Recommendations 35
To this end, the Task Force recommends that as part of the initial
announcement of the new strategy, the United States should work
with its allies and partners to jointly signal their intention to execute a
campaign of continually escalating pressure on North Korea on human
rights issues as long as the DPRK remains noncompliant with UN
human rights resolutions.85 They should make it known that the DPRK¡¯s
continued defiance of UN human rights resolutions puts into question
the regime¡¯s standing in that organization. In addition to designating
North Korean officials for sanctions under U.S. law, the United States
should work with its allies to present North Korea with a choice: make
rapid improvements to its human rights record or these countries will
support suspension of North Korea¡¯s credentials at the United Nations.
Suspension of a state¡¯s credentials is not the same as expulsion from
the organization: without credentials, a state may officially retain its
membership, but it is prohibited from attending or participating in
UN General Assembly proceedings. There is precedent for this step. In
1974, the General Assembly passed Resolution 3206, which endorsed
the recommendation of the Credentials Committee to suspend South
Africa¡¯s participation over its continued disregard for Security Council
resolutions condemning apartheid.86 The General Assembly also called
on the Security Council to consider full expulsion of South Africa from
the organization, but the measure was vetoed by France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.87 South Africa retained this status
until 1994, when the country¡¯s credentials were restored following its
transition to democracy.88
In the last two years, the commission of inquiry and increasing information
from within the regime have helped raise international awareness
about North Korean crimes against humanity. In 2014 and again
in 2015, the General Assembly recommended that the Security Council
refer the case of North Korea to the International Criminal Court
for prosecution of crimes against humanity, which diplomats expect
would be blocked by Russia and China.89 This flood of international
concern may permit action in the United Nations. As a first step, the
United States should work with its global allies to signal to North Korea
that they will support suspension of its credentials without rapid progress
on human rights. To prevent this suspension, North Korea will be
required to, within two years, receive a visit from the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights and a mission from the UN Special Rapporteur
on Human Rights in the DPRK, and show substantial progress
in implementing its human rights obligations under UN treaties. These
36 A Sharper Choice on North Korea
steps may be agreed through the UN system or as part of multilateral
negotiations with China, South Korea, and the United States.
Each year, when the UN Credentials Committee meets at the start of
each General Assembly session, it can consult with UN human rights
officials to determine whether North Korea has met the above conditions
and should have its credentials reinstated.
Second, the United States should support enhanced information
operations carried out by South Korea and nongovernmental organizations,
which aim to inform North Korea¡¯s population about the outside
world and, in so doing, could lay the groundwork for voluntary evolution
of the state. To do this, the U.S. Congress should appropriate funding
to support expanded Voice of America programming and NGOs
that are working to penetrate an increasingly porous censorship regime.
Priorities for funding include increased power for medium-wave radio
transmissions, more radio broadcasts, and cultivation of North Korean
defectors to serve as journalists for these stations. These broadcasts
should not focus on antigovernment political propaganda, but rather
should consist mainly of business and economic information, agricultural
instruction, weather forecasts, and information about daily life
outside of North Korea, including housing, food, and medicines, as well
as Korean pop music, talk radio, and gossip.
In addition, support should be provided to NGOs that require additional
funding for their efforts to deliver information to North Koreans
on USB drives. These USB drives can contain diverse sources from agriculture
and economics textbooks to novels and literature that convey
a portrait of everyday life free from the Kim regime. Over time, these
efforts could gradually undermine the regime¡¯s monopoly on information,
strengthen emerging market forces, and cultivate the foundation
for a different system of government for the people of North Korea in
the future.
Last, the United States should materially support and join efforts to
gather information about the regime¡¯s human rights violations to prepare
for the day when its worst offenders are brought to justice. In recent
years, this issue has received increased attention.90 In 2015, the United
Nations opened an office in Seoul to document human rights abuses
¡°with a view to accountability.¡±91 South Korea¡¯s new human rights act
provides for the establishment of a documentation center, which will
compile testimony and data in addition to that already uncovered by
the COI and various NGOs.92 In March 2016, the UN Human Rights
Recommendations 37
Council established a panel of experts ¡°to focus on issues of accountability.¡±
93 These efforts to prepare for accountability, including by continuing
to apply sanctions to North Korean officials who perpetrate
human rights abuses, could have a powerful deterrent effect today and
may also help undermine the regime¡¯s internal legitimacy. The United
States should provide information to these organizations, along with
material, technical, and rhetorical support when possible.
ENFORCE SANCTIONS AND
eSCALATE FINANCIAL PRESSURE
IV. The Task Force recommends that the United States invest in rigorous
enforcement of the sanctions regime and apply escalating pressure on
North Korea¡¯s illicit activities.
Severe economic pressure on the North Korean regime is a necessary
way to compel compliance with its nuclear, military, and human rights
obligations to the United Nations and a central instrument of U.S. and
international coercive power. However, sanctions alone are unlikely
to be enough. The Task Force recommends that the next administration
work with allies, countries in the region, and the U.S. Congress to
mount a more assertive and consistent campaign to sanction the full
range of North Korea¡¯s illicit behavior. The sanctions authority granted
by Resolution 2270 is a good start, but the resolution¡¯s effective impact
will depend on the extent to which the sanctions are enforced by states
in the region. Strictly enforcing Resolution 2270, including the mandate
to inspect all cargo entering or exiting North Korea, can not only apply
economic pressure to the regime, but also help limit corruption and
criminal activity that emanates from the regime and prevent the spread
of nuclear material and technology. New provocations should prompt
the Security Council to close loopholes in Resolution 2270, especially
the unenforceable provision that allows trade for the ¡°livelihood purposes¡±
but not for military purposes.94 Implementation of multilateral
sanctions should be accompanied by new rounds of U.S. financial sanctions
to apply escalating pressure to the regime¡¯s source of funding.
To ensure that regional states have the resources necessary to
enforce the new sanctions, the United States should act quickly to assist
its partners in setting up a standing multilateral mechanism to coordinate
implementation of UN sanctions, including inspection of North
Korean cargo and, if necessary, interdiction at sea of ships suspected of
38 A Sharper Choice on North Korea
transporting it, beginning with the most suspect shipments. This group
should be specifically dedicated to the enforcement of the DPRK sanctions
and would ideally include all states in the region, including China.
For this mechanism to succeed, it must be perceived as a regional initiative,
not as an extension of UN or U.S. authority. For this reason, interested
outside parties like the United States and the European Union
could provide assistance to the effort in an advisory capacity. China
should be encouraged to take a prominent and constructive role in this
process, commensurate with its claims to regional responsibility. If it
demurs, the participating states can coordinate sanctions enforcement
and maritime interdiction on their own, including, if necessary, in the
Yellow Sea. Enforcement of the shipping restrictions may require the
United States to expand its naval capacity assigned to the mission and
the region.
The process can serve as a clearinghouse for resources necessary
for sanctions enforcement, including shipping information and intelligence,
as well as financial, material, legal, technical, and military assistance
to states that request it.95 This process could also promote strict
sanctions enforcement by serving as a mechanism to discipline reticent
or distracted countries that might otherwise allow implementation to
slip.96 The new organization should seek to reform openly noncompliant
states, such as Vietnam and Myanmar; motivate states with mixed
records, such as Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and
Taiwan; and reinforce states such as Singapore and the Philippines that
are actively working to meet their obligations. This new mechanism will
build on the experience of existing multilateral instruments such as the
Proliferation Security Initiative to specifically enforce the multifaceted
UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea.97
To ensure that the United States and its allies can continue to escalate
economic pressure on the regime, they should initiate a consistent
campaign to sanction and restrict the full range of North Korea¡¯s criminal
activities. Financial crimes, money laundering, corruption, human
rights abuses, and malicious cyber activity have all received too little
attention from the international community and should be subject to
strict sanctions, financial pressure, and law enforcement. Efforts to
use financial measures such as Section 311 of the Patriot Act, as against
Banco Delta Asia in 2005, have been important but inconsistent. The
U.S. Treasury¡¯s recent designation of North Korea as a ¡°primary money
laundering concern¡± under Section 311 is a good starting point, as is
39
its June 2016 designation of senior North Korean officials for human
rights abuses, including Kim Jong-un.98 As long as North Korea continues
to refuse negotiations or conduct destabilizing provocations, the
United States should continue to designate new individuals and entities
for criminal activity as new information becomes available. The
U.S. government should also work with foreign partners to levy parallel
sanctions against these entities; a consistent and expanding multilateral
sanctions regime would be a powerful complement to efforts to
improve North Korea¡¯s human rights and criminal practices through
the United Nations.99 In the United States, the next steps should be to
establish private rights of action so that private companies can bring
legal suits against the countries and companies doing business with
North Korea, and to work with China to identify, designate, and sanction
entities that conduct corrupt and criminal activities under Chinese
and international law.100
This is an area where the interests of the United States, its allies, and
China substantially overlap. North Korea is a source of corruption and
criminal activity for the entire region. In May 2016, reports emerged of
North Korean cyberattacks on Asian banks that made off with more than
$100 million.101 All states have an interest in restricting this kind of illegal
activity within their borders. The exchange of information through a
regional sanctions enforcement mechanism should provide tools for law
enforcement to crack down on Pyongyang¡¯s criminal exports.
Last, the United States should signal to other governments that it
will actively designate and sanction foreign companies and individuals
that facilitate North Korea¡¯s illegal activities, which foster crime and
corruption across the region.
STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE
V. The Task Force recommends that the United States, South Korea, and
Japan move expeditiously to tighten collaboration and strengthen their
deterrence and defense posture.
Currently, the United States maintains strong alliances with both Japan
and South Korea. The Obama administration has pressed both allies to
participate in closer trilateral cooperation, which in 2010 led to a trilateral
statement that ¡°the DPRK¡¯s provocative and belligerent behavior
threatens all three countries and will be met with solidarity from all three
countries.¡±102 In light of North Korea¡¯s increasing capability to threaten
Recommendations
40 A Sharper Choice on North Korea
the three partners in diverse ways, the attendant benefits of coordination,
and improved Japan-ROK relations, the Task Force recommends
expanding this declaration.
Specifically, the United States, South Korea, and Japan should issue
a collective security commitment declaring that a North Korean attack
against any one of these states is an attack against all.103 The three countries
should aspire to formalize this relationship as a trilateral alliance
vis-a-vis North Korea as fast as political conditions allow. Both steps will
help facilitate cooperation on issues of joint concern and make it clear that
North Korea cannot hope to prevent a collective reaction to attacks.104
For example, strategists have long worried that Pyongyang may attempt
to cover a limited attack by striking U.S. forces on Okinawa. This strike
could create tensions between South Korea and Japan that would inhibit
a unified response and allow the regime to deescalate the crisis. A resolute
collective security declaration would disabuse Pyongyang of this notion.
The three partners should immediately expand their defense cooperation
to explore an expanded intelligence-sharing arrangement, joint maritime
operations (including antisubmarine operations and counter-SOF missions),
and regular joint exercises. The three partners should also coordinate
to build capacity of naval operations to interdict and inspect North
Korean cargo and then to implement the mandate. In addition, they
should pursue a regional joint missile defense architecture to improve
tracking and interception of North Korean missiles (though it need not
be integrated with the entire U.S. National Missile Defense system). The
collective security declaration should also extend to a cyberattack against
critical infrastructure in all three countries, as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) has done.105 Including this provision in the collective
security agreement would help the countries jointly assess threats
and provide for a commonality of doctrine for cyber operations, thereby
increasing the capability and credibility of a joint response. In issuing
their declaration, leaders of the three countries should be clear that the
declaration and increased trilateral cooperation is specifically directed at
the North Korean threat.
Coincident with their collective security declaration, the three partners
should clarify and declare their deterrent posture toward North
Korea. To deter Pyongyang from initiating dangerous new provocation
cycles, U.S., South Korean, and Japanese officials should jointly
signal that future aggression will be met with an active and proportionate
response, which may include strikes against military targets inside
Recommendations 41
North Korea. Although the U.S.-ROK alliance has never ruled out this
option, it has also never carried out such an operation. Halting the cycle
of provocation will require holding at risk North Korean units and positions
that believe they can strike at South Korean territory with impunity.
The joint statement should also reiterate that the DPRK has not
attained and will never be permitted to attain a condition of mutual
assured destruction with the three partners. Allied officials should
declare that although they do not intend to topple the North Korean
regime, widespread civilian casualties from invasion, indirect fire, or
the use of nuclear weapons could make this unavoidable.
While trilateral cooperation is under way, the United States and
South Korea should continue to strengthen their deterrence posture
toward North Korea to dissuade it from even more destabilizing behavior
in three ways.
First, although the United States will continue to extend nuclear
deterrence to South Korea, Seoul should not rely on this commitment to
deter aggression at low levels of conflict, nor on overflights by nuclearcapable
aircraft to reliably affect the regime¡¯s behavior. The U.S.-ROK
alliance should maintain the capabilities necessary to conduct robust
counter-SOF and antisubmarine operations at high readiness, as well as
an enhanced network of sensors and intelligence assets to track North
Korean assets in the littorals and airspace around North Korea and deep
within the country itself. The Task Force strongly supports the deployment
of Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to supplement
existing ballistic missile defense capabilities, and recommends
that both countries be prepared to assist each other in mitigating the
negative effects of potential reprisals for the deployment.
Second, the U.S. and South Korean armed forces should jointly cultivate
resilience to cyberattacks, prepare to operate in an environment
of degraded information awareness, and prepare to assist South Korean
civilians who may be affected by these attacks.106 Civilian officials should
build on existing efforts to jointly develop plans to respond to different
types of cyberattacks, readying differential responses to attacks against
private industry, public utilities, government, and armed forces.107
Third, although it is not their intention to employ these capabilities
preventively, the United States, in close coordination with its allies, is
obliged to develop the ability to forcibly secure stocks of North Korean
fissile material in the event of a war or regime collapse and to strike at
the North Korean leadership in an emergency.108
42 A Sharper Choice on North Korea
VI. The Task Force recommends that the United States, South Korea, and
Japan build capacity to intercept all missile launches with a rangepayload
capability greater than existing Scud missiles originating from
North Korea, whether they are declared to be ballistic missile tests or
civil space launch vehicles. In the event that Pyongyang fails to reenter
negotiations, or the negotiations fail, the three partners should be prepared
to declare and then implement this policy.
To delay or prevent North Korea from achieving confidence in its ability
to strike the U.S. homeland, the United States should publicly initiate
trilateral cooperation to prepare to intercept all missile launches with a
range-payload capability greater than existing Scuds, whether the launch
is declared to be a ballistic missile test or a civil space launch vehicle.109
The United States and its allies should justify this action as a way of
enforcing UN Security Council Resolution 1718 and subsequent resolutions,
which North Korea has repeatedly violated by carrying out illegal
tests of ballistic missiles.110 Without a protracted and successful program
to test the KN-08 or another ICBM and its associated reentry vehicle,
Pyongyang will lack the capability to deliver a nuclear warhead with any
confidence. Preventing this threshold from being crossed would both
strengthen the hand of the U.S.-ROK-Japan partnership in controlling
escalation on the peninsula and forestall a threat to the U.S. homeland. In
announcing the policy, the partners should clearly specify that it applies
only to North Korea¡¯s illegal missile program and should be accompanied
by the described measures to deter and defend against any and all
violent reprisals. If North Korea fails to accept the new offer for negotiations
and abide by its associated preconditions, the three partners should
implement this policy. The United States and its allies should explicitly
reserve the right in any case to intercept any projectile that they consider
an immediate kinetic threat to allied personnel, territory, or civilians.
Collectively, these recommendations aim to delay and deny North
Korea¡¯s ability to carry out a nuclear strike on the continental United
States with confidence and hedge against the possibility that it does
attain this capability. The United States and its allies need to prepare
to meet their national security requirements under any eventuality,
including continued expansion of the North Korean missile and nuclear
arsenal, to deter and defend against aggression at the nuclear level and
at lower levels of escalation.
Recommendations 43
It is not currently the policy of the U.S. government to induce a collapse
of the North Korean regime. However, if North Korea¡¯s nuclear
capabilities continue to expand and it continues to refuse to negotiate,
the U.S. administration will have to work with allies to reassess overall
strategy toward the regime and consider more assertive military and
political actions, including those that directly threaten the existence of
the regime and its nuclear and missile capabilities.
44
A comprehensive agreement that creates a nuclear-free and morally tolerable
North Korea has grown less likely each year. Yet a narrow margin
remains. To achieve an agreement will require protracted, costly, and
risky efforts to sharpen the choice North Korea faces—o offer greater
inducements for cooperation and impose heightened costs for continued
defiance. If the United States and its allies can convince China that
cooperation over North Korea is in its best interests, it may be possible
that China will help enforce new UN sanctions, compel North Korea
back to the negotiating table, force it to remain until an acceptable solution
is found, and then ensure that the terms are implemented. However,
the United States cannot trust that this outcome will come to pass
or wait for the situation to evolve of its own accord, particularly as the
nuclear threat grows; it needs to be ready to defend its national security
interests and those of its allies in the face of continued Chinese reticence
and North Korean intransigence.
Either route requires that the United States prioritize North Korea
as a critical national security issue. For too long, the difficulty of the
problem has inhibited creative thinking and concerted attention, and
the United States is currently paying a steep price measured in the safety
of the U.S. homeland, the security of U.S. allies, and an aggravated
relationship with a rising China. Prioritizing North Korea may mean
incurring costs to other U.S. objectives, but the rising threat to regional
stability and U.S. national security means that it cannot be overlooked.
The impending nuclear threshold where the DPRK can strike the U.S.
homeland with nuclear weapons, and evolving regional dynamics, may
mean that the next U.S. president might have the last chance to end the
North Korean threat and secure a stable, prosperous maritime Asia.
Conclusion
45
Of the many CFR Task Force reports on North Korea released over the
past two decades, this one in my view is the most reasoned and realistic,
and I am happy to endorse its general thrust.
I would also like to make four additional points:
1. Although there is obvious appeal to achieving a negotiated settlement
with the DPRK to the many threats it poses to the United
States, its allies, and the world, U.S. policymakers should recognize
how exceedingly unlikely such an outcome is today—r ever can
be, given the nature of the real, existing North Korean government.
U.S. objectives are regarded in Pyongyang as existential threats to
survival—nd governments simply do not trade away their survival.
It therefore verges on magical thinking to imagine that the
United States¡¯ record of near-total failure in nuclear diplomacy with
North Korea over the past generation can somehow be dramatically
changed absent a change of negotiating partners in the DPRK.
2. The notion that we might achieve dramatically better negotiation
outcomes with North Korea through ¡°carefully and deliberately
sequenced [steps] to calibrate pressure¡± and ¡°credibly signal[ling]¡±
is—et us speak plainly— fanciful conceit. Our North Korean
interlocutors did not take that game-theory course, and they do
not respond like one¡¯s partners from that graduate school seminar
on bargaining. Instead of straining to devise a perfectly calibrated
menu of incentives and disincentives for bringing North Korea
¡°back to the table,¡± the United States should instead be concentrating
on something tangible and manifestly in its interest: namely,
threat reduction. Reducing North Korea¡¯s capacity to harm the
United States and its allies does not require North Korean assent—
Washington can do this unilaterally, irrespective of Pyongyang¡¯s
inclination to parley with us. This indeed should be our top priority
in North Korea policy.
Additional and Dissenting Views
46 A Sharper Choice on North Korea
3. U.S. policymakers should be very careful in discussing any possible
¡°peace treaty¡± with North Korea. Do we actually understand why
such a treaty has been a top priority of North Korean policy for over
half a century? Pyongyang holds that the U.S.-ROK military alliance
must end, and U.S. troops in the peninsula must leave, once such a
document is signed. North Korea is not the only state longing for a
reduced U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia. Russia is another.
So is China. Incidentally, Americans ought to think long and hard
about the potential unintended consequences of confiding to Beijing
that ¡°attenuation of the [North Korean] threat may allow for a
commensurate reduction of U.S. force posture on the peninsula.¡±
We might be better served instead by explaining to Beijing that our
alliance with the ROK is intended to deal with threats in the post-
DPRK world, too.
4. Finally, let us be clear about the essence of the North Korean nuclear
threat: that threat is the North Korean government itself. So long as
the real existing North Korean government holds power, that threat
will continue. It is therefore incumbent upon the United States and
its allies to plan for a successful Korean reunification that does not
include the DPRK.
Nicholas Eberstadt
joined by Mary Beth Long and Walter L. Sharp
We agree with the report¡¯s general recommendation that the United
States and South Korea should make efforts to reassure China that
Korean unification will not damage China¡¯s interests. However, we take
issue with some of the specific proposals in this regard. Specifically, we
do not believe that it is necessary and is instead potentially harmful to
U.S. and alliance interests to ¡°jointly develop and present to China conditions
under which the alliance would consider revising the number
and disposition of U.S. forces on the peninsula.¡±
It is our view that providing such detailed reassurances to China
right now would not incentivize Beijing to restrict North Korea¡¯s ability
to threaten its neighbors, as the report maintains. More important,
we believe that discussions about potential readjustments in force posture
would undermine U.S. and South Korean interests. Any mention
of possible troop reductions could create doubts among South Korean
Additional and Dissenting Views 47
elites and the public about the U.S. commitment to their security and,
thus, undermine domestic support in Korea for the U.S.-ROK alliance,
while gaining little from China for doing so.
First and foremost, discussion about the future U.S. force posture,
including U.S. troop reductions, should be conducted within the alliance
and based on prevailing circumstances, not uncertain future
projections. It would be unwise and counterproductive to speculate
about how conditions on the Korean Peninsula might change and
posit different postures based on different scenarios for the purpose
of influencing Chinese policy. China is well aware that the U.S.-ROK
alliance is intended to deter and respond to threats from North Korea.
As part of a strategy of providing reassurances to China to assuage its
concerns about unification, it would be sufficient to convey to Beijing
that, should the North Korean threat disappear, the alliance would
consider how to respond, and future U.S. force posture would be a
part of that process—n close coordination and consultation with
South Korea.
Bonnie S. Glaser and Evan S. Medeiros
joined by Victor D. Cha, Mary Beth Long, and Walter L. Sharp
I was honored to participate in this Task Force, and I hope this effort
sparks debate about what steps our nation must soon take to change
Pyongyang¡¯s policy of provocation and a rapidly advancing nuclear
program, lest the United States face North Korea as an unpredictable
nuclear power.
There is much to applaud in this report. Significantly, the Task Force
acknowledges that for decades the United States has been trapped in an
increasingly dangerous and unproductive cycle in which North Korea
provokes a crisis to which the United States responds with demands for
discussions and, ultimately, with concessions. To break this cycle, the
Task Force endorses, among other things, a collective security commitment
declaring that an attack against South Korea or Japan is an attack
against all. It also suggests the United States and its allies adopt a policy
to intercept North Korea¡¯s long-range missile launches, including tests.
In addition, the report rightly recommends that Kim Jong-un¡¯s ruthless
regime lose its United Nations credentials unless it demonstrates progress
in respecting human rights.
48 A Sharper Choice on North Korea
Regrettably, some elements of this report undermine these recommendations.
Although few would argue that a policy rejecting diplomacy
is a wise one, fewer still can claim that years of diplomatic efforts
have resulted in any indication that Kim Jong-un is less intent on acquiring
nuclear weapons. On the contrary, after decades of talks, North
Korea¡¯s tests have accelerated to an unprecedented pace. The failure of
the talks to change North Korean behavior should raise questions about
the effectiveness of negotiations as a precursor to other policy options,
particularly those designed to unequivocally raise the costs of North
Korean aggression.
Without understanding why we might expect different results from
renewed negotiations, policymakers might consider a more creative
approach to sequencing that entails long-overdue responses to North
Korean provocations, including powerful sanctions and intercepts. At
a minimum, talks should resume only if and when North Korea indicates
an interest in negotiation and China is willing to apply meaningful
pressure for change. Moreover, restructuring talks on peripheral
issues while avoiding an unequivocal demand for a halt to nuclear testing
should be viewed as a dangerous return to the status quo. Even as a
threshold state only, North Korea still would be an impermissible threat
to our allies. And Iran and other nuclear aspirants are watching.
The report also lacks an appropriate sense of urgency. According to
the Director of National Intelligence, Pyongyang now ¡°tops the list¡± of
nuclear and proliferation threats. Soon after Kim Jung-un took power,
hard-to-find, Chinese-designed mobile missile launchers were discovered
with weaponry that could reach U.S. bases in Japan. The DPRK
also is developing a submarine-launched ballistic missile capable of
reaching the continental United States. In addition, North Korea is
reportedly expanding its uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon,
and has successfully launched a satellite with a three-stage rocket that, if
reconfigured, could reach the West Coast. The question now is whether
a new U.S. president must set limits beyond which the North Korean
nuclear program may not go.
Mary Beth Long
joined by Walter L. Sharp
I strongly agree with the policy thrusts and sequenced strategy recommendations
reached by the group. However, in Recommendations II
Additional and Dissenting Views 49
and VI, I believe the conditions for ending talks with North Korea are
not comprehensive enough and the concessions suggested during talks
are offered prematurely.
Recommendation II states, ¡°The United States should undertake talks
subject to the following conditions . . . a moratorium on tests of nuclear
weapons and missiles with a range-payload capability greater than existing
Scud missiles.¡± I believe the condition should include all ballistic missile
tests governed by current UN Security Council resolutions. Short
and intermediate tests threaten South Korea, Japan, and Guam. They also
increase the knowledge needed to obtain a long-range missile capability. I
also believe this condition needs to include a moratorium of all kinetic and
cyberattacks on South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Additionally,
Recommendation VI states, ¡°The United States, South Korea, and Japan
[should] build capacity to intercept all missile launches with a rangepayload
capability greater than existing Scud missiles originating from
North Korea.¡± Again, I do not believe this intercept capability should
be limited to long-range missiles. The ROK and Japan need to develop a
capability to defeat all missiles and rockets launched from North Korea in
order to protect both military and population centers. Bottom line is the
United States should cut off talks if North Korea attacks with any means,
and the U.S.-ROK alliance needs an airtight capability to defeat all North
Korea missiles and rockets.
Recommendation II also states, ¡°Parties may explore steps on conventional
arms control (including limits to the deployment of and
exercises with [U.S. and ROK] conventional forces).¡± I do not believe
we should consider this concession until we have verified that North
Korea has completely eliminated its nuclear and missile capability and
that this elimination is irreversible. ROK and U.S. deployments and
exercises are designed to deter North Korea and prepare to defend if
deterrence fails. Until the threat is eliminated, we should not reduce
our preparedness. Further, until North Korea becomes a nation that
abides by international norms and has granted its citizens the human
rights they deserve, a collapse and regime change is possible. We should
increase, not decrease, deployment and exercises that prepare the alliance
for instability in North Korea.
In summary, we should agree to talks with North Korea, but only
if it stops all provocations and agrees to and rapidly moves toward a
nuclear-free peninsula. Unfortunately, history shows that North Korea
has never lived up to these conditions. Therefore, we must maintain the
50 A Sharper Choice on North Korea
U.S.-ROK alliance¡¯s ability to deter and defend against North Korean
actions and attacks.
Walter L. Sharp
joined by Mary Beth Long
While I concur with and fully endorse the findings and recommendations
of the report, I do not believe that the Task Force¡¯s final recommendation
to ¡°strengthen deterrence and defense¡± goes far enough with respect to
the actual consequences of further North Korean nuclear weapons and
long-range missile development. The Kim Jong-un regime is continuing
its aggressive effort to develop and deploy a long-range, nuclear-capable
missile, which will eventually enable the DPRK to hold at risk the
western continental United States. While this does not, in itself, constitute
an existential threat, it does represent a sufficiently grave danger to
U.S. interests and to the population of the western United States that it
cannot go unchallenged, much less be tolerated.
It appears, at this point, inevitable that North Korea will soon
achieve (if it has not already) sufficient miniaturization and hardening
of its nuclear warhead design to facilitate successful launch and reentry
atop an intercontinental missile. Thus, it is my personal view that if the
DPRK continues to test and moves to deploy a missile system capable
of ranging the continental United States, the U.S. government should
respond by stating unequivocally that any evidence of preparations to
make such a system operational would constitute a serious and unacceptable
threat to U.S. national security and would immediately make
all such missile launch sites a legitimate target for U.S. military force.
Given the apparent North Korean determination to move ahead with
deploying a long-range missile—nd, quite possibly, with additional
nuclear tests intended, in part, to confirm successful miniaturization—y
I think it is essential for the United States to be explicit about its intentions
in the event that DPRK were to move ahead with efforts to induct
a nuclear-capable ICBM system.
Mitchel B. Wallerstein
joined by Mary Beth Long and Walter L. Sharp
51
1. For a summary of recent diplomacy, see Stephan Haggard, ¡°Diplomatic Update,¡±
North Korea: Witness to Transformation (blog), Peterson Institute for International
Economics, June 22, 2016, http://piie.com/blogs/north-korea-witness-transformation/
diplomatic-update-0.
2. There is no certainty when North Korea will cross the threshold. In April, 2016,
the South Korean government determined that Pyongyang could mount a nuclear
warhead on a medium-range missile. Choe Sang-Hun, ¡°South Korea Says North Has
Capacity to Put Nuclear Warhead on a Missile,¡± New York Times, April 5, 2016, http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-warhead-rodongmissile.
html.
3. Alastair Gale and Carol E. Lee, ¡°U.S. Agreed to North Korea Peace Talks Before
Latest Nuclear Test,¡± Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/
articles/u-s-agreed-to-north-korea-peace-talks-1456076019.
4. Choe Sang-Hun, ¡°North Korea¡¯s Kim Jong-un Tells Military to Have Nuclear Warheads
on Standby,¡± New York Times, March 3, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/
world/asia/north-koreas-kim-jong-un-tells-military-to-have-nuclear-warheads-onstandby.
html.
5. The canonical history of North-South relations can be found in Don Oberdorfer, The
Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York: Basic Books, 2013). For a critical look
at the cycle of provocation, see Van Jackson, Rival Reputations: Coercion and Credibility in
US-North Korea Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
6. For recent thinking on the possibility of collapse, see Bruce W. Bennett and Jennifer
Lind, ¡°The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements,¡±
International Security 36, no. 2, October 2011, pp. 84–19; Bruce W. Bennett, ¡°Preparing
for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse¡± (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation,
2013), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/
RR331/RAND_RR331.pdf; Bruce E. Bechtol, North Korea and Regional Security in the
Kim Jong-Un Era: A New International Security Dilemma (London: Palgrave Macmillan,
2014).
7. Ken E. Gause, ¡°North Korean House of Cards: Leadership Dynamics Under Kim
Jong-un,¡± Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2015, http://www.hrnk.
org/uploads/pdfs/Gause_NKHOC_FINAL_WEB.pdf. In February 2016, the regime
reportedly executed Ri Yong-gil, chief of the Korean People¡¯s Army General Staff.
Yonhap News Agency, ¡°N. Korea¡¯s Military Chief Executed on Corruption Charges:
Sources,¡± February 10, 2016, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2016/02/10
/50/0401000000AEN20160210005051315F.html.
8. Nicholas Eberstadt, ¡°North Korea¡¯s ¡®Epic Economic Fail¡¯ in International Perspective,¡±
Asan Institute for Policy Studies, November 2015, http://www.aei.org/publication/
north-koreas-epic-economic-fail-in-international-perspective/.
Endnotes
52 Endnotes
9. Hazel Smith, North Korea: Markets and Military Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2015); Marcus Noland, ¡°Why Is North Korea Growing?¡± North
Korea: Witness to Transformation (blog), Peterson Institute for International
Economics, October 20, 2015, http://blogs.piie.com/nk/?p=14552 Eric Talmadge,
¡°North Korea¡¯s Creeping Economic Reforms Show Signs of Paying Off,¡± Guardian,
March 5, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/05/north-koreaeconomic-
reforms-show-signs-paying-off; Anna Fifield, ¡°North Korea¡¯s Growing
Economy—nd America¡¯s Misconceptions About It,¡± Washington Post, March 13,
2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/north-koreas-growingeconomy-
and-americas-misconceptions-about-it/2015/03/13/b551d2d0-c1a8-11e4-
a188-8e4971d37a8d_story.html.
10. Nat Ketchum and Jane Kim, ¡°A Quiet Opening: North Koreans in a Changing
Media Environment,¡± InterMedia, http://www.intermedia.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/05/A_Quiet_Opening_FINAL_InterMedia.pdf.
11. Yonho Kim, ¡°Cell Phones in North Korea,¡± US-Korea Institute at SAIS, 2014, http://
uskoreainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Kim-Yonho-Cell-Phones-in-
North-Korea.pdf ¡°North Korea Media and IT Infrastructure Report,¡± North Korea
Strategy Center, 2015, http://en.nksc.co.kr/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NKSCNorth-
Korea-Media-and-IT-Infrastructure-Report.pdf.
12. For more on the history of the China-DPRK relationship, see Jonathan D. Pollack, No
Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011).
13. Jonathan D. Pollack, ¡°China and North Korea: The Long Goodbye?¡± Order from
Chaos (blog), Brookings Institution, March 28, 2016, http://www.brookings.edu/
blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/03/28-china-north-korea-sanctions-pollack.
14. BBC News, ¡°China Restricts North Korea Trade Over Nuclear Tests,¡± April 5, 2016,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35969412. For one recent example, see
Elizabeth Shim, ¡°China, North Korea Exchange War of Words Through Media,¡± United
Press International, April 8, 2016, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/
2016/04/08/China-North-Korea-exchange-war-of-words-through-media/9191460137544/.
15. China later denied the deployment. See Ben Blanchard, ¡°China Denies Rushing Forces
to Border During Korean Tensions,¡± Reuters, August 27, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-china-northkorea-idUSKCN0QW12Y20150827 Van Jackson and Adam
Mount, ¡°An Opening on North Korea?¡± National Interest, November 2, 2015, http://
nationalinterest.org/feature/opening-north-korea-14225 and Jane Perlez, ¡°Mystery
Cloaks a North Korean Pop Band¡¯s Canceled Beijing Dates,¡± December 21, 2015, http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/12/22/world/asia/north-korea-china-moranbong.html.
16. For this abortive effort, see Morgan Winsor, ¡°China-North Korea Relations:
Will Kim Jong-Un Visit Xi Jinping in Beijing?¡± International Business Times,
October 13, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/china-north-korea-relations-will-kimjong-
un-visit-xi-jinping-beijing-2139030.
17. China Radio International Online, ¡°China to Never Allow War or Chaos on Korean
Peninsula: Xi,¡± April 28, 2016, http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0428/c90000-9051184.html.
18. Andrea Berger, ¡°From Paper to Practice: The Significance of New UN Sanctions
on North Korea,¡± Arms Control Today, May 2016, http://www.armscontrol.org/
ACT/2016_05/Features/From-Paper-to-Practice-The-Significance-of-New-UNSanctions-
on-North-Korea.
19. Paul Boutin, ¡°Is China Cutting Off North Korea? New Analysis of Satellite Images Say
No,¡± Medium.com, July 26, 2016, http://medium.com/planet-stories/is-china-cuttingoff-
north-korea-new-analysis-of-satellite-images-say-no-bd7cccb2143#.dr5071fs5;
Endnotes 53
Jeffrey Lewis, ¡°No, China Isn¡¯t Punishing North Korea,¡± Armscontrolwonk.com,
July 26, 2016, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1201736/no-china-isntpunishing-
north-korea/. For an alternative view, see Beyond Parallel, ¡°Images
Suggest Decrease in Sino-NK Border Trade,¡± Center for Strategic and International
Studies, July 1, 2016, http://beyondparallel.csis.org/decrease-in-trade-after-nucleartest/
Josh Rogin, ¡°Satellite Imagery Suggests China Is Secretly Punishing North
Korea,¡± Washington Post, July 1, 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
global-opinions/satellite-imagery-suggests-china-is-secretly-punishing-northkorea/
2016/06/30/8638d8d6-3ee8-11e6-80bc-d06711fd2125_story.html.
20. Elizabeth Shim, ¡°Top North Korea Official Ri Su Yong in Beijing to Boost Cooperation,¡±
United Press International, May 31, 2016, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-
News/2016/05/31/Top-North-Korea-official-Ri-Su-Yong-in-Beijing-to-boostcooperation/
9201464707248/. For the nuclear remarks, see Jane Perlez, ¡°North Korea
Tells China of ¡®Permanent¡¯ Nuclear Policy,¡± New York Times, May 31, 2016, http://www.
nytimes.com/2016/06/01/world/asia/china-north-korea-ri-su-yong.html.
21. Jenny Jun, Scott LaFoy, and Ethan Sohn, ¡°North Korea¡¯s Cyber Operations: Strategy
and Responses,¡± Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2, 2015,
http://csis.org/files/publication/151216_Cha_NorthKoreasCyberOperations_Web.
pdf Taylor Brooks, ¡°Why China Needs to Rein In North Korea¡¯s Hackers,¡± Christian
Science Monitor, February 5, 2016, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-
Voices/2016/0205/Opinion-Why-China-needs-to-rein-in-North-Korea-s-hackers.
22. Choe Sang-Hun, ¡°Japan and South Korea Settle Dispute Over Wartime ¡®Comfort
Women,¡¯¡± New York Times, December 28, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/29/
world/asia/comfort-women-south-korea-japan.html.
23. Michael Auslin, ¡°A New Era in South Korean-Japanese Relations Begins,¡± American
Enterprise Institute, December 30, 2015, https://www.aei.org/publication/a-new-erain-
south-korean-japanese-relations-begins/.
24. ¡°Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement Concerning the Nuclear and Missile
Threats Posed by North Korea Among the Ministry of National Defense of the
Republic of Korea, the Ministry of Defense of Japan, and the Department of Defense
of the United States of America,¡± U.S. Department of Defense, December 29, 2014,
http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/Trilateral-Information-Sharing-Arrangement.
pdf. KJ Kwon and Dugald McConnell, ¡°outh Korea, Japan to Join U.S. Missile-
Defense Exercise,¡±CNN.com, May 17, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/16/asia/
south-korea-japan-missile-defense-exercise/.
25. Victor Cha, ¡°Path Less Chosun,¡± Foreign Affairs, October 8, 2015, http://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-10-08/path-less-chosun; for an earlier such
effort, see Sam King and Ting Shi, ¡°Xi, Park Urge Resuming Talks on North Korea
Nuke Program,¡± Bloomberg Business, July 3, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2014-07-02/xi-arrival-in-south-korea-marked-by-north-korean-missile-tests.
26. Elizabeth Shim, ¡°South Korea, China Oppose North Korea¡¯s Nuclear Program in
Joint Statement,¡± United Press International, September 2, 2015, http://www.upi.com/
Top_News/World-News/2015/09/02/South-Korea-China-oppose-North-Koreasnuclear-
program-in-joint-statement/7331441208150/.
27. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People¡¯s Republic of China, ¡°Xi Jinping Meets With
President Park Geun-hye of ROK,¡± April 1, 2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
zxxx_662805/t1353045.shtml. Kim Deok-hyun, ¡°Nuclear Envoys From S. Korea,
China Hold Talks on N. Korea,¡± Yonhap News Agency, June 8, 2016, http://english.
yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2016/06/08/74/0301000000AEN201606080098003
15F.html.
54 Endnotes
28. Mark Fitzpatrick, ¡°Leap Day in North Korea,¡± Foreign Policy, February 29, 2012, http://
foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/29/leap-day-in-north-korea/.
29. Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ian E. Rinehart, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, ¡°North Korea: U.S.
Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation,¡± CRS Report R41259, January
15, 2016, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf.
30. Jane Perlez, ¡°North Korea Tells China of ¡®Permanent¡¯ Nuclear Policy.¡± See also Eric
Talmadge, ¡°North Korea: We Won¡¯t Abandon Nukes With US Gun to Our Head,¡±
Associated Press, June 24, 2016, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/2db82c19afc844cd976
9085bbed84da6/north-korea-we-wont-abandon-nukes-us-gun-our-head.
31. Kim Deok-hyun, ¡°N. Korean Nuclear Envoy Says Six-Party Talks Are ¡®Dead,¡± Yonhap
News Agency, June 22, 2016, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2016/06/22/5
2/0301000000AEN20160622010400315F.html.
32. Alastair Gale and Carol E. Lee, ¡°U.S. Agreed to North Korea Peace Talks Before
Latest Nuclear Test,¡± Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/
articles/u-s-agreed-to-north-korea-peace-talks-1456076019.
33. Colleen McCain Nelson and Kwanwoo Jun, ¡°Obama Expresses Skepticism Over
North Korean Offer,¡± Wall Street Journal, April 24, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/
merkel-expresses-concern-over-syria-after-meeting-with-obama-1461514013.
34. For a perspective on the recent history of negotiations, see Leon V. Sigal, ¡°Getting
What We Need With North Korea,¡± Arms Control Today, April 2016, http://
www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2016_04/Features/Getting-What-We-Need-With-
North-Korea.
35. Megan Cassella and Doina Chiacu, ¡°U.S. Rejected North Korea Peace Talks Offer
Before Nuclear Test: State Department,¡± Reuters, February 22, 2015, http://www.
reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-idUSKCN0VU0XE.
36. Scott Snyder, ¡°North Korea¡¯s Denuclearization: Is It Possible?¡± Forbes, November 19, 2015,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottasnyder/2015/11/19/north-koreas-denuclearizationis-
it-possible/.
37. Scott Snyder, ¡°Addressing North Korea¡¯s Nuclear Problem,¡± Council on Foreign
Relations, November 19, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/north-korea/addressing-northkoreas-
nuclear-problem/p37258; and James M. Acton, ¡°Focus on Nonproliferation—
Not Disarmament—n North Korea,¡± Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, February 14, 2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/14/focus-onnonproliferation-
not-disarmament-in-north-korea.
38. Roberta Cohen ¡°Human Rights in North Korea: Addressing the Challenges,¡± International
Journal of Korean Unification Studies 22, no. 2, December 2013, pp. 29–2. http://
www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/RCohen_north_korea_Dec2013.pdf.
39. United Nations, United Nations Human Rights Council, ¡°Report of the Commission
of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People¡¯s Republic of Korea,¡± A/
HRC/25/63, February 7, 2014, p. 6, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/
RegularSessions/Session25/Documents/A-HRC-25-63_en.doc.
40. Ibid., 14.
41. Ibid., 7.
42. Ibid., 12.
43. For a list of human rights treaties that count North Korea as a signatory, see ¡°North
Korea, International Treaties Adherence,¡± Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project,
Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, October
2010. http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/international_treaties.php?id_state=50.
44. ¡°South Korea Questions North Korea¡¯s Qualifications as U.N. Member,¡±
Korea Times, February 19, 2016. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/
nation/2016/02/485_198416.html.
Endnotes 55
45. Elizabeth Shim, ¡°North Korea Defends Human Rights Record Ahead of U.N.
Meeting,¡± United Press International, September 10, 2015, http://www.upi.com/Top_
News/World-News/2015/09/10/North-Korea-defends-human-rights-record-aheadof-
UN-meeting/3581441909773/?src=r.
46. Lee Yeon Cheol, ¡°Official: UN, N. Korea Discuss Possible Human Rights Visit,¡± Voice
of America, October 29, 2015, http://www.voanews.com/content/un-north-koreadiscuss-
possible-human-rights-visit/3028431.html.
47. Matt Sciavenza, ¡°North Korea¡¯s Unsuccessful Charm Offensive,¡± Atlantic,
November 17, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/11/
north-koreas-charm-offensive-un-international-criminal-court/382849/.
48. ¡°UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea,¡± Arms Control Association, March
2016, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-
North-Korea.
49. Andrea Berger, ¡°Target Markets: North Korea¡¯s Military Customers,¡± Whitehall
Papers 84, no. 1, December 14, 2015, http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rwhi20/84/1#.
VtyYK_nSd4p.
50. United Nations, Security Council, ¡°Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant
to Resolution 1874 (2009),¡± S/2016/157, February 24, 2016, http://www.un.org/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=s/2016/157 Joshua Stanton, ¡°Arsenal of Terror: North Korea,
State Sponsor of Terrorism,¡± Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, April 27,
2015, https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/4_27_15_Stanton_ArsenalofTerror.pdf.
51. Paul K. Kerr, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, and Steven A. Hildreth, ¡°Iran-North Korea-Syria
Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Cooperation,¡± CRS Report to Congress R43480, April
16, 2014, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/225867.pdf; Joshua Pollack,
¡°Ballistic Trajectory: The Evolution of North Korea¡¯s Ballistic Missile Market,¡±
Nonproliferation Review 18, no. 2, July 2011, pp. 411–9, http://www.nonproliferation.
org/wp-content/uploads/npr/npr_18-2_pollack_ballistic-trajectory.pdf.
52. Joshua Stanton, ¡°North Korea: The Myth of Maxed-Out Sanctions,¡± Fletcher
Security Review 2, no. 1, January 21, 2015, http://www.fletchersecurity.org/#!stanton/
c1vgi Bruce Klingner, ¡°Time to Get North Korean Sanctions Right,¡± Heritage
Foundation, November 4, 2013, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/11/
time-to-get-north-korean-sanctions-right.
53. White House, ¡°Imposing Additional Sanctions With Respect to North Korea,¡±
Executive Order 13687, January 2, 2016. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/
2015/01/02/executive-order-imposing-additional-sanctions-respect-northkorea.
54. North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, HR 757, 114th Cong.
(2016), http://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr757/BILLS-114hr757ih.pdf.
55. U.S. Department of the Treasury, ¡°Treasury Takes Actions to Further Restrict North
Korea¡¯s Access to the U.S. Financial System,¡± press release, June 1, 2016, http://www.
treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0471.aspx.
56. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2270, S/RES/2270, March 2, 2016, http://
www.mofa.go.jp/files/000149964.pdf.
57. Andrea Berger, ¡°The New UNSC Sanctions Resolution on North Korea: A Deep Dive
Assessment,¡± 38 North, March 2, 2016, http://38north.org/2016/03/aberger030216/
Richard Nephew, ¡°UN Security Council¡¯s New Sanctions on the DPRK,¡± 38 North,
March 2, 2016, http://38north.org/2016/03/rnephew030216/.
58. White House, ¡°National Security Strategy, 2015,¡± February 2015, http://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf.
59. Joel S. Wit and Young Ahn Sun, ¡°North Korea¡¯s Nuclear Futures: Technology
and Strategy,¡± US-Korea Institute at SAIS, 2015, http://38north.org/wp-content/
56 Endnotes
uploads/2015/02/NKNF-NK-Nuclear-Futures-Wit-0215.pdf Mitchel B. Wallerstein,
¡°The Price of Inattention: A Survivable North Korean Nuclear Threat?¡± Washington
Quarterly 38, no. 3, November 4, 2015, pp. 21–5, http://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.
elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Fall2015_Wallerstein.pdf.
60. Anna Fifield, ¡°North Korea Says It Can Fit Nuclear Warheads on Ballistic
Missiles,¡± Washington Post, March 8, 2016. http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/south-korea-imposes-new-sanctions-on-north-tells-pyongyang-it-mustchange/
2016/03/08/15b0d29e-490a-4697-9742-3c81dde5eb5f_story.html.
61. Yonhap News Agency, ¡°N. Korea to ¡®Soon¡¯ Conduct Nuke Warhead, Ballistic Missile
Tests,¡± March 15, 2016, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2016/03/15/0401
000000AEN20160315001400320.html.
62. For public debate over miniaturization, see David E. Sanger, ¡°US Commander Sees
Key Nuclear Step by North Korea,¡± New York Times, October 24, 2014, http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/10/25/world/asia/us-commander-sees-key-nuclear-step-bynorth-
korea.html; and Jeffrey Lewis, ¡°North Korea¡¯s Nuclear Weapons: The Great
Miniaturization Debate,¡± 38 North, February 5, 2015, http://38north.org/2015/02/
jlewis020515/.
63. For an analysis of the KN-08, see John Schilling, ¡°A Revised Assessment of the North
Korean KN-08 ICBM,¡± Science & Global Security 21 (2013): pp. 210–6.
64. On the submarine-launched ballistic missile tests, see John Schilling, ¡°A New
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile for North Korea,¡± 38 North, April 26, 2016,
http://38north.org/2016/04/jschilling042516/; on the new MLRS artillery system, see
Anna Fifield, ¡°North Korea Has New Rocket System That Could Strike Seoul This Year,
South Korea Warns,¡± Washington Post, April 6, 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/south-korea-says-north-has-large-caliber-rocket-system-could-strikeseoul-
this-year/2016/04/06/38cd0f52-fbce-11e5-a569-2c9e819c14e4_story.html
for the ICBM engine test, see John Schilling, ¡°North Korea¡¯s Large Rocket Engine
Test: A Significant Step Forward for Pyongyang¡¯s ICBM Program,¡± 38 North, April
11, 2016, http://38north.org/2016/04/schilling041116/ on the satellite launch, see
Michael Elleman, ¡°North Korea Launches Another Large Rocket: Consequences and
Options,¡± 38 North, February 10, 2016, http://38north.org/2016/02/melleman021016/;
on the failed Musudan IRBM test, see Anna Fifield, ¡°North Korea¡¯s Missile Launch
Has Failed, South¡¯s Military Says,¡± Washington Post, April 15, 2016, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/north-koreas-missile-has-failed-officialsfrom-
south-say/2016/04/14/8eb2ce53-bc38-40d0-9013-5655bed26764_story.
html on the successful test, see John Schilling, ¡°A Partial Success for the Musudan,¡± 38
North, June 23, 2016, http://38north.org/2016/06/jschilling062316/.
65. David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, ¡°Plutonium, Tritium, and Highly
Enriched Uranium Production at the Yongbyon Nuclear Site,¡± Institute for Science
and International Security, June 14, 2016, http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/
documents/Pu_HEU_and_tritium_production_at_Yongbyon_June_14_2016_
FINAL.pdf; Wit and Ahn, ¡°North Korea¡¯s Nuclear Futures¡±; Albright and Kelleher-
Vergantini, ¡°Update on North Korea¡¯s Reactors, Enrichment Plant, and Possible
Isotope Separation Facility,¡± Institute for Science and International Security,
February 1, 2016, http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Yongbyon_
January_2016_Update_Final.pdf.
66. Additionally, North Korea has reportedly restarted its 4MWth IRT research reactor
using domestically produced uranium. David Albright and Serena Kelleher Vergantini,
¡°North Korea¡¯s IRT Reactor: Has It Restarted? Is It Safe?¡± Institute for Science and
International Security, March 9, 2016. Warhead estimate available in Albright and
Kelleher-Vergatini, ¡°Plutonium, Tritium, and Highly Enriched Uranium Production
at the Yongbyon Nuclear Site.¡±
Endnotes 57
67. Jonathan Landay, David Brunnstrom, and Matt Spetalnick, ¡°North Korea Restarts
Plutonium Production for Nuclear Bombs –U.S. Official,¡± Reuters, June 8, 2016, http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-usa-exclusive-idUSKCN0YT2I1;
Yonhap News Agency, ¡°S. Korea Closely Watching N.K. Nuclear Activity With
Serious Concern: Gov¡¯t,¡± June 8, 2016, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/20
16/06/08/0301000000AEN20160608000451315.html.
68. For a perspective on China¡¯s assessment, see Jeremy Page and Jay Solomon,
¡°China Warns North Korean Nuclear Threat Is Rising,¡± Wall Street Journal,
April22,2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-warns-north-korean-nuclear-threatis-
rising-1429745706.
69. Kerr, Nikitin, and Hildreth, ¡°Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and Nuclear
Cooperation¡±; Justin McCurry, ¡°North Korea ¡®Is Exporting Nuclear Technology,¡¯¡±
Guardian, May 28, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/28/
north-korea-exporting-nuclear-technology.
70. Van Jackson, ¡°Alliance Military Strategy in the Shadow of North Korea¡¯s Nuclear
Futures,¡± U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, September 2015, http://38north.org/wpcontent/
uploads/2015/09/NKNF-Jackson-Alliance-09151.pdf Robert Carlin and
Robert Jervis, ¡°Nuclear North Korea: How Will It Behave?¡± U.S.-Korea Institute at
SAIS, October 2015, http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/CarlinJervisfinal.
pdf.
71. Brad Roberts, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2015), pp. 58–0.
72. Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, ¡°The Next Korean War,¡± Foreign Affairs, April 1,
2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2013-04-01/next-koreanwar
Elbridge Colby, ¡°Nuclear Security in the Third Offset Strategy: Avoiding a
Nuclear Blind Spot in the Pentagon¡¯s New Initiative,¡± Center for a New American
Security, February 2015, http://www.cnas.org/avoiding-nuclear-blindspot-offsetstrategy#.
V6zbzfkrK70 Adam Mount, ¡°The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Restraint,¡±
Survival 57, no. 4 (July 22, 2015):pp. 53–6, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10
80/00396338.2015.1069991.
73. White House, ¡°Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant
Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities,¡± Executive Order 13694, April 1, 2015. http://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cyber_eo.pdf.
74. For an extensive assessment, see Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin, ¡°The
Changing Military Balance in the Koreas and Northeast Asia,¡± Center for Strategic
and International Studies, June 2015, http://csis.org/files/publication/150325_Korea_
Military_Balance.pdf.
75. Office of the Secretary of Defense, ¡°Military and Security Developments Involving
the Democratic People¡¯s Republic of Korea: Report to Congress,¡± U.S. Department
of Defense, January 2016, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/
Military_and_Security_Developments_Involving_the_Democratic_Peoples_
Republic_of_Korea_2015.PDF.
76. ¡°North Korea Deploys 300 New MLRS Along Front Line: Sources,¡± Yonhap News
Agency, April 24, 2016, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2016/04/24/43/03
01000000AEN20160424001100315F.html.
77. Agreement is growing in Washington that strategic patience has failed. For one recent
view, see Joel S. Wit, ¡°Trapped in No-Man¡¯s-Land: The Future of US Policy Toward
North Korea,¡± US-Korea Institute at SAIS, June 2016, http://38north.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/06/NKNF_Wit-2016-06.pdf.
78. Jim Walsh and John Park, ¡°To Stop the Missiles, Stop North Korea, Inc.,¡± New York
Times, March 10, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/10/opinion/to-stop-themissiles-
stop-north-korea-inc.html.
58 Endnotes
79. In one proposal for a sustainable U.S. defense posture in East Asia, Andrew
Krepinevich proposes cultivating anti-access/area-denial capabilities in allied states
along the first island chain. Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., ¡°How to Deter China: The Case
for Archipelagic Defense,¡± Foreign Affairs 94, no. 2, 2015. For an alternative view, see
Michael D. Swaine, ¡°The Real Challenge in the Pacific,¡± Foreign Affairs 94, no. 3, 2015.
80. Reuters, ¡°South Korea¡¯s Park Seeks 5-Party Talks on North¡¯s Nuclear Program,¡±
January 21, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-parkidUSKCN0V009D;
The U.S. Department of State¡¯s Special Representative
for North Korea Policy, Sung Kim, supported the idea in testimony to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. United States Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, ¡°The Persistent North Korea Denuclearization and Human
Rights Challenge,¡± October 20, 2015, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/
the-persistent-north-korea-denuclearization-and-human-rights-challenge_102015.
81. For an analysis of the humanitarian dimension of DPRK crisis scenarios, see Roberta
Cohen, ¡°Human Rights and Humanitarian Planning for Crisis in North Korea,¡±
International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall/Winter 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/~/
media/research/files/articles/2016/02/18-human-rights-north-korea-cohen/robertacohen--
nk--art-reunification.pdf.
82. See Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History for a critical look at the
cycle of provocation, see Jackson, Rival Reputations.
83. Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, September 18, 2005,
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm.
84. These conditions are broadly consistent with those listed in Sec. 402 of the North
Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, HR 757.
85. For an argument for prioritizing human rights in U.S. North Korea policy, see Dan Aum,
Greg Scarlatoiu, and Amanda Mortwedt Oh, ¡°Crimes Against Humanity in North
Korea: The Case for U.S. Leadership and Action,¡± Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice
and Human Rights, 2014, http://www.icasinc.org/2014/2014l/2014ldxa.pdf.
86. Spyros Blavoukos and Dimitris Bourantonis, ¡°The Presidency of the UNGA and
the Case of South Africa (1974),¡± in Chairing Multilateral Negotiations: The Case of
the United Nations (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp.45–2; United Nations General
Assembly, Resolution 3206, ¡°Credentials of representatives to the twenty-ninth session
of the General Assembly,¡± September 30, 1974, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/738/09/IMG/NR073809.pdf?OpenElement.
87. United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 3207, ¡°Relationship Between the United
Nations and South Africa,¡± September 30, 1974, http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/738/09/IMG/NR073809.pdf?OpenElement.
88. For a discussion of the legal basis for this step, see Dan Ciobanu, ¡°Credentials
of Delegations and Representation of Member States at the United Nations,¡±
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 25, no. 2, April 1976, pp. 351–1; Alden
Abbott, Filiberto Augusti, Peter Brown, and Elizabeth Rode, ¡°The General Assembly,
29th Session: The Decredentialization of South Africa,¡± Harvard International Law
Journal 16, no. 3, Summer 1975, pp. 576–8.
89. United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 69/188, ¡°Situation of Human Rights
in the Democratic People¡¯s Republic of Korea,¡± December 18, 2014, http://www.
un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/69/188; United Nations General
Assembly, A/C.3/70/L.35, ¡°Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People¡¯s
Republic of Korea,¡± October 30, 2015, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/
cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_c3_70_L35.pdf
Somini Sengupta, ¡°United Nations Security Council Examines North Korea¡¯s Human
Rights,¡± New York Times, December 22, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/23/
Endnotes 59
world/asia/united-nations-security-council-examines-north-koreas-humanrights.
html Michelle Nichols, ¡°China, Russia Fail to Stop U.N. Meeting on Rights
in North Korea,¡± Reuters, December 10, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-northkorea-rights-un-idUSKBN0TT2RU20151210.
90. Nick Cumming-Bruce, ¡°U.N. Seeks Ways to Try North Koreans for Human Rights
Abuses,¡± New York Times, March 23, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/24/
world/asia/un-seeks-ways-to-try-north-koreans-for-human-rights-abuses.
html?_r=0.
91. UN News Centre, ¡°New UN Office Opens in Seoul to Monitor Human Rights Issues in
DPR Korea,¡± June 23, 2015, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51223#.
VxZiaPkrK71.
92. Ha-young Choi, ¡°S. Korea Passes North Korean Human Rights Law,¡± NK News, March 3,
2016, http://www.nknews.org/2016/03/s-korea-passes-north-korean-human-rights-law/.
93. United Nations Human Rights Council, Resolution A/HRC/31/L.25, ¡°Situation of
Human Rights in the Democratic People¡¯s Republic of Korea,¡± March 21, 2016, http://
ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/31/L.25.
94. For more on this exemption, see Stephan Haggard, ¡°Once Again, Sanctions
Enforcement,¡± North Korea: Witness to Transformation (blog), Peterson Institute for
International Economics, July 5, 2016, http://piie.com/blogs/north-korea-witnesstransformation/
once-again-sanctions-enforcement.
95. Material assistance may consist of equipment needed for inspection or compensation
for services lost by severing illegal contracts with North Korean entities. Legal assistance
could place pro bono advisors in member countries to assist with the complex process
to bring domestic legal codes into compliance with international obligations, to ensure
that countries have the legal authority act when the time comes. Technical assistance may
include efforts to train and equip regional coast guards and port authorities.
96. Disciplining the behavior of member states is a primary function of all international
institutions. See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1984); Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal,
¡°The Rational Design of International Institutions,¡± International Organization 55, no.
4, 2001.
97. For more information on PSI, see Mary Beth Nikitin, ¡°Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI),¡± CRS Report to Congress RL34327, June 15, 2012, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
nuke/RL34327.pdf Emma Belcher, ¡°The Proliferation Security Initiative: Lessons for
Using Nonbinding Agreements,¡± International Institutions and Global Governance
working paper, Council on Foreign Relations, July 2011, http://www.cfr.org/
proliferation/proliferation-security-initiative/p25394.
98. U.S. Department of the Treasury, ¡°Treasury Sanctions North Korean Senior Officials
and Entities Associated with Human Rights Abuses,¡± July 6, 2016, http://www.
treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0506.aspx.
99. For example, in 2016, the European Union moved to impose additional sanctions
on Burundi for human rights reasons. Robin Emmott, ¡°EU Ready to Impose More
Sanctions on Burundi,¡± Reuters, February 15, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSKCN0VO0XC/.
100. For more on China¡¯s role in enforcing DPRK sanctions, see ¡°John S. Park, ¡°The Key to
the North Korean Targeted Sanctions Puzzle,¡± Washington Quarterly 37, no. 3, Fall 2014,
http://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Park_Fall2014.pdf.
101. Elias Groll, ¡°Bank Thefts Show North Korea¡¯s Hacking Prowess,¡± Foreign Policy,
May 27, 2016, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/27/bank-thefts-show-northkoreas-
hacking-might/ Nicole Perlroth and Michael Corkery, ¡°North Korea Linked to
Digital Attacks on Global Banks,¡± New York Times, May 26, 2016, http://www.nytimes.
60 Endnotes
com/2016/05/27/business/dealbook/north-korea-linked-to-digital-thefts-fromglobal-
banks.html.
102. U.S. Department of State, ¡°Trilateral Statement Japan, Republic of Korea, and the United
States,¡± December 6, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/12/152431.htm.
103. For a provocative explanation of why U.S. alliances in Asia lack this level of formalism
and permanence, see Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, ¡°Why Is There No
NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,¡±
International Organization 56, no. 3, 2002.
104. On the history and advantages of collective security declarations, see Charles A.
Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, ¡°The Promise of Collective Security,¡± International
Security 20, no. 1, 1995.
105. In June 2016, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg declared that a cyberattack
could trigger Article 5, which mandates a collective response to an attack on a NATO
member. Colin Clark, ¡°NATO Declares Cyber a Domain,¡± Breaking Defense, June
14, 2016, http://breakingdefense.com/2016/06/nato-declares-cyber-a-domain-natosecgen-
waves-off-trump/. See also Franklin D. Kramer, Robert J. Butler, and Catherine
Lotrionte, ¡°Cyber, Extended Deterrence, and NATO,¡± Atlantic Council, May 2016,
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Cyber_Extended_Deterrence_
and_NATO_web_0526.pdf. An overview of NATO¡¯s cyber policy is available at: North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, ¡°Cyber Defence,¡± June 23, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/topics_78170.htm.
106. For more on North Korea¡¯s cyber capabilities and responses, see Jun, LaFoy, and Sohn,
¡°North Korea¡¯s Cyber Operations.¡±
107. Reginald Brothers and Jae-Yoo Choi, ¡°Joint Statement of Intent Between the
Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate,
United States of America and the Ministry of Science, ICT, and Future Planning
(MSIP), Republic of Korea,¡± May 2, 2016, http://static.politico.com/e6/
a1/08b6339f465ea51e2f87f1ec3e2e/us-south-korea-joint-cyber-agreement.pdf.
108. Anna Fifield, ¡°In Drills, U.S., South Korea Practice Striking North¡¯s Nuclear Plants,
Leaders,¡± Washington Post, March 7, 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
in-drills-us-south-korea-practice-striking-norths-nuclear-plants/2016/03/06/
46e6019d-5f04-4277-9b41-e02fc1c2e801_story.html.
109. For an ROK appraisal of the Scud-Extended Range, see Jeong Yong-soo and Kang Jinkyu,
¡°North¡¯s Scud-ER can reach U.S. base in Japan,¡± JoongAng Daily, June 28, 2016,
http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3020543.
110. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1718, December 14, 2006, http://www.
un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1718%282006%29.
61
Task Force members are asked to join a consensus signifying that
they endorse ¡°the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the
group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation.¡±
They participate in the Task Force in their individual, not their institutional,
capacities.
Victor D. Cha is a senior advisor and inaugural holder of the Korea
chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), as
well as director of Asian studies and D.S. Song-KF chair at Georgetown
University¡¯s Department of Government and School of Foreign
Service. From 2004 to 2007, he served as director for Asian affairs at
the White House on the National Security Council (NSC). Cha was
also the deputy head of delegation for the United States at the Six Party
Talks in Beijing and received two Outstanding Service Commendations
during his tenure at the NSC. He is the award-winning author of
Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security
Triangle, winner of the 2000 Ohira Book Prize; Nuclear North Korea:
A Debate on Engagement Strategies, with Dave Kang; Beyond the Final
Score: The Politics of Sport in Asia The Impossible State: North Korea, Past
and Future, selected by Foreign Affairs as a 2012 Best Book on Asia and
the Pacific; and Powerplay: Origins of the American Alliance System in
Asia. Cha is a former John M. Olin national security fellow at Harvard
University, a two-time Fulbright Scholar, and a Hoover national fellow,
CISAC fellow, and William J. Perry fellow at Stanford University. He
holds Georgetown University¡¯s Dean¡¯s Teaching Award for 2010 and
the Distinguished Research Award for 2011. He serves as an independent
consultant and has testified before Congress on Asian security
issues. Cha holds a BA, an MIA, and a PhD from Columbia University,
as well as an MA from Oxford University.
Task Force Members
62 Task Force Members
Roberta Cohen is a specialist in human rights, humanitarian, and refugee
issues and a leading expert on internally displaced persons and on
human rights conditions in North Korea. For more than a decade, she
was a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and codirector of the
Brookings Project on Internal Displacement together with the representative
of the UN secretary-general on internally displaced persons.
Together, they won the Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World
Order. She is co-chair emeritus of the Committee for Human Rights in
North Korea, a distinguished group of foreign policy, human rights, and
Asia experts; the author of more than one hundred articles and op-eds
in the human rights field; a senior fellow at Georgetown University¡¯s
Institute for the Study of International Migration; and a member of the
committee on conscience of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum.
Earlier, she served as deputy assistant secretary of state for human
rights and senior advisor to U.S. delegations to the UN Commission
on Human Rights and General Assembly. She is a graduate of Barnard
College and Johns Hopkins University¡¯s School of Advanced International
Studies, and she received an honorary doctorate from the faculty
of law at the University of Bern in Switzerland.
Joseph R. DeTrani is the president of Daniel Morgan Academy. He previously
served as president of the Intelligence and National Security Alliance
and now serves on their board of advisors. DeTrani was a former
senior advisor to the director of national intelligence (DNI), director of
the National Counter Proliferation Center, and intelligence community
mission manager for North Korea. He also served at the U.S. Department
of State as the special envoy for Six Party Talks with North Korea,
and as the U.S. representative to the Korea Energy Development Organization.
DeTrani had a distinguished career with the Central Intelligence
Agency, serving as a member of the Senior Executive Service, director of
East Asia operations, director for European operations, director of the
office of technical services, director of public affairs, director of the crime
and narcotics center, and executive assistant to Director of Central Intelligence
William Casey. DeTrani served in the U.S. Air Force and is a graduate
of New York University. He received a certificate in Chinese from
the State Department Foreign Language School in Taiwan and attended
Harvard University¡¯s International Security Program for executives. He
has published numerous articles dealing with North Korea, China, Iran,
cyber espionage, and nonproliferation issues.
Task Force Members 63
Nicholas Eberstadt holds the Henry Wendt chair in political economy
at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC, and is
a senior advisor to the National Bureau of Asian Research in Seattle.
Eberstadt is an authority on issues of demography, development, and
international security, and has published hundreds of articles in popular
and scholarly journals on these topics over the course of the past
four decades, as well as over twenty books and monographs. He has
written extensively about North Korea; his studies include The Population
of North Korea (coauthor), The End of North Korea, The North
Korean Economy Between Crisis and Catastrophe, and The North Korean
Economy¡¯s ¡°Epic Economic Fail¡± in International Perspective. Eberstadt
is a founding member of the U.S. Committee for Human Rights
in North Korea. Previously, he has served as a member of the President¡¯s
Council on Bioethics, the board of scientific counselors for the
U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, and the World Economic
Forum¡¯s Global Agenda Councils. He consults and advises with a
range of offices within the U.S. government and has been invited to
offer expert testimony before Congress on a wide range of issues.
Eberstadt earned his AB, MPA, and a PhD at Harvard as well as an
MSc from the London School of Economics.
Robert J. Einhorn is a senior fellow with the Brookings Institution¡¯s
arms control and nonproliferation initiative. Before coming to Brookings
in May 2013, Einhorn served as the U.S. Department of State¡¯s
special advisor for nonproliferation and arms control, a position created
by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2009. Between 2001 and
2009, Einhorn was a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, where he directed the proliferation prevention
program. Before coming to CSIS, he was assistant secretary of state for
nonproliferation (1999–001), deputy assistant secretary of state for
political-military affairs (1992–9), and a member of the State Department
Policy Planning Staff (1986–2). Between 1972 and 1986, he held
various positions at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA), including as ACDA¡¯s representative to the strategic arms
reduction talks with the Soviet Union. Einhorn holds a BA in government
from Cornell University and a MA in public affairs and international
relations from Princeton University¡¯s Woodrow Wilson School
of Public and International Affairs.
64 Task Force Members
Bonnie S. Glaser is a senior advisor for Asia and the director of the
China power project at CSIS, where she works on issues related to Chinese
foreign policy and U.S. security interests in Asia. She is concomitantly
a nonresident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, Australia,
a senior associate with CSIS Pacific Forum, and a consultant for the U.S.
government on East Asia. From 2008 to mid-2015, Glaser was a senior
advisor with the CSIS¡¯s Freeman chair in China studies, and from 2003
to 2008, she was a senior associate in the CSIS international security
program. Prior to joining CSIS, she served as a consultant for various
U.S. government offices, including the U.S. Departments of Defense
and State. Glaser is a regular contributor to the Pacific Forum quarterly
web journal Comparative Connections. She is currently a board member
of the U.S. committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the
Asia Pacific, and a member of both the Council on Foreign Relations and
the Institute of International Strategic Studies. She served as a member
of the U.S. Department of Defense¡¯s Defense Policy Board China panel
in 1997. Glaser received her BA in political science from Boston University
and her MA with concentrations in international economics and
Chinese studies from Johns Hopkins University¡¯s School of Advanced
International Studies.
Mary Beth Long is a nonresident senior fellow at the Foundation for
Defense of Democracies and was a senior subject matter expert to
the supreme allied commander of NATO from 2013 to 2015. She is the
founder and chief executive officer of Metis Solutions, recognized in
2014 by Inc. Magazine¡¯s 5,000 list as the 201st fastest-growing private
company and the twelfth top government service company. She also
consults for several Fortune 50 companies. Long was the first woman to
be confirmed by the U.S. Senate as assistant secretary of defense in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (2007–009), specifically as assistant
secretary for international security affairs. Long chaired NATO¡¯s highlevel
group responsible for nuclear policy (2007–009). She is a regular
contributor to CNN, Bloomberg, Fox News, BBC, and NPR on foreign
policy issues and the intelligence community. She is a licensed lawyer,
and from 1999 until 2004 was an associate specializing in civil litigation
matters at Williams & Connolly LLP. Long earned her JD from Washington
and Lee University School of Law.
Task Force Members 65
Catherine B. Lotrionte is the director and founder of the Cyber Project
in Georgetown University¡¯s School of Foreign Service, where she
teaches and writes on international and national security law, international
affairs, and technology. In 2002, she was appointed by General
Brent Scowcroft as counsel to the president¡¯s foreign intelligence
advisory board at the White House, a position she held until 2006. In
2002, she served as a legal counsel for the joint inquiry committee of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, investigating the 9/11 terrorist
attacks. Prior to that, Lotrionte was assistant general counsel in the
Office of General Counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency and also
served in the U.S. Department of Justice. She is an internationally recognized
expert on international law and cyber conflict. Lotrionte holds
an MA and a PhD from Georgetown University and a JD from New
York University, and is the author of numerous publications, including
two forthcoming books, Cyber Policy: An Instrument of International
Relations, Intelligence and National Power and U.S. National Security Law
in the Post–old War Era. She is a frequent speaker at cyber conferences
worldwide and has founded and hosted the annual International Conference
on Cyber Engagement at Georgetown University since 2011.
Lotrionte currently serves on the World Economic Forum¡¯s Global
Agenda Council on Cybersecurity and the CSIS cyber task force, and
she is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Evan S. Medeiros leads Eurasia Group¡¯s research on Asia. Most
recently, he served as special assistant to the president and senior director
for Asian affairs on the National Security Council, where he served
as President Obama¡¯s top advisor on the Asia Pacific and coordinated
U.S. policy in the region across the areas of diplomacy, defense policy,
economic policy, and intelligence affairs. In 2009, he joined the NSC
staff as director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolian affairs, and was
actively involved in U.S.-China relations throughout his nearly six-year
NSC tenure. From 2002 to 2009, Medeiros served as a senior political
scientist at the RAND Corporation, specializing in research on the
international politics of East Asia, China¡¯s foreign and national security
policies, U.S.-China relations, and Chinese defense and security
issues. From 2007 to 2008, he was policy advisor to the special envoy
for China and the U.S.-China strategic economic dialogue at the Treasury
Department, serving Secretary Henry Paulson. Prior to joining
66 Task Force Members
RAND, Medeiros was a senior research associate at the Monterey Institute
of International Studies, a visiting fellow at the Institute of American
Studies at the China Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, and
an adjunct lecturer at China¡¯s Foreign Affairs College. He holds a PhD
from the London School of Economics and Political Science, an MPhil
from the University of Cambridge (where he was a Fulbright Scholar),
an MA from the University of London¡¯s School of Oriental and African
Studies, and a BA from Bates College in Maine. He travels to Asia frequently
and speaks, reads, and writes Mandarin Chinese.
Adam Mount is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress.
Previously, he was a Stanton nuclear security fellow at the Council
on Foreign Relations and prior to that worked on nuclear elimination
contingencies at the RAND Corporation. Mount¡¯s writing has been
published by Foreign Affairs, Survival, the Nonproliferation Review,
Democracy, and other outlets. He is the coauthor with Lawrence J.
Korb of the Center for American Progress report ¡°Setting Priorities
for Nuclear Modernization,¡± the author of the Deep Cuts Commission
working paper ¡°Anticipatory Arms Control,¡± and a columnist at the
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, where he writes on nuclear strategy and
force structure. He has spoken widely on strategic issues, including in
testimony before the House Armed Services subcommittee on strategic
forces. He holds a PhD in government from Georgetown University.
Mike Mullen is a retired U.S. Navy admiral who served as the seventeenth
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mullen, who spent four
years as chairman—he top military advisor to Presidents George W.
Bush and Barack Obama—rought bold and original thinking to the
work of strengthening the U.S. military and advocating for those who
serve. Mullen oversaw the end of the combat mission in Iraq and the
development of a new military strategy for Afghanistan, while promoting
international partnerships, new technologies, and new counterterrorism
tactics culminating in the killing of Osama bin Laden. A 1968
graduate from the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Mullen sought
high-risk positions to develop his leadership skills. He served as chief
of naval operations prior to assuming duties as chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Now retired from the U.S. Navy, Mullen serves on the
boards of General Motors, Sprint, and the Bloomberg Family Foundation,
and teaches at Princeton University¡¯s Woodrow Wilson School.
Task Force Members 67
He is known for his honesty and candor, and for his efforts on behalf of
service members, veterans, and their families.
Sam Nunn is co-chairman and chief executive officer of the Nuclear
Threat Initiative (NTI). He served as a U.S. senator from Georgia for
twenty-four years (1972–6). In addition to his work with NTI, Nunn
has continued his service in the public policy arena as a distinguished
professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia
Tech and as chairman of the board of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies in Washington, DC. Nunn attended Georgia
Tech, Emory University, and Emory Law School, where he graduated
with honors in 1962. After active duty service in the U.S. Coast Guard,
he served six years in the U.S. Coast Guard Reserve. He first entered
politics as a member of the Georgia House of Representatives in 1968.
During his tenure in the U.S. Senate, Nunn served as chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Committee and the permanent subcommittee
on investigations. He also served on the intelligence and small business
committees. His legislative achievements include the landmark Department
of Defense Reorganization Act, drafted with the late Senator
Barry Goldwater, and the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
program, which provided assistance for more than twenty years
to Russia and the former Soviet republics for securing and destroying
their excess nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
Gary Samore is the executive director for research at the Belfer Center
for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School.
In December 2015, he was appointed as a member of the Secretary of
Energy advisory board under Secretary Ernest Moniz. He is also a nonresident
senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and member of the
advisory board for United Against Nuclear Iran, a nonprofit organization
that seeks to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. He
served for four years as President Obama¡¯s White House coordinator
for arms control and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including
as U.S. sherpa for the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington,
DC, and the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, South Korea. As
WMD coordinator, he served as the principal advisor to the president
on all matters relating to arms control and the prevention of WMD proliferation
and terrorism, and coordinated U.S. government activities,
initiatives, and programs to promote international arms control efforts.
68 Task Force Members
Samore was a National Science Foundation fellow at Harvard University,
where he received his MA and PhD in government in 1984. While
at Harvard, he was a predoctoral fellow at what was then the Harvard
Center for Science and International Affairs, later to become the Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs.
Walter L. Sharp graduated from West Point in 1974 and was commissioned
an armor officer. He has earned a master of science degree in
operations research and system analysis from Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute. Sharp commanded the United Nations Command, Republic
of Korea –United States Combined Forces Command, and United
States Forces Korea from June 3, 2008, to July 14, 2011. Earlier in his
career, Sharp¡¯s command positions included: squadron commander,
1st Squadron, 7th U.S. Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood Texas;
regimental commander, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk,
Louisiana; assistant division commander for maneuver 2nd Infantry
Division, Camp Red Cloud, South Korea; and division commander,
3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia. He commanded troops
in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Operation Uphold Democracy in
Haiti, and SFOR¡¯s Multinational Division (North) in Bosnia. Sharp had
four assignments at the Pentagon on the Joint Staff. He was the deputy
director, J5 for Western Hemisphere/global transnational issues; vice
director, J8 for force structure, resources, and assessment; director for
strategic plans and policy, J5; and director of the Joint Staff. He is consulting
for several U.S. and Korean companies; serves on the board of
directors for NEXEO Solutions, ARTIS, and the Korea Society; and
is involved in strategy and policy discussions at several DC-area think
tanks concerning strategy and policy for Northeast Asia and especially
Korea.
Mitchel B. Wallerstein was appointed as president of Baruch College
of the City University of New York in August 2010. Baruch College
is home to the nation¡¯s largest collegiate business school, the Zicklin
School of Business, as well as prominent schools of arts and sciences
and public affairs. From 2003 to 2010, he served as the dean of Syracuse
University¡¯s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, which
is the nation¡¯s number-one ranked graduate school of public and international
affairs. Prior to leading the Maxwell School, Wallerstein was
vice president of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
Task Force Members 69
from 1998 to 2003, where he directed the foundation¡¯s international
programs. Before that, he served from 1993 to 1998 as deputy assistant
secretary of defense for counterproliferation policy and senior defense
representative for trade security policy. During his five-year tenure, he
dealt with nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons proliferation, as
well as national security export controls; he also helped to found and
subsequently co-chaired the senior defense group on proliferation at
NATO. In January 1997, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry awarded
Wallerstein the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public
Service, and he subsequently received the Bronze Palm to that award in
April 1998. Wallerstein is a long-time member of the Council on Foreign
Relations. In 2006, he was elected a fellow of the National Academy
of Public Administration, and in 2015, he was similarly elected a
fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
Robert F. Willard is president and chief executive officer of the Institute
of Nuclear Power Operations. In May 2012, Willard completed a
distinguished U.S. Navy career as the commander, U.S. Pacific Command,
Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii. Willard is a Los Angeles native and
a 1973 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. He has a master¡¯s degree
in engineering management from Old Dominion University and is
an Massachusetts Institute of Technology Seminar XXI alumnus. An
F-14 aviator, Willard served in a variety of West Coast fighter squadrons:
VF-24, VF 124, VF-2, and VF-51 aboard the aircraft carriers USS
Constellation, USS Ranger, USS Kitty Hawk and USS Carl Vinson. He
was operations officer and executive officer of Navy Fighter Weapons
School (TOPGUN). He later commanded the ¡°Screaming Eagles¡± of
Fighter Squadron 51. Following nuclear-power training, Willard served
as executive officer of USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70), commanded the
amphibious flagship USS Tripoli (LPH 10) in the Persian Gulf during
¡°Operation Vigilant Warrior,¡± for which Tripoli received a Navy Unit
Commendation, and commanded the aircraft carrier USS Abraham
Lincoln (CVN 72). As a flag officer, Willard twice served on the Joint
Staff, was deputy and chief of staff for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, commanded
Carrier Group Five aboard USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63), and commanded
the U.S. Seventh Fleet. Willard became the thirty-fourth vice
chief of naval operations in March 2005, assumed command of the U.S.
Pacific Fleet in May 2007, and became the commander of U.S. Pacific
Command in October 2009. His decorations include the Defense
70 Task Force Members
Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of
Merit, and various other awards.
Juan Carlos Zarate is the chairman and cofounder of the Financial
Integrity Network, the chairman and senior counselor for the Foundation
for Defense of Democracies¡¯ Center on Sanctions and Illicit
Finance, a visiting lecturer of law at the Harvard Law School, and the
senior national security analyst for CBS News. He served as the deputy
assistant to the U.S. president and deputy national security advisor
for combating terrorism from 2005 to 2009, and was responsible for
developing and implementing the U.S. government¡¯s counterterrorism
strategy and policies related to transnational security threats. Zarate
was the first assistant secretary of the Treasury for terrorist financing
and financial crimes; he led domestic and international efforts to attack
terrorist financing as well as the innovative use of the U.S. Treasury¡¯s
national security-related powers. Zarate sits on several boards, including
HSBC¡¯s financial system vulnerabilities committee, the Vatican¡¯s
Financial Information Authority, and the board of advisors to the director
of the National Counterterrorism Center. He is the author of Treasury¡¯s
War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare, Forging
Democracy, and a variety of articles.
71
Task Force Observers
Observers participate in Task Force discussions, but are not asked to
join the consensus. They participate in their individual, not institutional,
capacities.
Nate Adler is a professional staff member on the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence. He was formerly the defense and foreign policy
advisor to Senator John D. Rockefeller IV and a Rosenthal fellow on
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where he focused on U.S.
foreign policy in East Asia. Adler received an MPA in international
relations at Princeton University and an AM in East Asian studies at
Harvard University. A San Francisco native, Adler is a term member at
the Council on Foreign Relations and was a Fulbright Scholar to South
Korea in 2005.
Patrick Costello is the director of Washington External Affairs at the
Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. In this capacity, he
leads the Congress and U.S. Foreign Policy Program, CFR¡¯s diplomatic
program and executive branch initiative, and regularly works with the
policymaking community and the foreign diplomatic corps on a wide
range of foreign policy and economic issues. Costello worked in Congress
as an aide to former Representative Jon Porter, serving as the primary
foreign policy and economic policy advisor. After leaving Capitol
Hill, Costello was a government relations counselor with International
Business-Government Counsellors where he directed congressional
relations, and provided strategic advice, analysis, and direct representation.
Prior to joining CFR¡¯s Washington office, he was a senior associate
at the Whitaker Group, a consultancy and project development firm
specializing in Africa. Originally from Boston, Massachusetts, Costello
earned a bachelor¡¯s degree from the University of Massachusetts. He
also earned a postgraduate certificate from Exeter College, University
72 Task Force Observers
of Oxford, and a master¡¯s degree from King¡¯s College London. Costello
has also done graduate study at the National Defense University. He
was a 2011 Future Leader with the Foreign Policy Initiative, named an
Atlantik-Brucke Young Leader in 2014, and is currently a term member
of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Anya Schmemann (observer, ex officio) is Washington director of
Global Communications and Media Relations and director of the Independent
Task Force Program at the Council on Foreign Relations in
Washington, DC. She recently returned to CFR after serving as assistant
dean of communications and outreach at American University¡¯s School
of International Service. Previously, Schmemann managed communications
at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the
Harvard Kennedy School and administered the Caspian studies program
there. She coordinated a research project on Russian security issues at
the EastWest Institute in New York and was assistant director of CFR¡¯s
Center for Preventive Action in New York, focusing on the Balkans and
Central Asia. She received a BA in government and an MA in Russian,
East European, and Central Asian Studies, both from Harvard University.
She was a Truman national security fellow and a nonresident senior
fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and was a term member
and is now a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Sydney Seiler is the senior advisor on North Korea to the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence. Prior to this position he served as
the State Department special envoy for the Six Party Talks, where he
coordinated U.S. efforts on denuclearization of North Korea through
the Six Party Talks framework and led day-to-day negotiations with Six
Party partners. Seiler served as the director for Korea on the National
Security Council staff from April 2011 to August 2014. In that position,
Seiler advised the president and senior White House officials on
South and North Korea issues, and planned, directed, and coordinated
policy on Korea. A member of the senior national intelligence service
who has worked on Korean Peninsula issues for thirty-four years, Seiler
served previously as the acting and deputy DNI national intelligence
manager for North Korea, and had a variety of assignments across the
intelligence community to include the Central Intelligence Agency and
the National Security Agency. He participated in numerous rounds
of Six Party Talks and bilateral U.S.-DPRK talks, and has served over
Task Force Observers 73
twelve years in the Republic of Korea. Seiler received his MA degree
in Korean studies from Yonsei University¡¯s Graduate School of International
Studies and is a graduate of the Korean language programs of
the Defense Language Institute and Yonsei University. He is the author
of the book Kim Il-Song 1941–948: The Creation of a Legend, the Building
of a Regime, and is a recipient of the National Intelligence Superior
Service Medal.
Sheila A. Smith, an expert on Japanese politics and foreign policy, is
senior fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. She
is the author of Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising
China and Japan¡¯s New Politics and the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Her current
research focuses on how geostrategic change in Asia is shaping Japan¡¯s
strategic choices. She joined CFR from the East-West Center in 2007
and was a visiting scholar at Keio University in 2007–008, where she
researched Japan¡¯s foreign policy toward China, supported by the Abe
fellowship. Smith has been a visiting researcher at leading Japanese foreign
and security policy think tanks and universities, including the Japan
Institute of International Affairs, the Research Institute for Peace and
Security, the University of Tokyo, and the University of the Ryukyus.
Smith is vice chair of the U.S. advisors to the U.S.-Japan Conference on
Cultural and Educational Interchange and serves on the advisory committee
for the U.S.-Japan Network for the Future program run by the
Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation. She teaches as an adjunct
professor at Georgetown University and serves on the board of its
Journal of Asian Affairs. She earned her MA and PhD degrees from the
department of political science at Columbia University.
Scott Snyder is senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program
on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, where
he had served as an adjunct fellow from 2008 to 2011. Snyder¡¯s latest
books include the coauthored volume The Japan-South Korea Identity
Clash: East Asian Security and the United States and Middle-Power Korea:
Contributions to the Global Agenda. Snyder is also the coeditor of North
Korea in Transition: Politics, Economy, and Society and the editor of Global
Korea: South Korea¡¯s Contributions to International Security. He served
as the project director for CFR¡¯s Independent Task Force No. 64 on
policy toward the Korean Peninsula. He currently writes for the CFR
blog Asia Unbound. Prior to joining CFR, Snyder was a senior associate
74 Task Force Observers
in the international relations program of the Asia Foundation, where he
founded and directed the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy and served as the
Asia Foundation¡¯s representative in Korea (2000–004). He was also a
senior associate at Pacific Forum CSIS. Snyder has worked as an Asia
specialist in the research and studies program of the U.S. Institute of
Peace and as acting director of Asia Society¡¯s contemporary affairs program.
He was a Pantech visiting fellow at Stanford University¡¯s Shorenstein
Asia-Pacific Research Center (2005–006), and received an Abe
fellowship, administered by the Social Sciences Research Council, from
1998 to 1999. Snyder received a BA from Rice University and an MA
from the regional studies East Asia program at Harvard University, and
was a Thomas G. Watson fellow at Yonsei University in South Korea.
75
Working With a Rising India: A Joint Venture for the New Century
Charles R. Kaye and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Chairs; Alyssa Ayres, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 73 (2015)
The Emerging Global Health Crisis: Noncommunicable Diseases in Low- and Middle-Income
Countries
Mitchell E. Daniels Jr. and Thomas E. Donilon, Chairs; Thomas J. Bollyky, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 72 (2014)
North America: Time for a New Focus
David H. Petraeus and Robert B. Zoellick, Chairs; Shannon K. O¡¯Neil, Project Director
Independent Task Force No. 71 (2014)
Defending an Open, Global, Secure, and Resilient Internet
John D. Negroponte and Samuel J. Palmisano, Chairs; Adam Segal, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 70 (2013)
U.S.-Turkey Relations: A New Partnership
Madeleine K. Albright and Stephen J. Hadley, Chairs; Steven A. Cook, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 69 (2012)
U.S. Education Reform and National Security
Joel I. Klein and Condoleezza Rice, Chairs; Julia Levy, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 68 (2012)
U.S. Trade and Investment Policy
Andrew H. Card and Thomas A. Daschle, Chairs; Edward Alden and Matthew J. Slaughter,
Project Directors
Independent Task Force Report No. 67 (2011)
Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations
Samuel W. Bodman and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairs; Julia E. Sweig, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 66 (2011)
U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan
Richard L. Armitage and Samuel R. Berger, Chairs; Daniel S. Markey, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 65 (2010)
U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula
Charles L. Pritchard and John H. Tilelli Jr., Chairs; Scott A. Snyder, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 64 (2010)
Independent Task Force Reports
Published by the Council on Foreign Relations
76 Independent Task Force Reports
U.S. Immigration Policy
Jeb Bush and Thomas F. McLarty III, Chairs; Edward Alden, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 63 (2009)
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy
William J. Perry and Brent Scowcroft, Chairs; Charles D. Ferguson, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 62 (2009)
Confronting Climate Change: A Strategy for U.S. Foreign Policy
George E. Pataki and Thomas J. Vilsack, Chairs; Michael A. Levi, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 61 (2008)
U.S.-Latin America Relations: A New Direction for a New Reality
Charlene Barshefsky and James T. Hill, Chairs; Shannon O¡¯Neil, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 60 (2008)
U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Course
Carla A. Hills and Dennis C. Blair, Chairs; Frank Sampson Jannuzi, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 59 (2007)
National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil Dependency
John Deutch and James R. Schlesinger, Chairs; David G. Victor, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 58 (2006)
Russia¡¯s Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do
John Edwards and Jack Kemp, Chairs; Stephen Sestanovich, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 57 (2006)
More than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach Toward Africa
Anthony Lake and Christine Todd Whitman, Chairs; Princeton N. Lyman and J. Stephen
Morrison, Project Directors
Independent Task Force Report No. 56 (2006)
In the Wake of War: Improving Post-Conflict Capabilities
Samuel R. Berger and Brent Scowcroft, Chairs; William L. Nash, Project Director; Mona K.
Sutphen, Deputy Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 55 (2005)
In Support of Arab Democracy: Why and How
Madeleine K. Albright and Vin Weber, Chairs; Steven A. Cook, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 54 (2005)
Building a North American Community
John P. Manley, Pedro Aspe, and William F. Weld, Chairs; Thomas d¡¯Aquino, Andres
Rozental, and Robert Pastor, Vice Chairs; Chappell H. Lawson, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 53 (2005)
Iran: Time for a New Approach
Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert M. Gates, Chairs; Suzanne Maloney, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 52 (2004)
Independent Task Force Reports 77
An Update on the Global Campaign Against Terrorist Financing
Maurice R. Greenberg, Chair; William F. Wechsler and Lee S. Wolosky, Project Directors
Independent Task Force Report No. 40B (Web-only release, 2004)
Renewing the Atlantic Partnership
Henry A. Kissinger and Lawrence H. Summers, Chairs; Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 51 (2004)
Iraq: One Year After
Thomas R. Pickering and James R. Schlesinger, Chairs; Eric P. Schwartz, Project Consultant
Independent Task Force Report No. 43C (Web-only release, 2004)
Nonlethal Weapons and Capabilities
Paul X. Kelley and Graham Allison, Chairs; Richard L. Garwin, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 50 (2004)
New Priorities in South Asia: U.S. Policy Toward India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan
(Chairmen¡¯s Report)
Marshall Bouton, Nicholas Platt, and Frank G. Wisner, Chairs; Dennis Kux and Mahnaz
Ispahani, Project Directors
Independent Task Force Report No. 49 (2003)
Cosponsored with the Asia Society
Finding America¡¯s Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy
Peter G. Peterson, Chair; Kathy Bloomgarden, Henry Grunwald, David E. Morey, and
Shibley Telhami, Working Committee Chairs; Jennifer Sieg, Project Director; Sharon
Herbstman, Project Coordinator
Independent Task Force Report No. 48 (2003)
Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared
Warren B. Rudman, Chair; Richard A. Clarke, Senior Adviser; Jamie F. Metzl,
Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 47 (2003)
Iraq: The Day After (Chairs¡¯ Update)
Thomas R. Pickering and James R. Schlesinger, Chairs; Eric P. Schwartz, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 43B (Web-only release, 2003)
Burma: Time for Change
Mathea Falco, Chair
Independent Task Force Report No. 46 (2003)
Afghanistan: Are We Losing the Peace?
Marshall Bouton, Nicholas Platt, and Frank G. Wisner, Chairs; Dennis Kux and Mahnaz
Ispahani, Project Directors
Chairman¡¯s Report of an Independent Task Force (2003)
Cosponsored with the Asia Society
Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge
Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, Chairs; Eric Heginbotham, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 45 (2003)
78 Independent Task Force Reports
Chinese Military Power
Harold Brown, Chair; Joseph W. Prueher, Vice Chair; Adam Segal, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 44 (2003)
Iraq: The Day After
Thomas R. Pickering and James R. Schlesinger, Chairs; Eric P. Schwartz, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 43 (2003)
Threats to Democracy: Prevention and Response
Madeleine K. Albright and Bronislaw Geremek, Chairs; Morton H. Halperin, Director;
Elizabeth Frawley Bagley, Associate Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 42 (2002)
America—till Unprepared, Still in Danger
Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, Chairs; Stephen E. Flynn, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 41 (2002)
Terrorist Financing
Maurice R. Greenberg, Chair; William F. Wechsler and Lee S. Wolosky, Project Directors
Independent Task Force Report No. 40 (2002)
Enhancing U.S. Leadership at the United Nations
David Dreier and Lee H. Hamilton, Chairs; Lee Feinstein and Adrian Karatnycky, Project
Directors
Independent Task Force Report No. 39 (2002)
Cosponsored with Freedom House
Improving the U.S. Public Diplomacy Campaign in the War Against Terrorism
Carla A. Hills and Richard C. Holbrooke, Chairs; Charles G. Boyd, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 38 (Web-only release, 2001)
Building Support for More Open Trade
Kenneth M. Duberstein and Robert E. Rubin, Chairs; Timothy F. Geithner, Project Director;
Daniel R. Lucich, Deputy Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 37 (2001)
Beginning the Journey: China, the United States, and the WTO
Robert D. Hormats, Chair; Elizabeth Economy and Kevin Nealer, Project Directors
Independent Task Force Report No. 36 (2001)
Strategic Energy Policy Update
Edward L. Morse, Chair; Amy Myers Jaffe, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 33B (2001)
Cosponsored with the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University
Testing North Korea: The Next Stage in U.S. and ROK Policy
Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, Chairs; Robert A. Manning, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 35 (2001)
The United States and Southeast Asia: A Policy Agenda for the New Administration
J. Robert Kerrey, Chair; Robert A. Manning, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 34 (2001)
Independent Task Force Reports 79
Strategic Energy Policy: Challenges for the 21st Century
Edward L. Morse, Chair; Amy Myers Jaffe, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 33 (2001)
Cosponsored with the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University
A Letter to the President and a Memorandum on U.S. Policy Toward Brazil
Stephen Robert, Chair; Kenneth Maxwell, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 32 (2001)
State Department Reform
Frank C. Carlucci, Chair; Ian J. Brzezinski, Project Coordinator
Independent Task Force Report No. 31 (2001)
Cosponsored with the Center for Strategic and International Studies
U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 21st Century: A Follow-on Report
Bernard W. Aronson and William D. Rogers, Chairs; Julia Sweig and Walter Mead, Project
Directors
Independent Task Force Report No. 30 (2000)
Toward Greater Peace and Security in Colombia: Forging a Constructive U.S. Policy
Bob Graham and Brent Scowcroft, Chairs; Michael Shifter, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 29 (2000)
Cosponsored with the Inter-American Dialogue
Future Directions for U.S. Economic Policy Toward Japan
Laura D¡¯Andrea Tyson, Chair; M. Diana Helweg Newton, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 28 (2000)
First Steps Toward a Constructive U.S. Policy in Colombia
Bob Graham and Brent Scowcroft, Chairs; Michael Shifter, Project Director
Interim Report (2000)
Cosponsored with the Inter-American Dialogue
Promoting Sustainable Economies in the Balkans
Steven Rattner, Chair; Michael B.G. Froman, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 27 (2000)
Non-Lethal Technologies: Progress and Prospects
Richard L. Garwin, Chair; W. Montague Winfield, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 26 (1999)
Safeguarding Prosperity in a Global Financial System:
The Future International Financial Architecture
Carla A. Hills and Peter G. Peterson, Chairs; Morris Goldstein, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 25 (1999)
Cosponsored with the International Institute for Economics
U.S. Policy Toward North Korea: Next Steps
Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, Chairs; Michael J. Green, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 24 (1999)
80 Independent Task Force Reports
Reconstructing the Balkans
Morton I. Abramowitz and Albert Fishlow, Chairs; Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 23 (Web-only release, 1999)
Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions
Michel Rocard, Chair; Henry Siegman, Project Director; Yezid Sayigh and Khalil Shikaki,
Principal Authors
Independent Task Force Report No. 22 (1999)
U.S. Policy Toward Northeastern Europe
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Chair; F. Stephen Larrabee, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 21 (1999)
The Future of Transatlantic Relations
Robert D. Blackwill, Chair and Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 20 (1999)
U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 21st Century
Bernard W. Aronson and William D. Rogers, Chairs; Walter Russell Mead, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 19 (1999)
After the Tests: U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan
Richard N. Haass and Morton H. Halperin, Chairs
Independent Task Force Report No. 18 (1998)
Cosponsored with the Brookings Institution
Managing Change on the Korean Peninsula
Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, Chairs; Michael J. Green, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 17 (1998)
Promoting U.S. Economic Relations with Africa
Peggy Dulany and Frank Savage, Chairs; Salih Booker, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 16 (1998)
U.S. Middle East Policy and the Peace Process
Henry Siegman, Project Coordinator
Independent Task Force Report No. 15 (1997)
Differentiated Containment: U.S. Policy Toward Iran and Iraq
Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, Chairs; Richard W. Murphy, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 14 (1997)
Russia, Its Neighbors, and an Enlarging NATO
Richard G. Lugar, Chair; Victoria Nuland, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 13 (1997)
Rethinking International Drug Control: New Directions for U.S. Policy
Mathea Falco, Chair
Independent Task Force Report No. 12 (1997)
Independent Task Force Reports 81
Financing America¡¯s Leadership: Protecting American Interests and Promoting American Values
Mickey Edwards and Stephen J. Solarz, Chairs; Morton H. Halperin, Lawrence J. Korb,
and Richard M. Moose, Project Directors
Independent Task Force Report No. 11 (1997)
Cosponsored with the Brookings Institution
A New U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan
Richard N. Haass, Chair; Gideon Rose, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 10 (1997)
Arms Control and the U.S.-Russian Relationship
Robert D. Blackwill, Chair and Author; Keith W. Dayton, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 9 (1996)
Cosponsored with the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom
American National Interest and the United Nations
George Soros, Chair
Independent Task Force Report No. 8 (1996)
Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence
Maurice R. Greenberg, Chair; Richard N. Haass, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 7 (1996)
Lessons of the Mexican Peso Crisis
John C. Whitehead, Chair; Marie-Josee Kravis, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 6 (1996)
Managing the Taiwan Issue: Key Is Better U.S. Relations with China
Stephen Friedman, Chair; Elizabeth Economy, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 5 (1995)
Non-Lethal Technologies: Military Options and Implications
Malcolm H. Wiener, Chair
Independent Task Force Report No. 4 (1995)
Should NATO Expand?
Harold Brown, Chair; Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 3 (1995)
Success or Sellout? The U.S.-North Korean Nuclear Accord
Kyung Won Kim and Nicholas Platt, Chairs; Richard N. Haass, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 2 (1995)
Cosponsored with the Seoul Forum for International Affairs
Nuclear Proliferation: Confronting the New Challenges
Stephen J. Hadley, Chair; Mitchell B. Reiss, Project Director
Independent Task Force Report No. 1 (1995)
Note: Task Force reports are available for download from CFR¡¯s website, www.cfr.org.
For more information, email publications@cfr.org.